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NOTES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATIVE LIVING

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(To Ella Sharpe, who wanted this paper to be written)

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(I) INTRODUCTION

This paper is the last of three which, taken together, might be entitled ' Some Implications of Psycho-Analysis : a Personal Estimate '. It is described as ' Notes ' because, like its predecessors (Brierley, 1944, 1945), this paper is also highly schematic. The intention of the series is not to compile a treatise reviewing the whole literature of the subjects discussed. The aim is rather to present in broad and tentative outline the general conception of human nature and the attitude towards life with its consequences for behaviour which appear to the writer to be inherent in psycho-analysis.

The term ' integration ' may easily become something of a catchword, but it conveys perhaps better than any other term the sense of wholeness resulting from the organization of dynamic components, a living unity engendered by the harmonious patterning of variety. Integration, in its application to personality, is a strictly relative term. Individuals react at any given moment as functional wholes, but these functional wholes are more or less temporary and vary, according to psycho-social circumstances, within limits imposed by the total personality. Applied to the living but more permanent total pattern of mental organization, the term integration conveys the meaning of a stable and unified personality, a microcosm of harmoniously interrelated systems, as contrasted with a schizoid micro-chaos of mutually discordant sub-organizations.

Integration is a term that is useful both in metapsychology and in personology and one for which there appears to be no adequate synonym. It is indispensable in metapsychology and its use in personology is confirmed by habit. The term ' personal integrity ' is too closely associated with conventional morality to be a satisfactory one, but it will sometimes be used in this paper as a personological synonym for integration of the total personality.

It may be noted here that an American psychoanalyst, Joseph J. Michaels, has arrived independently at similar conclusions about the concept of integration in psycho-analysis. These are summarized in the following quotation (1945, 54) : ' In the theory of psycho-analysis, the conception of integration probably finds its most complex expression and elaboration. Although this conception is not expressly stated, it is implicit and inherent in the system as a whole and in its component parts. It seems as if Freud took for granted the conception of integration and built upon it extensively and even though one does not find a specific description of it as such, nevertheless one can observe its implications permeating all the branches of psycho-analytical knowledge.'

The development of personality-pattern is brought about through synthesis and dissociation. It is moulded by the varied sequence of experience, that is, by all the relationships effected, whatever their nature. It is, therefore, highly improbable that even the best integrated personality should be free from dissociated components or lack tendencies to disintegration. Primary instincts cannot be eradicated and the effects of experience cannot be nullified, though they may be modified. Hence, integrative living is a continual resolution of conflict and integration is a constant, creative transcendence of disintegrative trends. Therapeutic success and failure both point to the difficulty of such transcendence but indicate the possibility that human beings might achieve more satisfactory degrees of personal integrity than are common to-day if they could overcome their profound dread of understanding and accepting themselves and develop a more enlightened psychological reality-sense.

The pressure of world affairs is compelling attention to the practical importance of psychology and sociology. Personal and social conditions are interdependent and understanding of the psycho-social factors which favour the development and maintenance of personal integrity may help towards the establishment of the principles of social organization which would be conducive to world integration. Whereas philosophy and theology have sought to provide logical explanations of man and the universe, it has, until recently, been the province of religion and ethics to supply ' values ' and to direct the conduct of life. In their strictly personal aspect, religions offer plans or methods of integration and ethics purport to supply the rules of integrative living. It is, therefore, desirable to consider to what extent the implications of psycho-analysis accord with the recommendations of religion and ethics and how far they diverge from

them. It is naturally impossible here to consider all the major religions of the world or all the numerous ethical systems and philosophies. All that can be attempted is a brief consideration of some aspects of Christianity and the Christian ethic, since they have been most influential in the development of that Western European civilization which is our most immediate concern.

The limitations of this paper and the strictly tentative nature of its conclusions should be borne in mind throughout. It is confined to general principles and leaves out all questions of detailed application. The omissions include the vital current problem of how far and by what means the individual can improve his reality-sense without specialist aid. The views of any one individual on the subjects discussed can only be personal estimates and must, therefore, be selective and fallible : the author is a psycho-analyst and not a philosopher or a theologian. The preceding paper (Brierley, 1945) was in no sense an attempt to formulate a systematic philosophy of psycho-analysis : it was only an attempt to indicate an attitude to life inherent in it and, therefore, at most, to suggest a type of empirical philosophy with which the findings of psycho-analysis would be consonant. In the same perspective-seeking way, this paper discusses certain implications of psycho-analysis relevant to the gradual development of a positive ethics of human necessity and the equally gradual establishment of more integrative ways of living. It would appear that it is still mainly to people with some working knowledge of psycho-analysis that we must look for any assessment of the positive and creative human values inherent in it or for the recognition of many implications that could with advantage be utilized by thinkers in other fields. Psycho-analytic thought is already widely disseminated and will continue to spread, but its constructive significance for human life, as distinct from its revolutionary impact upon human thought and its detailed application in specific fields, has not yet been fully appreciated.

(II) PERSONALITY TYPES

(1) Desiderata of Classification

Differences in mode of integration and in habitual behaviour are correlated with variation in personality-pattern. Any psychological approach to the problems of religion and ethics must therefore include a consideration of personality types. Personology is, by definition, the study of the total personality (see Brierley, 1945, 89–90). It follows that any satisfactory classification of types must take into account both the dynamics and the economics of personality-pattern. It must include motives but cannot be content merely with allotting them to primary instinctual sources ; on the contrary, it must consider motives in operation through the network of relationships canalized by experience. In terms of metapsychology, classification must allow for qualitative and quantitative variation in instinctual endowment and for degrees of instinct-modification but must assess these in relation to their distribution in the mental organization, i.e., to their mode of integration. Moreover, the pattern of personality is so intimately affected by the sequence of experience, and its basic or ground pattern is so largely determined by infantile experience, that any adequate classification must clearly take account of developmental factors. As knowledge of mental heredity becomes more exact, classification may also become genetic in the strict sense of the term. Individual and group differences may prove to be related to differences in genotype, as suggested by Bowlby (1940), to whose work reference will be made later.

(2) Psychological Heredity

Genotypic differences may exist both in instinctual endowment and in organizational trends, in which case there may be innate predispositions to certain kinds of experience and to particular modes of integration. Writing of the primal phantasies that are important determinants in symptom formation, Freud enquired ' how is it to be explained that the same phantasies are always formed with the same content ? ' and answered himself by saying ' I believe that these *primal phantasies* (as I should like to name these, and certainly some others also) are a phylogenetic possession ' (1922, 310-11). Later he wrote (1923, 48) ' Through the forming of the ideal, all the traces left behind in the id by biological developments and by the vicissitudes gone through by the human race are taken over by the ego and lived through again by it in each individual. Owing to the way in which it is formed, the ego-ideal has a great many points of contact with the phylogenetic endowment of each individual—his archaic heritage.'

Irrespective of the question of their relation to a ' Collective Unconscious ' Jung's archetypes appear as alternative descriptions, on the one hand, of subjective primal phantasies and, on the other, of objective organizational trends. Thus, Michael Fordham writes (1945, 225) ' the collective unconscious is a hypothesis, inasmuch as it is the place from which the archetypes emerge. The actual archetypes are facts of experience, whatever may be thought of their nature.' Jung himself wrote (1928, 139), ' The Archetypes do not consist of inherited ideas but of inherited predispositions to reaction.' Thus, Freud's primal phantasies, Jung's archetypes and some of the phantasies regarded by Melanie Klein as typical of early phases of development, alike suggest the possible existence of innate

predispositions to particular experiences. But only if there existed one single human genotype, which is an incredible assumption to any biologist, would all innate dispositions be identical for all human beings. While some organizational trends, such as the tendency to super-ego formation, seem to have become universal, the proclivity to one or other specific mode of integration may prove to be due, in part or wholly, to innate differences. If this should be the case it would help to explain the hitherto insoluble riddle of choice of psychosis, neurosis or normal character pattern.

In the language of genetics, living individuals are phenotypes ; they are resultants of the interaction between their innate potentialities (genotype) and the actual circumstances of their lives. Even if the existence of a relatively small number of genotypes were ever to be established, classification would still have to remain sufficiently plastic to allow for the near-infinity of phenotypes, that is, of personal variations. Whatever groupings are ultimately adopted, ' pure ' types are likely to be an insignificant minority and ' mixed ' types to be the rule. Like the nomenclature of instincts, that of types will be a conceptual labelling of classes whose members exhibit certain major similarities and the description of any given personality will never be exhausted by correct allocation to an appropriate class. Moreover, people are not independent or insulated psychological entities, they are interdependent and interacting psycho-social beings ; hence, the ultimate desideratum is a psycho-social classification of human types. It will be evident that, in the meantime, a purely psychological classification of personality types is both theoretically and practically an important first step and a step which is probably indispensable.

(3) Standards of Normality : Adequacy of Integration as a Criterion of Mental Health

In dealing with the problem of typing, psychoanalysts are hampered to some extent by their closer association with disease than with health, but they are also hindered by the intrinsic relativity of standards of normality. Hollitscher (1943) discussed the logical aspects of concepts of mental illness and mental health. In everyday life, the actual working criterion of health is almost bound to be an average standard, a more or less statistical norm of viable adaptation to a particular social setting at a given period of history. Clearly, adaptation to unhealthy conditions in a sick world may yield average normality but it is equally clear that this may be achieved at the cost of impairment of personal integrity. Naturally this possibility is more evident now than it was before the First World War. Since 1914, evidence has accumulated that modern Western civilization rests on insecure foundations and it would be a singularly obtuse psycho-analyst who regarded global war as a sign of world health or failed to recognize that we are now living in a transitional and unstable period.

The social conditions under which Freud grew to maturity may have seemed stable enough to demand their acceptance as a task of reality-adaptation but *Civilization and Its Discontents* (Freud, 1929) is, in effect, a devastating critique of a moribund society. There has never been much substance in the complaint that psycho-analysis deliberately ignores the social determinants of personality, although these are sometimes underemphasized or not clearly recognized as such. Nor is there much truth in the Communist thesis that psycho-analysts are invariably social reactionaries. In a recent novel the Communist heroine labours under the delusion that two years' analysis would convert her to Toryism, and says (Morley, 1946, 98), ' I take issue with the bourgeois psycho-analyst. His object is to reconcile the individual to existing society—an aim so narrow that it shows a complete disregard for objective reality.' The objective reality to-day is that existing society all over the world is in a state of metamorphosis. The task of the analyst remains what it always has been, namely, to help his patients to find themselves, and, in so doing, to achieve as favourable a psycho-social adaptation as their own personalities and actual conditions permit.

It is inevitable, in a world changing as rapidly as ours, that social criteria of adaptation should themselves be in a state of flux : the everyday average normality is no longer the same as it was fifty, or even five, years ago. But if social and psycho-social criteria of normality are temporarily unreliable, there yet exists for psycho-analysts a useful, though perforce still relative standard of mental health, namely, the standard of personal integrity. This is not, of course, a standard limited to psycho-analysts and analytical psychologists, but one widely accepted throughout the ages : it is, for example, the economic equivalent of the balanced life advocated by Confucius. It is true that ego-differentiation militates against integration because it tends to obstruct the development of psychological reality-sense and to interfere with the appreciation of external reality. But, when everything has been said about the opposing factors, integration remains the libidinal aim of humanity, the goal of psychological development for all those who wish to live and who are not dominated by the urge to destroy themselves or others. John Dorsey, who equates psychological reality with ' meaning ', and integration with comprehensive ego-toleration of meaning, posits the same standard of health from a slightly different angle. He writes (1943, 149) : ' An individual's optimal mental health is defined as his capacity to express all of himself to his own best interests. Motivation for the unreserved acceptance of psychic reality is optimal mental health.'

Each person will describe integration according

to his own preferred conceptions but the many differences in conception are differences in evaluation and description of the one class or type of psychological event or condition. The phenomenon that Jung calls ' integration of the personality ', or more simply, ' finding the self ', is the same kind of phenomenon that psycho-analysts refer to as ' integration of the total personality '. The self is a total self not to be equated with the reality-ego. Integration is described by Jung as a '*unio oppositorum*', individuation through harmonization of ego with personal and collective unconscious : psycho-analysts think of it as a three-fold harmonization of id, super-ego and ego systems. What appears to Jung as tension between nature and spirit usually corresponds, for psycho-analysts, to tension between id and super-ego and the agent of integration appears to them to be the creative libido.

The relation between the type of personal unification achieved by the great Saints and total integration will be discussed later. Here, it need only be stated that the psycho-analytic conception of integration as a three-fold working harmonization of the total personality must be distinguished from the many idealist confusions of integrity with perfection of one kind or another. It must also be distinguished from a series of partial integrations, for example, from the ego super-ego alliance against the id favoured by traditional inhibitory morality and Puritanism. It would often seem that the average standard of modern Western morality has been an average of psychological impoverishment. This average not seldom corresponds to a viable degree of ego-stability dearly purchased at the cost of a host of major and minor impairments of zest in living. It will be clear that, in discussing standards, average normality and mental health should not be equated. There is a psychological criterion of health in degree or adequacy of integration ; this is a relative standard, since integration at its highest can only be relative and has continually to be maintained or re-attained. It is, however, a positive, dynamic and economic standard ; it draws no artificially sharp distinction between health and disease and it allows for the probability that there may be more than one type of adequate integration. It should, perhaps, be repeated, since integration of the total personality tends to be confused with ego-stability, that the former is a total, or ultra-egoistic concept. Clearly, however, the stability and efficiency of the reality or operative ego will tend to vary with the adequacy of total integration. The higher the degree of personal integrity attained the stronger and richer the reality-ego will be, and the more capable of life-fulfilling adaptation even in face of adverse circumstances.

(4) Views of Jung, Experimental Psychologists and Others

In regard to the problem of classification itself psycho-analysts have, as yet, achieved nothing comparable in scope to Jung's *Psychological Types* (1923). These types are based on what Jung considers to be the two fundamental mechanisms of Extraversion and Introversion and the four basic functions of Thinking, Feeling, Sensation and Intuition. Only the initial extravert-introvert antithesis seems to have been at all widely used by psychologists. American workers invented the term ' ambivert ' to describe persons who could not be labelled definitely extravert or introvert, i.e., persons whom psycho-analysts would think of as making a more balanced use of mechanisms of projection and introjection. However, Jung himself posits a compensating relation between conscious and unconscious. Fordham says (1945, 227), ' According to him, there is no introvert without an extraverted unconscious, there is no extravert without an introverted unconscious.' A series of war-time tests that proved useful in predicting liability to breakdown under Service conditions was based on the hypothesis that, in neurotics, there is an increased tendency for interest to be deflected from the environment on to the self (Bennett and Slater, 1945).

An up-to-date summary of views, more particularly American views, on personality types is given by Kimball Young in his *Handbook of Social Psychology* (1946, 148). In this country, the methods initiated by Spearman have been developed by Burt and others in relation to emotional factor analysis (Burt, 1939, 1940). The Presidential Address delivered by Godfrey Thomson to the British Psychological Society at Durham, 1946, surveyed recent work in factorial analysis. In the field of trait analysis the work of Raymond Cattell of Harvard on personality structure and measurement is of a kind that merits serious attention from psycho-analysts, in spite of his very true observation (1946, 100) that ' Clinical and general psychologists, especially when irritated by the difficulties of statistics, have been known to say that the " unitary traits " obtained by factor analysis are mere mathematical entities having no necessary relation to psychologically real functional unities.' It would be interesting and might be very useful to compare Bowlby's series of diagnostic traits (Bowlby, 1940, 201 *et seq.*) with trait series obtained experimentally. The work of British experimental psychologists on ' schemata ' (see Oldfield and Zangwill, 1942, 1943) clearly has relevance to character as well as to intelligence. The ' schemata ' attested by experiment appear to be closely akin to the mental systems posited in metapsychology by inference from clinical experience.

(5) Psycho-Analytic Views

Turning to psycho-analysis itself, the earlier libidinal character-typing has not yet been brought up-to-date nor fully related to the economics of

personality-pattern. Freud (1932, 278) made a beginning when he distinguished three main libidinal types and three mixed types ' According as the subject's libido is mainly allocated to one or another region of the mental apparatus '. Edward Glover (1932) made a developmental classification of mental disorders on the basis of his theory of the multiple nuclear origin of the ego-organization which could, with advantage, be expanded in relation to variations in normal development. Ernest Jones' ' Love and Morality ' (1937) is a dynamic and economic study of contrast in personality-pattern.

Research on mental hospital patients led John Bowlby to the conclusion that Kretschmerian typology is useful in psychiatric diagnosis and prognosis. He considers that variations between health and illness are not merely matters of degree but also of kind, and states (1940, 10): ' The qualitative distinction which is believed to be vital is that between the affective and schizophrenic psychoses.' This qualitative difference appears to Bowlby to hold good not only for psychotics but also for psycho-neurotics and abnormal and normal character-types. He therefore proposes a vertical classification of syntonic and schizoid personality types (corresponding to Kretschmer's cyclothymes and schizothymes), each containing a number of recognizable sub-types, ranging from normal to psychotic. The genetic evidence available suggests to him that the main groups may be genotypically distinct though the sub-types may be determined by the course of development. Bowlby recognizes the occurrence of mixed types and does not claim that his two main groups exclude the possible existence of other major genotypes. He realizes that the whole problem demands further investigation, particularly research on ' normal ' subjects.

Bowlby himself regards vertical classification as an alternative to the linear classification, in terms of developmental stages and depth of regression, initiated by Abraham. However, the two systems may prove to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. The linear classification is essentially dynamic since it is based on instinct vicissitude whereas the vertical classification is fundamentally economic. The crucial difference between syntone and schizoid would appear to be a difference in mental organization. This is borne out by Bowlby's own conclusion (1940, 190): ' The truth is that whatever else it may be, the psychic mechanism which distinguishes the schizoid from the syntone is not simply a splitting of the mind. It is my belief that it is *a particular form of splitting which is distinctive.*' A particular form of splitting in disease carries with it the implication of a particular mode of integration in health. It is possible that the syntonic mode is phylogenetically younger than the schizoid. Both are ' immature ' modes, if relative strength of ego-organization and optimum degree of personal integrity be taken as features of ' maturity '. In general, the difference in mode of organization seems to turn on relative id-dominance in the schizoid and archaic super-ego dominance in the syntone, neither of which favour ego-stability. Even if the mode of integration be innately determined, the individual personality-pattern will still have its own linear developmental history.

Apart from systematic research, everyday experience shows that a wide range of character variation is to be found among people well enough adapted to rate as ' normal '. Freud rightly insisted that, whatever the basis of classification, the resultant types ' should embrace all the variations which according to our practical standards fall within the category of the normal. In their extreme developments, however, they may well approximate to clinical pictures and so help to bridge the gulf which is assumed to exist between the normal and the pathological ' (1932, 278–9). Persons who give the impression of being really whole and full of life are still the exception rather than the rule. Irrespective of those minor ' symptoms of the normal ' that psycho-analysts regard as safety-valves, health insurance rather than disease, many people met with in ordinary life automatically remind us of types familiar in the consulting-room. Thus, a man who likes his life to run on tram-lines and becomes fussed and irritable if meals are not punctual, will probably be considered by any practising analyst as quite likely to be obsessional in personality-type. But, unless the analyst is unusually rash, he will not thereupon diagnose this man as a pathological case of obsessional neurosis. On the contrary, psycho-analysts actually behave in these matters rather as if they took for granted that their patients represent only more or less extreme examples of types common among the omnibus class of practical or average normality.

(6) ' Genital Primacy ', Psychological Maturity and Personal Integrity

Psycho-analysts assume that, among other diversities, normal persons will show great variations in their relationships to their fellows. Abraham's view (1925) that the normal adult reaches a genital stage of libidinal development in which genital sexual primacy is accompanied by capacity for personal object-love still throws a useful light on the problem of psychological maturity. It is illuminating because it suggests that Abraham's genital type corresponds, in terms of personality-pattern, to a favourable mode of integration in which libidinization of infantile hostility is maximal rather than minimal and in which genital sexuality is fully synthesized with the reality-ego organization. People are more reasonable about sex than they used to be, but there is an inevitable lag between knowing and becoming. Persons whose genital impulses are fully ego-syntonic are still

comparatively rare. It is permissible to assume that ego-syntonic genitality is more amenable to intelligent reality-adaptation and that it carries with it an increased ability for personal love of the sexual partner. 'Falling in love' is a special phenomenon, but it seems likely that the psychologically mature adult should be capable of passionate love, that is, of an effective synthesis of personal affection and sensual passion. According to Abraham, the hysteric develops object-love but with exclusion of the genitals: frigidity in women and impairment of potency in men are common enough in people not otherwise markedly neurotic. But experience testifies that the opposite condition, genital potency with incapacity for personal appreciation of the sexual partner is by no means uncommon: it is, perhaps, more frequent among men, where its development may have been aided by the long tradition of 'feminine inferiority'. Such incapacity to feel genuine affection and personal friendship for members of the opposite sex is evidently closely related to the splitting of sensuality from affection and their allocation to different hetero-sexual objects described by Freud (1912, *Collected Papers*, IV, 203).

Although he disclaimed any such intention, Abraham seems to have set a genital standard of maturation which is relevant to personal integration and not only to sexual development. Such normal maturity is likely to be the outcome of a predominantly positive Œdipus situation, issuing in a favourable post-Œdipal economic distribution of parental relationships. In one such favourable distribution, the ego is strengthened and enabled to retain control of a good part of the infantile aggression and libidinal capacity through identification with the sexual rival, and the super-ego is libidinized by identification with the love-object. On the other hand, where mental and environmental conditions are sufficiently favourable, more evenly balanced hetero-homo-sexual and even predominantly homo-sexual Œdipus situations can be resolved without giving rise to overt illness or delinquency in the adult. Certainly, the post-Œdipal distribution of identificatory relationships can vary widely without obvious pathological consequences. Nevertheless, it is also clear that it is only a fortunate few who enter on adult life with their genital potential intact and fully ego-syntonic. The majority suffer damage in varying degree through dissociation and regression, inadequate libidinization and tension-promoting distributions of identificatory relationships. These conditions may never result in illness or prevent the subject from making a reasonable success of life, judged by average standards, but the impairment of function may, nevertheless, be appreciable in a host of major and minor psychological impediments to vigorous and joyful living.

It is difficult to see how genital sexuality can become fully and generally ego-syntonic until the mental facts of infantile sexuality are as clearly recognized and taken for granted as are the physiological facts of infantile development. So long as the parental conception of infantile life excludes sexuality, the infant will remain under pressure to deny it himself. The cultural scales are thus weighted in favour of dissociation of sexual impulses rather than in favour of their ego-synthesis. The different evaluation of infantile sexuality is a crucial difference between psycho-analysts and members of derivative Schools. The psycho-analytic conception of infantile sexuality is its oldest cause of offence and the one that may easily endure the longest. It has instigated more deviations and new Schools among those unable to tolerate its psychological reality than any other single factor. To psycho-analysts, the clinical evidence appears to admit of no compromise and infantile sexuality must therefore remain a stumbling-block until such time as its key significance can be more widely appreciated. The importance of realism about infantile life is discussed further in the section on ethics.

(7) Conclusion

It is evident that a satisfactory classification of personality-types that will be at once genetic, dynamic and economic, and useful in practical life, cannot be easily or quickly achieved. Its formulation should not be hurried, in spite of its obvious desirability. Once psycho-analysts have completed their own ground-work and have arrived at working hypotheses regarding the principles of type differentiation, they will be well advised to compare and collate their results with those of experimental psychologists, social psychologists and sociologists. The ultimate classification of human types must be psycho-social if it is to contribute to the solution of problems of social organization on lines more favourable to individual and group adaptation. Differences of terminology will tend to cloud the issues but, whatever form of words or mathematical expression is preferred by different workers, any conclusion which has a fair degree of probability will ultimately prove to be consonant with other reliable findings. Mutual interpretation between workers in various fields will not always be easy, but it should become increasingly possible. Marion Milner's recent paper (1945) is a pioneer attempt to interpret 'internal objects' in terms of general psychology. Psycho-social classification may eventually correlate with anatomical and physiological classifications, but development and modification of types at the psycho-social level is bound to be more rapid and multifarious than changes at a biological level. A generation or two might suffice to bring about an appreciable change in the distribution of psycho-social types. Although our Western civilization has, during more recent times, favoured the development of immature and

poorly integrated personalities, a century of healthier psycho-social conditions might go some way to correct this adverse balance.

This brief discussion of classification is given as a preface to the remainder of the paper for two reasons. In the first place, the diversity of types and the variety of individuals are clearly relevant to the personal significance of religion and to the application of any general principles of behaviour to the personal conduct of life. It is, for instance, self-evident that a routine which may be life-saving and rewarding to an obsessional character may be little short of murderous to a creative artist. In the second place, diagnostic terms will be used in this paper in a characterological rather than in a pathological sense. Terms such as 'manic-depressive' or 'obsessional' will refer to persons who are not necessarily ill in the clinical sense, but whose mental pattern and *modus vivendi* seem to resemble those of persons exhibiting the corresponding diseases. Further research alone can show whether Bowlby's vertical classification by genotype is right or wrong, but in the meantime clinical terminology pre-judges the issue less than the use of terminology implying the definite acceptance of genetic assumptions.

(III) RELIGION AS A METHOD OF INTEGRATION

(1) The 'Problem of Religion'

In his recent book (1945) Flugel devotes a chapter to the 'Problem of Religion' in which he summarises the main contributions of psycho-analysis and discusses some points of convergence and divergence between Freud and Jung. He notes the parallel drawn by Pfister between the aims of the Christian 'cure of souls' and those of psycho-analytic therapy and combines the views of Freud and Philpott (1942) in his estimate of the Atonement. He writes (1945, 274–5): 'Notwithstanding the magnificence of its vision and the nobility of its purpose, Christianity (like the other great religions) has been in most respects a failure, and this in spite of its nominal and worldly triumphs. It has failed both to remove internal guilt and to abolish external aggression—largely, as we have seen in this book, two aspects of the same problem. . . . The great weakness of Christianity would seem to be that it has indicated neither a suitable outlet for the energies of aggressive extraverted individuals nor an adequate and positive goal for social and political endeavour; indeed, by its attitude of indifference to the larger social problems, it fostered the divorce between ethics and politics which many thinkers have in recent years deplored . . . recent events have made it clear in which direction the next step in religious development must lie. The religious emotions must be largely or entirely secularized and be put in the service of humanity. The religion of humanity is surely the religion of the nearer future.'

Finally, Flugel discusses (1945, 277) Cattell's proposed 'substitution of the group "Theopsyche" for the God of revealed religion'. He writes (*ib.* 279–81) that 'Humanity or the Theopsyche serves as a sublimation for the primitive feelings relating to the mother or the idea of brotherhood rather than for those relating to the father. The Western world, with its strongly patriarchal traditions, will perhaps not easily forgo the father. How to cater for the archetypal need for a father-figure in a world society is indeed a problem. . . . Men must abandon the last shred of that longed-for but illusory "omnipotence" to which, even after the relinquishing of magic, they sought to cling through their relation with a divine ruler of the universe. . . . If there is a purpose in evolution, we have no means of understanding it except in and through the mind of man. There is no guidance as to the nature of this purpose and our place in it save such as we ourselves provide through the free use of human faculty.'

(2) The Vitality of Christianity.

Flugel's conclusions will be referred to later, but some consideration of the present status of religion may be advisable here. One gains the impression that psycho-analysts and scientists in general are often too ready to assume that Christianity is steadily and rapidly losing ground, an assumption not wholly consistent with available evidence. For instance, Latourette's *Advance Through Storm* (1946) the seventh and latest volume of his *History of the Expansion of Christianity* shows that the years 1914–44 were years of continued expansion, at any rate in the mission field. In Europe, in spite of the increasing secularization of culture and the avowedly anti-religious campaigns which reduced Christians in some countries to the status of persecuted minorities, Latourette believes there has been some advance, although a slowing-down by comparison with the nineteenth century. In a review of this book (*Sunday Times*, June 23, 1946) the Dean of St. Paul's said: 'Even in Europe, where the reaction against Christianity has been most marked, there are signs that the Christian religion has a power of resurgence unsuspected by its enemies. The Church was not destroyed either in Russia or Germany, and the drive towards unity expressed in the Œcumenical movement gathered strength during the dark days of the threat of war and even in the war itself.' During the war, the Russian Church regained official toleration. Christians were active in all the resistance movements, and at the present moment are more rather than less influential in politics. The fact that, according to Latourette, Roman Catholics constitute the largest single denominational group in the United

States (twenty-three millions) and the recent creation of more than thirty new Cardinals do not point to any diminution in the vitality of Catholicism.

Times of trouble naturally and inevitably tend to rouse latent religious attitudes in individuals. It has been said, for instance, that there are no atheists in a bomber, and while this may not be literally true, it underlines the human proclivity for turning to God in danger and distress. Recent years have seen a revulsion from materialism and a growing conviction of the failure of the nineteenth century brand of humanism, and there has been a swing of the pendulum back from impersonal and scientific to personal and religious interests. Rosamund Murray's book *The Good Pagan's Failure* (1943) illustrates this trend and there are many people in somewhat similar case to its author who see no alternative between a psychologically unrealistic humanism and Christianity.

The appeal of Christianity has also been increased by changes internal to itself that have come about during the last few decades. For example, modern Protestantism can no longer be accused of failure to realise its social responsibilities. The late Archbishop Temple, who championed the movement for unity among Christian Churches, also had at heart the welfare of the common man and laboured unceasingly in the rather stony vineyard of social re-organization according to Christian principles. The difference between Christian Socialist trends and many secular types of collectivism derives from their regard for personality. If human beings are all the children of God and equal before Him, the personality of every individual demands respect and must be given due consideration. John MacMurray (1935, 229) goes so far as to say that the goal of religion is 'the creation of a human society, universal in its extent, based upon the communion of persons'. Christian experiments in neighbourhood relationships are under way as illustrated, for example, in Joseph McCulloch's *Medway Adventure* (1946). The Catholic Church as a whole is regarded by many people as still reactionary, but Catholic writers like Jacques Maritain and S. B. Frank are socially progressive. Such writers may not affect the official policies of the Church, but they are popular and influential within the widening circle of their readers. Indeed, voices may even be heard to-day protesting against the over-socialization of Christianity and insisting that the primary task of religion is the fostering of man's relation to God and not the betterment of his earthly conditions.

Asceticism has an acknowledged rôle in the spiritual life and extreme forms of it are sometimes practised. The Catholic Church, however, unlike the Puritans and the gloomier Protestant sects, has never disdained to recognize and use the senses for its own purposes: the Seven Deadly Sins are not all sins of the flesh. The relations between the sexes are strictly regulated, but when the required conditions are observed, the Catholic can enjoy marriage and intercourse as sacraments (see Gerald Vann, 1944, 48 *et seq.*). In recent years many Protestants have changed their views regarding the anti-sensual and anti-emotional bias of the Puritan tradition and have begun to appreciate its life-denying implications (as witness Sidney Dark's *Passing of the Puritan*, 1946). The Anglican mystic and publicist, Evelyn Underhill, was a convincing exponent of the sacramental view of life.

An emotional resurgence in Christianity has expressed itself both in a revival of interest in mysticism and in revolt against purely formal institutionalism. It has come home to many people that religion is a matter of the spirit and not of the letter of the law, a way of living based upon experience of God, permeating the whole life, and not a lip-serving habit of Sunday observance dissociated from everyday life. On the Continent these trends owe much to Kierkegaard, Karl Barthe and Emil Brunner. The subjectivist Existentialism now fashionable in France in some ways appears to be the philosophic counterpart of Surrealism in art; it has many aspects and many exponents who differ among themselves, but it also retains from Kierkegaard its avowedly religious expressions, e.g., the personalism of Berdyaev. For most Christian mystics, e.g., the Catholic S. B. Frank and the Anglican Evelyn Underhill, there is no real conflict between mysticism and institutionalism, only a recognition that the latter must be quickened by the spirit and enlightened by a renewal of understanding of the significance of Church organization and ritual. Quoting Baron von Hügel, Arthur Hopkinson writes (1946, 17): 'To use his own words, there are "Three Means of Religious Apprehension": the first, institutional and authoritative; the second, intellectual and ethical; the third, mystical and experimental. These are the three elements in religion.'

There is also a revival on the intellectual plane, one expression of which amongst Protestants and also among non-sectarian critics of materialism, is neo-Thomism. St. Thomas Aquinas has never ceased to be the official philosopher of the Catholic Church, and the views of Jacques Maritain are said to be adaptations of Thomism to modern conditions. Neo-Thomists are to be found among critics of psycho-analysis. In reply to criticism of his chapter on religion in *Mind, Medicine and Man* (1943), Zilboorg writes (1944, 94) that he tried 'to demonstrate that the strictest adherent to Catholic theology and to the philosophy of St. Thomas can and ought to accept the principles of psycho-analytic theory and practice, and that in accepting these he would not have to violate his theology or do any injury to his faith'. In an earlier paper Zilboorg wrote (1939a, 488) of Thomist critics, 'they fail to observe the major principle of St. Thomas which saved Aristotle from being re-

forgotten after he had been re-discovered. This principle represents perhaps the greatest contribution of St. Thomas. He adapted Aristotle to the prevailing apologetics by means of a new postulate : that which is true in philosophy may not be true in theology and *vice versâ*. By confusing soul with psyche or psychic apparatus . . . the opponents of psycho-analysis found themselves unable to apply the Thomistic principle to the Freudian studies and unable to comprehend that what is true in psychology may not be true in traditional apologetics, Catholic, Protestant or secular, and *vice versâ*—that the psychic apparatus is not the soul and the soul is not the psyche.'

The Thomist argument, however, can be a dangerous sophistry unless it is clearly realized that the ' soul ' is a subjective, personological concept, whereas the ' psychic apparatus ' is an objective, metapsychological concept. The subjective facts of experience are of a different order to the inferred probabilities of objective psychology. It is now appreciated that each level of organization has its own laws and that psychological phenomena cannot be adequately described in physical or chemical terms. But the underlying assumption is that the different systems of objective knowledge concerned are mutually consistent and not mutually contradictory. A fact of experience, such as a truth of subjective theology or mysticism, will differ from an objective concept of philosophy but the truths of a theology which claims to be objective should be consistent with objective philosophy, scientific theory, and all the other objective constructions of human intelligence. It was noted elsewhere (Brierley, 1945, 106) that Catholics themselves find the theories of Jung acceptable but not those of Freud or Adler.

Another intellectual resurgence in religion takes forms which might be grouped as evolutionary and which seek to reconcile science and religion. Religious thinkers of this type have found much support in the latest theories of modern physics. They accept the ' historical process ' but regard the development of religion from early primitive to advanced forms as the story of the gradual unfolding of man's God-given capacity to appreciate Eternal Truth. They contend, in brief, that religion cannot be explained by reference to its primitive origins and phases of growth, but that these earlier stages can be understood only in the light of subsequent developments. On this view, animism cannot explain Christianity but Christianity can illuminate the problems of primitive animism. Evelyn Underhill, for whom psychology was a good servant but a bad master, took this point of view. She criticised theology for the obscurity of its language but she endorsed the doctrines and ritual of Christianity as accepted by the Church of England.

There are also Christians who take yet a further step in the direction of a fresh interpretation of Christianity. For Albert Schweitzer, the historical truth about the teaching of Jesus is that it is permeated by the mistaken conception that the end of the world was at hand. The credibility of the older Gospels, Mark and Matthew, is increased for Schweitzer by the fact that they report this mistaken conviction and thus show that Jesus shared the ' eschatological Messianic ' expectations of the late Judaism into which he was born. Schweitzer's arguments are given in full in two books *The Mystery of the Kingdom of God* (trans. 1925) and *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* (trans. 1910), but are summarized in his autobiography, *My Life and Thought* (1931) (trans. 1933, 6th imp. 1946). He notes, for instance, of the teaching of Jesus (1946a, 60) ' . . . in a series of passages He speaks in a quite realistic way of the coming of the Son of Man and the Messianic Kingdom when this world comes to an end '. Also (*ib.*, 61) ' the passages in which He entrusts to His disciples the Secret that He is the Messiah, are, one and all, " eschatological Messianic " in that He, according to them, holds Himself to be the person who at the end of the world will appear as the Son of Man '. Schweitzer's conclusion is that (67) : ' We have, therefore, to reconcile ourselves to the fact that His religion of love appeared as part of a world-view which expected a speedy end of the world. Clothed in the ideas in which He announced it, we cannot make it our own ; we must re-clothe it in those of our modern world-view. . . . We are obliged, that is, to admit the evident fact that religious truth varies from age to age.' But (*ib.* 67–8) : ' So far as its essential spiritual and ethical nature is concerned, Christianity's religious truth remains the same through the centuries. The variations belong only to the outward form which it assumes in the ideas belonging to different world-views.'

In Schweitzer's view the essence of Christianity, as distinct from the formalized religion of dogma and ritual, is its spiritual and personal ethic of active love. Thus, he writes (*ib.*, 69) : ' Jesus never undertakes to expound the late Jewish dogmas of the Messiah and the Kingdom. His concern is not how believers ought to picture things, but that Love, without which no one can belong to God, and attain to membership of the Kingdom, shall be powerful within it. The subject of all His preaching is love. . . . The late Jewish Messianic world-view is the crater from which bursts forth the flame of the eternal religion of love.' Having come to terms with historical truth (*ib.* 74), ' We are now at liberty to let the religion of Jesus become a living force in our thought, as its purely spiritual and ethical nature demands. We know how much that is precious exists within the ecclesiastical Christianity which has been handed down in Greek dogmas and kept alive by the piety of so many centuries, and we hold fast to the Church with love, and reverence, and thankfulness.

But we belong to her as men who appeal to the saying of St. Paul: "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty", and who believe that they serve Christianity better by the strength of their devotion to Jesus' religion of love than by acquiescence in all the articles of belief. If the Church has the spirit of Jesus, there is room in her for any form of Christian piety, even for that which claims unrestricted liberty.'

A socially-minded British Christian, writing under the name of John Hadham, says (1944, 86): 'I profoundly believe that the New Age will not be firmly established until it has found the spiritual formula which will give it unity, harmony, power and purpose. I profoundly believe that this new formula will be a re-interpretation in terms of new knowledge and new thought-forms of the Christian faith.' John MacMurray holds that religion is still very immature, but that (1935, 240): 'The development of religion is in its substance the integration of human society.' He writes further (243): 'The maturity of religion waits on the development of consciousness, upon the universal sharing of a maturity of consciousness which has been already achieved as the individual consciousness of one religious genius.' MacMurray believes that 'religion has not yet reached maturity because we have not yet understood Jesus'. In his view the 'specific task of religion' is 'to integrate the community of mankind'. These opinions may appear to be rather one-sided since personal integration and social integration are inter-dependent factors in what field-theorists might call the human life-space. But although MacMurray regards isolationary individualism as anti-religious, he is none-the-less a respector of persons, as is shown by his views on education. He has outgrown the Puritan tradition and insists on the necessity for educating the senses and the emotions as well as the intellect.

This short review of signs of life in modern Christianity is only illustrative and very incomplete, but it will serve its purpose if it checks the too confident expectation of an early or inevitable demise of Christianity. Christianity may be challenged and on the defensive, but it is also challenging and on the offensive, and it is probably wiser to regard it as a psycho-social force which will retain vitality for a long time to come. Moreover, conceptions like Cattell's 'Theopsyche' are mainly intellectual in their appeal; in theory they may offer what appears to be ample provision for religious need, but in fact, they lack the profundity of emotional appeal characteristic of Christianity. The probability that any such intellectual artefact will replace God is, perhaps, on a par with the likelihood that an artificial language, like Esperanto, or even a semi-artefact like Basic English, will ever become a living universal language.

(3) The Psycho-Analytic Approach: Freud's Views on Religion and Christianity

Some repetition will be unavoidable, but it would be superfluous to re-traverse in any detail the ground so recently and ably covered by Flugel. The psychological study of religion, however, and not least the study of Christianity, is only in its infancy. Understanding of its personal significance is still elementary. It appears, as Flugel says (1945, 261), that 'the attitude of man towards his Gods is determined to a large extent by displacement of his attitude towards his parents'. There are grounds also for assuming that the individual's appreciation of the nature of God will be affected by the quality of the attitudes projected on to Him. A God identified with a beloved ego-ideal will seems a very different God from one identified with hate-charged or sadistic super-ego components. There is also reason to suppose that the intra-psychic mechanism of religious experience is to be found in ego relationships to ego ideal-systems and parental ideal-systems. It is a matter of interest that Cardinal Newman directly related God and conscience. In his *Apologia pro Vita Sua* he wrote (1890, 198), 'if I am asked why I believe in a God, I answer that it is because I believe in myself, for I feel it impossible to believe in my own existence (and of that fact I am quite sure) without believing also in the existence of Him, Who lives as a Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience'.

Such conceptions as these are fundamental, but they do not exhaust the dynamics and economics of mystical experience, nor do they completely account for the modifications of personality-pattern to which the 'spiritual life' may conduce. Psycho-analysis itself undoubtedly implies the possibility of more integrative living and, in favourable circumstances, it actualizes this possibility to some extent. A consideration of Christianity as a method of integration, albeit a method more often doomed to failure than to success, may throw some light on the general problem of integration and on the points of likeness and difference between Christian and psycho-analytic conceptions of personal 'wholeness'.

Some psycho-analysts, like Pfister, and many Freudian-influenced psycho-therapists like William Brown, combine their psychological insight with religious belief. Zilboorg's views on the compatibility of psycho-analysis and Catholicism have already been quoted, but his general approach is conveyed in the following passage (1944, 99): 'Instead of opposing religion, instead of rejecting it as unscientific or as a cultural neurosis (the use of the latter term is hardly more than a polite pseudo-scientific name-calling) I believe we shall understand it better and view it probably with greater sympathy, if we concentrate our attention on the study of its psycho-cultural function as one of man's fundamental ways of living and of meeting life.'

The majority of psycho-analysts tend to think that the biological and psycho-social conditions of human life, so far as they are known to them, justify the conception of religion, in both its personal and its social aspects, as a natural consequence of human development. This evolutionary conception of religion did not originate in psycho-analysis. The authority of divine revelation had been challenged by the natural scientists long before Freud published the *Future of an Illusion* (1927) and the post-Darwinian work on comparative religion and cultural anthropology, for example, the work of Tyler, Frazer, Westermarck and others, had already made out a strong case for an evolutionary theory. The earlier work was mainly concerned with the objective invalidity of religious dogmas and myths and with the primitive survival nature of ritual and ceremonial. The social aspect, the political and cultural function of religion and its rôle in history, also received much consideration. It was William James who first pointed out that, whatever the nature of dogmas and ritual, religious experience is undeniable as experience, and who first connected it with the realm of the subconscious. It is Freud, however, who gave us our first clues to the specific unconscious drives and infantile dilemmas which can manifest themselves in religious guise.

While Freud himself recognized the personal sources of religious belief in infantile helplessness and father-longing, he appears to have been far more interested in its public than in its private aspects, i.e. in its phylogeny than in its ontogeny, in ritual and dogma rather than in religious experience. Thus, both he and Reik were forcibly struck by the parallel between ritual and obsessional ceremonial and, in the *Future of an Illusion*, Freud leans to the conclusion that religion is the ' universal obsessional neurosis of humanity ' (1928, 76). He says : ' To be sure this analogy does not exhaust the essence of religion ' but ' it accords well with this that the true believer is in a high degree protected against the danger of certain neurotic afflictions ; by accepting the universal neurosis he is spared the task of forming a personal neurosis '. (*ib.* 77). In *Moses and Monotheism*'(Freud, 1939, 117) this analogy has come to be ' rather in the nature of an axiom ' and ' religious phenomena must of course be regarded as a part of mass psychology '. In this book, however, Freud dealt neither with a universal obsession nor with mass psychology, but with the development of Judaic monotheism in terms of Jewish group psychology (or rather, psycho-sociology) and, to a slighter extent, with its suppression by Christianity. Thus he writes (*ib.* 148), ' we have treated here of only one case in the rich phenomenology of the religions and have not thrown any light on the others '.

Moses and Monotheism has been severely criticized. In a Review in the *American Journal of Sociology* (1939, **45**, 475), Salomon A. Baron writes : ' Methodically, however, the work is open to most crucial objections. The extreme liberties admittedly taken by Freud with available Biblical material is illustrative also of his utilization of the findings of modern anthropological and historical research. . . . This limitless arbitrariness in the selection and use of the little existing evidence renders the entire factual basis of Freud's reconstruction more than questionable.' Whatever the ultimate verdict on Freud's historical reconstruction may be, he is fully justified in stressing both the pre-eminently patriarchal character of Judaism and its persisting influence in Christianity. It is easy to recognize in many of the divisions within Christianity the factor of recurrent revolt against paternal authority. In this country, for instance, the Pope's refusal to sanction Henry VIII's first divorce and re-marriage was an important factor in bringing about the Reformation. The formal definition of Papal Infallibility, issued by the Vatican Council in 1870, appears as an attempt to re-assert the divinely inspired omniscience of the Holy Father in face of the incoming tide of secularism and rationalism. Incidentally, the existence of the Essenes might be taken as corroborative evidence of possible Egyptian sources of Judiaism. The *Encyclopœdia Britannica* (11th ed., 1910, 778) describes the Essenes as ' a monastic order among the Jews prior to Christianity. . . . our authorities agree in assigning them a dateless antiquity.' ' Before the rising of the sun they were to speak of nothing profane, but offered to it certain traditional forms of prayer as if beseeching it to rise. . . . Their most singular feature, perhaps, was their reverence for the sun ' (*ib.* 780). In his ' Preliminary Notes upon the Problem of Akhenaten ' (1939) James Strachey describes the rôle of the sun in the first emergence of monotheism in the history of the human race.

It would not seem to be a matter of crucial significance whether Freud is right or wrong in his conception of the original form of the human group, in seeming to narrow down the origins of religion to ancestral patricide, or in positing the totem feast as the *fons et origo* of all ritual. Hypotheses regarding the earliest phases of social life, like those regarding the earliest phases of infantile life, are bound to be conjectural and insusceptible of proof other than inherent probability and conformity with hypotheses more amenable to positive demonstration. What does seem highly probable is that, whatever the exact conditions of primordial life, they were not lacking in opportunities for familial and tribal disagreements with fathers and leaders, siblings and fellow-tribesmen : as is attested by a wealth of myths quite independent of psycho-analytic evidence. Anthropology supplies many records of the ceremonial slaying of kings and the more strictly utilitarian killing of the aged and infirm. The anecdotal history of familial and tribal vicissitudes, passed on from one generation

to another by word of mouth as soon as speech became equal to this task, must gradually have crystallized into more or less stereotyped myths and legends, epics and sagas. The psycho-analytic evidence strongly suggests that the more crucial ancestral vicissitudes find psychological representation in infantile development. If indeed, as Freud himself suggests, the infantile peak of sexuality represents a primitive human or pre-human ancestral puberty, the inevitability and intensity of Œdipal conflicts become much less surprising. We are not entitled, in view of the current state of knowledge of genetics and heredity, especially mental heredity, to affirm positively that infantile psychology reflects accurately the pre-historic vicissitudes of human life. We are entitled to say that the course of infantile development seems to exhibit a certain parallel to reconstructions of the course of racial development and that this assumption makes many infantile strains and stresses more intelligible. We are most fully justified by our clinical experience in asserting that the Œdipal and pre-Œdipal conflicts operating in the individual are of an importance which can hardly be exaggerated in the development of personal religion and, therefore, presumably also in the historical development of the great religions.

Œdipal paternal relations, albeit the dominant strand in Judaism, are only one set of threads in the tangled skein of infantile drives that may find expression in religion. Freud is justified, from his own point of view, in regarding Christianity as ' a cultural regression as compared with the older Jewish religion ' because it ' was no longer strictly monotheistic, took over from the surrounding peoples numerous symbolical rites, re-established the great Mother Goddess and found room for many deities of polytheism in an easily recognizable disguise—though in subordinate positions ' (1939, 142). But he also feels bound to admit ' and yet Christianity marked a progress in the history of religion ; that is to say, in regard to the return of the repressed ' (*ib.* 143) (see also Philpott, 1942).

(4) The Nature of Christianity and its Appeal

In effect, Christianity, though its spread is in part to be accounted for by political and social exigencies, owes the width of its appeal to individuals of all ages and races to the circumstance that partially corrected the one-sidedness of Judaism and included many more of the unconscious motivations that are potentially religious. If the history and doctrines of Christianity were studied from this angle it would probably be found that at some time, in one way or another, Christianity offers some solution to every infantile problem and not only a solution of Œdipal guilt and hostility. It is true that redemption through the vicarious sacrifice of Christ, a doctrine emanating from St. Paul, is a cardinal tenet of every Christian sect and that the Cross seems very soon to have become the official symbol of Christianity. The work of St. Paul was admittedly decisive in the early transmission and development of Christian teaching and it may well be true that the Pauline influence in the institutionalizing of Christianity, particularly in the organization of the western church, was greater than that of Jesus himself. But, surely, only concentration on the social aspects of religion and on the expiation of blood guilt and primæval hostility could have led Freud to pass over Jesus as the occasion rather than the originator of Christianity and to write : ' It can scarcely be chance that the violent death of another great man should become the starting-point for the creation of a new religion by Paul ' (1939, 143).

The religious genius of Jesus expressed itself in the positive re-affirmation of the other aspect of Œdipal ambivalence, the love of the Father, already enjoined in the Mosaic commandment ' Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart ' (Deut. vi, 5). To this Jesus added the New Commandment ' love one another ' (John xiv, 12). What launched Paul on ' his continuation of primæval history ' (Freud, 1939, 143), was his personal experience on the road to Damascus (Acts xxii, 6–11) ; the resulting change of heart converted him from an active persecutor of Christians to an Apostle of Christ. Paul's own rendering of the gospel of love is given in the thirteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, beginning ' Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal ' and ending 'And now abideth faith, hope and charity, these three : but the greatest of these is charity.'

The Gospels preach a personal religion to all human beings as God's children, equal before Him. This teaching of Jesus was the result of his own experience. Despite the omniscience claimed by the Churches for Christ as the Son of God, the historical Jesus was a Jew, brought up in a patriarchal tradition, and his ideas, although revolutionary, retain the impress of this tradition in the form in which it was compatible with his own personal insight. His revolt was not against the Fatherhood of God, the patriarchal conception of Deity as such, but against the deadening influence of righteousness as obedience to law and conformity to ritual observance unquickened by personal love of a Heavenly Father, whose essence appeared to Jesus to be love. The Catholic Church still claims to be the only true representative on earth of the spiritual Church of Christ, but is presumably unaware that, in so doing, it is voicing the isolationist claim of its ancestral Jewry to be the Chosen People, in direct contradiction to the true catholicity of Jesus. At various times, down to to-day, people have wondered what Jesus would make of his Churches and his Churches of Jesus, if he were born again in their time. It would seem that the historical Jesus sent his disciples out to

preach glad tidings of life more abundant to individual persons rather than to found institutions. The recognition of the personal significance of Christianity has never been lost ; it has remained alive through all the hazards of 2,000 years of institutionalization and is again being stressed by many modern believers as the quintessence of Christianity.

Although the Churches never quenched the personal flame of love of God, yet in the course of their development of formal organization, dogma and ritual, they restored and even at times surpassed the tyranny of law and external observance which Jesus had found so deadening in Jewry. Nevertheless, the psychological effects of their historical development were not wholly detrimental. The tracing of the various cultural influences that helped to mould Christian thought and practice is a fascinating study in itself, but it is their effect rather than their historical derivation that is of most immediate concern to psychology. The expansion of Christian doctrine and ritual, deemed by Freud to be regressive in that it involved abandonment of the highly selective monotheism of Jewry, brought about the greater psychological inclusiveness which endowed Christianity with its almost universal appeal. However instrumental political and economic motives may have been in engineering the world dissemination of Christianity, it could scarcely have established itself with the tenacity it has shown in so many of the fields of missionary effort had it not been for the depth and variety of its psychological appeal. In our own days, for instance, why should some educated Chinese, who are the heirs of a cultural tradition much older than that of Europe, adopt this ' barbarian ' religion unless it offers them something not so adequately provided by their indigenous Confucianism or their earlier adopted Buddhism ? Part of the answer, at any rate, is to be found in the Christian emphasis on personal love. The doctrine that ' God is Love ' is reinforced by the doctrine of the Incarnation and by the greater ease, for many men and women, of themselves feeling love for God Incarnate in Christ Jesus. The Son of Man albeit Son of God offers a personal target for personal affection as well as a suitable object for certain types of identificatory relationship.

The Œdipus conflict involves mother-relations as well as father-relations, as Ernest Jones noted in his 'A Psycho-Analytic Study of the Holy Ghost '(1922). He considers that in the Christian solution (*ib.* 423) : ' Object-love for the Mother is replaced by a regression to the original identification with her, so that incest is avoided and the Father pacified ; further the opportunity is given of winning the Father's love by the adoption of a feminine attitude towards him. Peace of mind is purchased by means of a change in heart in the direction of a change in sex.' Incidentally, this solution is indicated in the equation of ' Mother Church ' with the ' Body of Christ '. The quoted passage naturally refers to the male Christian ; no such inversion is required of women. For women, as implied in such phrases as ' the bride of Christ ', Christianity offers an aim-inhibited hetero-sexual solution of infantile father-love.

The complete relinquishment of infantile object-love for the mother is difficult of attainment and Ernest Jones recognizes in the doctrine of the Trinity the re-emergence of the primal mother-goddess in the mysterious disguise of the Holy Ghost and her more direct re-emergence in the Madonna. The Council of Nice repudiated the divinity of Mary, but later (Jones, 1922, 429), ' voices were increasingly raised in favour of according the Virgin Mary a loftier part in the hierarchy. This tendency won the day in the Catholic Church and may be said to be still proceeding, for it is hardly more than half a century since the last step was taken of pronouncing that she herself was also conceived immaculately. The human need for a Mother to worship was too strong, so that She had to be reinstated.' The Madonna and the women Saints provide objects for hetero-sexual mother-love in men and also cater for homo-sexual attitudes in women. How successfully they can do this is illustrated in Franz Werfel's *The Song of Bernadette* (1942). The breadth of its Œdipal appeal is, perhaps, one reason why the Catholic Church retains such formidable vitality to-day by comparison with most of its Protestant derivatives. It is correct, so far as unconscious determinants are concerned, to speak of heterosexual and homosexual attitudes towards religious objects, but it must be remembered that the sentiments developed undergo a varying but often a high degree of rarefaction and de-sexualization. The personal relation of the devotee to the object of his worship is one of emotional adoration for an ideal. On occasion, more primitive infantile longings re-emerge, as in the instance quoted by Evelyn Underhill (1927, 151) from Mallock's *Veil of the Temple*, of a clergyman ' whose litany led up to the fervent petition : " Hands of Mary, which drip with myrrh, fondle us " '.

The Catholic idealization of the Mother of God is balanced by a patriarchal subordination of the daughters of men and together they constitute a factor making for asceticism, particularly in the priesthood. But the Catholic Church as a whole has never disdained to use sensory avenues of appeal for religious ends. It is the Protestants, who deny any feminine attribute to the Godhead, who have carried the denigration of sensuality to its fullest extent, although this very denial has enabled them to allow women better public status, and even, in some cases, to permit them to function as ministers of religion. Among Protestants, sensuality may take its revenge in orgiastic ' revivals ' and comparable emotional festivals.

In brief, there is little doubt of the significance of Œdipal drives in Christianity or of the continuing influence in the latter of patriarchal trends inherited from Judaism in spite of the re-emergence in Catholicism of matriarchal trends and the general advance in conceptions of human fraternity (see Flugel, 1945, 273). When the nature of mysticism is considered, it will become clearer that while the Œdipal conflicts finally mould personal religion, they do not exhaust its infantile motivations. This is the case whether these pre-Œdipal motivations are regarded as primary or as secondarily re-evoked and modified by regression. At present the most reasonable view would appear to be that in religious motivations we have to deal with Œdipal conflicts and with pre-Œdipal situations whose interest has been reinforced and selectively accented as a result of regressive or partially regressive solutions of Œdipal conflict.

Theologians and students of comparative religion have emphasized the syncretism of Christianity, particularly in earlier formative centuries. By this is meant its capacity for absorbing and re-editing in its ritual a great variety of primitive rites and customs from different sources, the fertilization of its theology by the marriage of Greek and Palestinian-Oriental conceptions, and its adoption of a Roman pattern of organization. This formal syncretism is paralleled on the psychological side by the catholicity of its provision, not merely for the restraint but also for the sanctioned expression of infantile impulses which are otherwise taboo. The supreme instance of this is perhaps the Eucharist. By whatever name it is called this is the sacrament which is of cardinal importance to believing Christians of all creeds and denominations, the means of Holy Communion with Christ and fellow-Christians. The religious significance of the Eucharist is not adequately assessed by regarding it simply as a revival of the totem feast, although ' only in its tender and adoring sense, not in its aggressive sense ' (Freud, 1939, 141). The Catholic Mass, perhaps, exhibits best the ultimate personal significance of the Sacrament. The Mass offers an almost exact parallel to the manic-depressive's relations to his idealized ' good object ' and to the attitudes described by Melanie Klein (1935) as typical of a ' depressive position '. All Christian sects enjoin some form of baptismal re-birth and confirmatory initiation prior to admission to Communion and stress the need of mental preparation and a right spirit in approaching the Sacrament. The Catholic must undergo a more or less immediate antecedent purification, i.e. he must confess, repent and receive absolution : he must go to Mass fasting and must swallow the consecrated wafer whole. Every precaution is thus taken to preserve the idealized object from cannibalistic destruction. The Catholic reservation of the Host carries on the manic-depressive parallel. The spiritual renewal and worshipful refreshment, which is the gift of sacramental grace to the true believer, appears as a sublimated version of infantile suckling fulfilment, in the form of loving, uninjuring incorporation of the idealized object. It is, at the same time, the reward and the substitute for the relinquishment of Œdipal erotic aspirations.

For Christians the diabolical connotations of oral sadism and greed are unmistakeably demonstrated in C. S. Lewis's *Screwtape Letters* (1942). Writing to his apprentice Wormwood, that accomplished fiend Screwtape says (*ib.* 45) : ' To us a human is primarily food ; our aim is the absorption of its will into ours, the increase of our own area of self-hood at its expense. But the obedience which the Enemy demands of men is quite a different thing. . . . We want cattle who can finally become food ; He wants servants who can finally become sons. . . . Our war aim is a world in which Our Father below has drawn all other beings into himself ; the Enemy wants a world full of beings united to him but still distinct.' The signature of Screwtape's final letter runs (*ib.* 160) : ' Your increasingly and ravenously affectionate uncle, Screwtape.' The late Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple, gave the following definition of peace (1944, 39) : ' Peace as the goal of our striving, that peace the makers of which are blessed, must be nothing less than this : Goodwill effectively maintained against every form of greed.'

It is important for the psychologist to become fully informed of the archaic-infantile content of dogma and ritual, but this should not lead him to overlook the provision made in ritual and prayer for the satisfaction of impulse and the recovery of otherwise lost instinctual energy in the believer. It soon becomes apparent that Christianity caters not only for obsessional characters but also for a much greater variety of psychological types. As will be seen later, it can be argued that to a person of truly religious temperament, his religion is a sublimation rather than a disease. The distinguishing feature of Christianity is its emphasis on personal love : ' He that loveth not, knoweth not God ; for God is love ' (John, iv, 8) ; ' In love the *whole* spiritual life of man consists ' (Aquinas, *On Perfection*, Opusculum XVIII, cap. 1). This rôle of love in Christianity is most apparent in the accounts given by the mystics of their religious experience, to which some attention must now be given.

(5) The Nature of Mystical Experience

After all, it seems only logical to expect that the study of religious experience and of the methods employed to foster the ' spiritual life ', i.e. mystical technique, would yield more exact knowledge of the personal significance of religion than enquiry into ritual and dogma, informative though these are. The difficulty is that a thorough study of mystical experience would be a life-work ; the

literature of Christian mysticism is voluminous and much of it is couched in language hard to understand. Baron von Hügel, a mystic's mystic in the sense in which one speaks of a novelist's novelist, wrote a book called *The Mystical Element in Religion as Studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and Her Friends* (1909) which is considered by many religious people to be the greatest modern work on the subject, but is generally agreed, even by them, to be hard to follow. For present purposes I have used the work of Evelyn Underhill, a recognized authority in this country, who has the great advantage of writing simply and directly in everyday language. I have also referred to such modern non-technical publications as Sackville-West's *The Eagle and the Dove*, Almedingen's *Dom Bernard Clements*, S. B. Frank's *God with Us*, etc. It seemed that it would be easy for anyone like myself, not thoroughly conversant with the whole literature, to choose unrepresentative quotations from the sayings of mystics. With a few exceptions, quotations from the writings of the Saints are re-quoted from the modern authorities, thus affording a better guarantee that they are representative than they would have had as first-hand choices of my own.

Mysticism is not limited to Christianity. *Oriental mysticism*, however, frequently though not invariably repudiates life and seeks peace in the annihilation of individuality over and above the surrender of personal self-will. Thus, the attainment of Nirvana seems to a psycho-analyst to involve the profoundest possible regression to pre-natal primary identification. In striking contrast, the main line of Christian mysticism is active rather than quietist. Consciousness of self may, indeed, be lost in ecstasy but more frequently the ' creaturely sense ' is retained in some degree. The Christian aim is less absorption into God than active participation in the Divine Life and utilization of the gifts of the Spirit for other people, through prayer and deeds. There is considerable variety of character and personality among the Saints and corresponding diversity in their experience and in their technique but, for those drawn to pursue it, the way of the Spirit seems to be a very positive way of life which bears positive fruit. It would appear, however, that ' strait is the gate and narrow is the way ' and that ' many are called but few are chosen '.

The Christian Saints have all been great lovers of God. With one accord they insist on what, in theological terms, is called the ' prevenience ' of God and is more simply described by Evelyn Underhill (1946, 110–11) in a definition of mysticism as ' Man's conscious Godward trend ; the response of his small dependent spirit to the pressure and invitation of the real God, the magnet of the universe. Such a definition as that relieves us from narrow and exclusive conceptions ; since God's demand on the soul is a universal truth experienced by different men in many different ways and degrees '. Human love of God begins in response to Divine Love. S. B. Frank writes (1946, 76) : ' Religious experience is a special kind of experience the essence of which may be best defined as *communion*.'

It will spring to mind that this living communion initiated by God is paralleled by the infantile libidinal relationship with the mother. Primary identification and the infant's innate libidinal capacity are pre-disposing and determining factors in this relationship, but it cannot flower into a mutual communion unless initiated and sustained by maternal love. Whether a happy suckling period and innately high libidinal capacity are preconditions of adult love of God is one of those possibilities it may be very difficult to determine with any certainty. There is a passage in Book I of the Confessions of St. Augustine, which I have not seen quoted elsewhere, but which seems highly relevant in this connection. St. Augustine writes (1930 ed., 17–18 ; Book I (VI) 7), in describing God's mercies in infancy : ' Thus there received me the comforts of woman's milk. For neither my mother nor my nurses stored their own breasts for me ; but Thou didst bestow the food of my infancy through them, according to Thine ordinance, whereby Thou distributest Thy riches through the hidden springs of all things. Thou also gavest me to desire no more than Thou gavest ; and to my nurses willingly to give me what Thou gavest them. For they, with an heaven-taught affection, willingly gave me, what they abounded with from Thee. For this my good from them, was good for them.' It is possible for suckling experience to be so satisfactory that no later gratifications approach the same high level. In such circumstances mysticism might well provide the answer to needs which no adult human relationship could supply.

Some religious people retain throughout life conspicuously affectionate relationships with one or other of their parents. The outstanding historical example is that of St. Augustine and his mother, St. Monnica. In modern times a particularly close relation of mutual understanding and affection existed between the Anglo-Catholic Benedictine, Dom Bernard Clements, and his mother. His biographer writes (Almedingen, 1945, 7) : ' There lived but one woman in his life, and she was his mother.' William Temple (1944, 5) wrote of ' my own father, of whom I say nothing except that he was and is, among men, the chief inspiration of my life '. However, it is impossible to say, at present, whether these relations are more common in religious families than in others or how common they are among the religious.

Persons to whom religion offers a working solution of their life problems seldom appear in the consulting-room, whereas many appear who have failed to gain adequate help from religion. These ineffectively religious patients usually lament their

loss of faith and their estrangement from God. Such states of mind are ordinarily found in conjunction with a high degree of unresolved infantile ambivalence, which may or may not be accompanied by conscious hatred of parents and parent-substitutes. It would seem, however, that the libidinization of parental relations achieved by some religious people is often, though not invariably, purchased at high cost. It may demand the sacrifice of all normal adult heterosexual relationships, and even the surrender of individual responsibility for a life under authority. Dom Bernard Clements not only lived a celibate life, but in his forties, he was constrained to give up his independent parish and in due course to take the vow of absolute obedience to the Benedictine Rule. Discussing this step, Almedingen says (1945, 35): 'The freeing of a will in the undoubtedly harsh school of absolute submission is, indeed, as Donne said about another majestic truth—"Stone to philosophers, and milk to faith".' It is difficult to read Dom Bernard's biography without being impressed, on the one hand, by the intensity and sincerity of his faith and, on the other, by the depressive-obsessional character of his personality.

No rapid survey can do justice to the depth and strength of feeling displayed by true lovers of God or to the richness of their imagery. Every aspect of infantile life seems to be included in the scope of their religious experience. Infantile suckling drives take a prominent place and appear in intellectual description as well as in personal worship and adoration. Thus, Evelyn Underhill writes that mysticism is (1946, 107) 'to use a favourite phrase of Baron von Hügel, a "metaphysical thirst". A mystic is not a person who practices unusual forms of prayer, but a person whose life is ruled by this thirst'. But thirst is not the only primary need to receive both direct and sublimated expression. In another place, Evelyn Underhill writes (1927, 157): 'Those have not been among the least of the saints who have recognized in the Beatific Vision itself some equivalent for the sense-conditioned experiences of men; and been humble enough to accept the supernatural with and through these its natural veils. "What do I love when I love Thee?" says St. Augustine. "I love a certain kind of light, and voice, and fragrance, and a kind of food and embrace, when I love my God: a light, melody, fragrance, food, embrace of the inner man. Where for my soul that shines which space does not contain, that sounds which time does not sweep away, that is fragrant which the breeze does not dispel, and that tastes sweet which when fed upon is not diminished, and that clings close which no satiety disparts." So too his English pupil (Julian of Norwich): "And we shall endlessly be all had in God, Him verily seeing and fully feeling, Him spiritually hearing and Him delectably smelling and sweetly swallowing." "For Thou," says Nicolas of Cusa, "dost abide where speech, sight, hearing, taste, touch, reason, knowledge and comprehension merge in one".'

St. Theresa's attitude towards God was at first quite consciously ambivalent. She refers to her 'hatred of our Lord, which I made so public', and says that her decision to become a nun was 'more influenced by servile fear than by love' (Sackville-West, 1943, 28). The influence of both aspects of her Œdipal conflict is apparent in many of her visions. Thus she saw the devil as 'a frightful little negro' (*ib.* 31) gnashing his teeth in despair at losing what he attempted to seize. 'She was one day in prayer when she found herself, without knowing how, plunged apparently into the infernal regions. The entrance was by a long, narrow pass like a furnace, very low and dark and close; the ground saturated with water and mud, exceedingly foul, sending forth pestilential odours and covered with loathesome vermin. At the end was a hollow place in the wall like a cupboard, and in that she saw herself confined. She could neither sit nor lie down, there was no room; there was no light, only thick darkness . . . in hell it is the soul itself that tears itself in pieces, with an inward fire surpassing all torments and all pain' (33). Of St. Theresa's book *The Interior Castle*, Sackville-West writes (1943, 48–9): 'God himself had supplied the basic image around which she built her Castle. . . . The precincts were horrible indeed "a mass of darkness and impurity, full of toads and vipers and other venomous animals"; but, once the infested entrance had been passed, God showed her "a most beautiful globe of crystal in the shape of a castle, with seven rooms, the seventh, situated in the centre, being occupied by the King of Glory, resplendent with the most exquisite brilliancy which shone through and adorned the adjoining rooms. The nearer these lay to the centre, the more did they partake of that wondrous light".'

Blissful experience, however, is not the element most emphasized by Christian mystics, rather is it their overwhelming conviction of the reality of God. To quote Evelyn Underhill again (1946, 110), 'St. Augustine's saying "God is the only reality and we are only real in so far as we are in His order and He in us" gives us in a phrase the central conviction of every mystic; and we notice at once its intensely objective character. Their concern is with God. He is. That is what matters; not the ecstatic feelings I may happen to have about Him. For mystics, God is the fact of facts.' Elsewhere she writes (1913, 228): 'The sense of intimate communion with a transcendent Personality—usually identified with the exalted Christ—is one of the best attested phenomena of Christian mysticism.' Frank writes (1946, 40): 'That which is immediately given us in the religious experience is a reality which we apprehend, on the one hand, as something primary, as the deepest source and the absolute foundation of our being, and, on the other, as something absolutely valuable,

giving us the supreme, perfect joy, satisfaction and delight.' Also (*ib.* 59–61) : ' In religious experience we have a peculiar and clear combination of intimate nearness with remoteness, or, in philosophical language, of the greatest immanence (which in this case is actual possession, a mergence of the object of experience and ourself) with transcendence . . . it is an immanent experience of a transcendenta reality . . . and it actually is such that we are aware of a living intimate contact with something that comes from afar, we are conscious that something taking place within us is an effect produced from without.'

The combination of the utmost intimacy with overwhelmingly mysterious unknowability characteristic of the sense of the ' Presence of God ' will again correlate in the psycho-analyst's thinking with the probable experiences of infancy. Nor do the infantile drives leading to emphasis on the omniscience and omnipotence of God require much elaboration. Any psycho-analyst reading Berdyaev's *Slavery and Freedom* (1943) will probably appreciate anew how imperative it may be to allay anxieties of helplessness and bondage through the recovery of omnipotence and magical wish-fulfilment in God. As Dorsey says (1943, 148) : ' Ideas of omnipotence (the necessary counterpart of the utter helplessness of our infanthood) are carried over into adult life because of our continued insecurity as adults.' In discussing Determinism, Wisdom says of the libertarian concept of freedom (1943, 146), ' Underlying it may be found the omnipotence of thought.'

Religious systems and religious persons vary in the emphasis they lay on the immanance or the transcendence of God. Quakers stress His immanence whereas most Protestant sects tend rather to assert His transcendence. The Catholic, Frank, writes (1946, 26–7) : ' Without going into the whole content of the Christian revelation we can see merely from what it tells us concerning the relation between God and man that it is the revelation of God's *immanence* in the human soul. The revolutionary significance of Christ's message is in His showing that God is immediately near, within our reach and that faith is *a direct knowledge of God*—a knowledge which may be clearer in babes than in the " scribes " versed in the Scriptures, the law and tradition.' The testimony of the Christian saints asserts both immanence and transcendence, a paradox which will seem inevitable and natural to anyone familiar with the mental mechanisms of introjection and projection and the difference between identificatory and definitive object-relationships. In the consulting-room we more often meet with immanent and transcendent devils in various forms than with experience of God. However, one woman known to the writer had two experiences in her late teens which illustrate both these aspects. In the first, while in great distress and confusion of mind, she was trying to submit herself and her problem to God in the sense of ' Thy Will be done ', when she received a blessing ; her consciousness was suffused with a feeling of peace and beatitude which seemed like the healing gift of a transcendent power. In the second experience she was faced with an exhausting task to which she felt inadequate. She spent a few minutes in concentrated prayer for strength. This time waves of energy seemed to well up within her, she went to the dreaded task refreshed and renewed and carried it through without difficulty. At the time, she herself attributed both these blessings to the grace of God, but both can be interpreted in terms of modification of intra-psychic economy. The first can be thought of as an experience of definitive object-love relationship between ego and super-ego ideal, a revival of infantile beatitude, and the second as a release of id energy for sublimatory use sanctioned by the super-ego.

Nevertheless, it remains true of most believers that, as Evelyn Underhill says of contemplative prayer (1946, 51) : ' No experienced Christian will be willing to allow that in such prayer he merely explores his own buried resources. He is aware, at least in his deepest and most surrendered moments, of real contact with a real spiritual order, however dimly and mysteriously known : and from this contact he does receive renewal of assurance and of life.' Her conception of the psychology of such prayer is given in the following passage (*ib.* 52–3) : ' We know in other departments of life that some of our greatest experiences and all our most fruitful intentions are undoubtedly prepared and matured in the subconscious deeps, and it is only their finished results that enter the conscious field. And this I believe to be true of the soul's deepest intercourse with God ; abiding unbroken in the depths of personality, and thence overflowing as a transforming, strengthening and cleansing tide into the consciousness which is sufficiently pure, humble and attentive to receive it.'

(6) The Economics of Mysticism : Sanctity and Integrity

Students who are sympathetic to religion often become too evangelistic whereas students who are antipathetic to religion often tend to underestimate its personal significance. There is as much ' for ' and ' against ' special pleading in the sphere of the psychology of religion as in politics. It is necessary to recognize that, for persons of religious temperament, who are by no means only obsessional types, religion can and sometimes does offer a positive way of living. To the psycho-analyst, the economic aim of Christianity tends to appear as the pursuit of ego and super-ego ideal integration, although Christians themselves, particularly mystical Christians, would maintain that it is the pursuit of total integration. The Christian conception is summarized in the following quotation

from Evelyn Underhill, although this has been abbreviated by the omission of some, not absolutely essential, passages (1946, 114–18): 'the great Christian mystical tradition . . . has a special quality which distinguishes it from those who have responded to the attraction of God from within other faiths. . . . It is different because it is based on the Incarnation, the redemptive self-giving of the Eternal Charity. The Christian mystic tries to continue in his own life Christ's balanced life of ceaseless communion with the Father and homely service to the crowd . . . and the more profound his contemplation of God, the more he loves the world and tries to serve it as a tool of the divine creative love. . . . This acceptance of our whole life of thought, feeling, and action, as material to be transformed and used in our life towards God, is what Baron von Hügel meant by "inclusive mysticism". It alone is truly Christian; because its philosophic basis is the doctrine of the Incarnation, with its continuance in the Church and Sacraments. Its opposite, exclusive mysticism, the attempt to ascend to the vision of God by turning away from His creatures by an unmitigated other-worldliness, is not Christian at all. . . . Finally, the thoroughly organic, deeply human character of real mysticism is surely brought home to us when we see how gradually a mystic grows, what hard work he is called upon to do, and how many things he often has to suffer in getting rid of all that prevents him from swinging easily and peacefully between the Unseen and the Seen; how marked are the moral and psychological changes which must take place in him, and the different kinds of prayer which express his increasing communion with God.'

'Most people have heard of the "Mystic Way" with its three stages of Purgation, Illumination and Union. Though this ancient formula, borrowed by Christian writers from the Neo-Platonists, cannot be applied rigidly to all cases, it does in a general sense describe the great phases of growth which gradually make our ordinary, faulty, earthbound human nature capable of communion with the Eternal God. All indeed have to pass through a process much like this on their way to the full living-out of any kind of life. The artist, explorer, scientist, philanthropist, must root out everything that conflicts with his vocation and impedes his progress—all forms of self-occupation, pride, ambition, love of comfort; all competing interests, pleasures and affections—and such self-conquest is the very essence of the mystic's purgation. . . . The reward of this courage and singlemindedness, this stern training in detachment, is always a great increase in knowledge and understanding. . . . But the fullness and creative quality of the life to which he is called is only developed in him when he passes, and usually by way of great suffering, beyond this to a further stage: . . . The mystics are fond of this metaphor—"I live in the ocean of God as a fish in the sea". That is the life of union, of conscious abiding in God; the full expansion of man's spiritual possibilities, and full satisfaction of his deepest desires. It brings with it great creative power. Once more we come back for our best definition to St. Paul's "I live, yet not I".'

True sanctity is, indeed, very seldom achieved by human beings. Psychologists and others have been quick to seize on the pathological affinities of mysticism and the frequent failure of its practitioners to attain their goal. These aspects were intensively studied by Leuba, but it is he who writes of the great Christian mystics (1925, 128): 'all of them, so soon as unity was established in their consciousness, have spent themselves without stint in the service of their fellow men'. It is Leuba who considers that the satisfaction of their fundamental needs in relationship to God (189) 'resulted in a substantial unification of personality. The latter parts of the careers of our mystics show them able to manifest the whole energy of synthesized beings in the fulfilment of tasks considered as assigned by God himself and achieved in close collaboration, or even in union, with him'. Referring to life as a symphony in which many instruments play their parts, Arthur Hopkinson says (1946, 23): 'No body of men and women have understood this orchestral view of life, or exercised more harmonizing influence in human relationships than the mystics. . . . They were, for the most part, many-sided men and women; some of them highly intellectual, many of them engrained with institutionalism, and most of them people of practical wisdom doing good service in their generation. They lived harmonized lives, which contradict by facts the popular conception of mysticism as a vague and profitless form of religious emotion.' The argument that the spiritual life, sincerely followed, is a way of sublimation and sanctity a rare but genuine type of integration rather than a disease, is certainly not without evidential support.

There are, however, aspects of sanctity which are not so satisfactory. For instance, 'there is a definite type of ill-health which dogs the possessors of great mystical genius. . . . The psychic pain and instability which accompany growth to new levels have their reverberations in the bodily frame. . . . The lives of Suso, St. Theresa and others, provide well-known examples of this bodily rebellion against growing spiritual stress; which mystical writers accept as an inevitable part of the way' (Underhill, 1913, 174–5). The pre-disposition to the love of God may be given by the earliest experiences of infancy, but, as it operates in the adult mystic, the love of God is a love moulded and crystallized by Œdipal idealization and the 'spiritual life' wears the aspect of a process of regression, prepared by the issue of the Œdipal conflict but set in motion in the adult by voluntary self-frustration. 'The lives of the saints are filled

with accounts of id vengeance exacted in such forms as bodily ill-health and persecution by the Devil' (Brierley, 1945, 112). Mystical literature indicates that the solution by the Saints of their problems of aggression was either masochistic and auto-plastic, or projective, usually a combination of both. It is tempting to surmise that St. Theresa of Avila would have died at a much earlier age had she not found a sanctioned outlet for her strong aggressive drives in a public career of convent reform.

The argument that sanctity and the life of union with God are psychoses must carry weight on account of the many pathological phenomena associated with mysticism, the evident psychopathic constitution of many mystics and the clearly regressive nature of the 'mystic way'. There is much to be said, for instance, for the view that the super-abundant energy, which is quite as characteristic of the Saints as their liability to ill-health, is a manic phenomenon bound up with the denial of reality to anything but Divine Love. In the present state of knowledge, it must be admitted that sanctity may be a benign antithesis or counterpart of melancholia and beatitude a very convincing form of euphoria. Schizoid affinities can also be adduced. But it is by no means certain that this is an altogether satisfactory diagnosis, at any rate in the case of the great Saints, in whom the effects of terminal 'unification' are most clearly apparent. In them the regressive progress seems to culminate in a positive redintegration which is, to say the least, an unexpected issue in psychosis.

There are two presumptive factors which might help to determine this result. It will be remembered that Freud emphasized the psychotic's denial of reality and finding of substitutes for it (1924, *Collected Papers*, II, 272–82) and that Federn more recently suggested that new psychotic reality is created by 'the gaining of reality by what has previously been mere thought' (Federn, 1943, Reprint p. 42). It is quite true that the Saints deny full reality to anything but God and that they accord him an altogether Supreme Reality. They are, however, not given to denying the phenomenal realities of everyday life and current conditions. They simply 'value' nothing but the Divine Love. Neither is it certain that, apart from the distortion effected by idealization, they create any wholly new reality. It may be that the infantile experience to which they regress and which is so clearly mirrored in the descriptions quoted above is historically real. 'Except ye become as little children, ye cannot enter the Kingdom of Heaven.' Perhaps the Saints enter the Kingdom of Heaven, after they have re-traversed the intervening developmental hells and purgatories, because they were peculiarly blessed in infancy. There is no positive proof but it is possible that the redintegration of the Saints is successful because their 'spiritual' regression ends in the revival of satisfactory infantile experience: their subsequent idealization may derive from early sensory-affective enjoyment of actual blissful communion. The second factor is the high personal capacity of the Saints for active loving; this is well attested by the circumstantial evidence. The accounts of their lives may be inaccurate in many respects, but they are unanimous on this point and such unanimity is probably not without some basis in fact. The term 'love' covers a wide range of human emotions and sentiments, some of which attain great refinement and sublimatory differentiation. Father D'Arcy has published a comprehensive and erudite book called *The Mind and Heart of Love* (1946), but a simple tale like *Silver Fountains* (Mackinder, 1946) will bring home to the reader the quality of the loving-kindness which is 'Christian charity'. The contrast between charity and the cruelty of formal piety is also strikingly illustrated in another novel, *A Woman of the Pharisees* (François Mauriac, trans. 1946). Loving-kindness is not the exclusive prerogative of Christians but it seems to have been quite unusually well-developed in the greatest Saints.

The unification of the Saints is a hierarchic theocentric type of integration dominated by the Love of God. It is selective in the sense that impulses and systems refractory to the love of God, and to His will tend to be projected or to receive somato plastic expression. Projected mechanisms are illustrated in or by the temptations of St. Anthony and the persecutions of many other Saints by convincingly objective devils. Many of the bodily distressed of the Saints suggest conversion phenomena. What is remarkable about the integrity of the Saints is not its impairment by certain inevitable dissociations but its validity. Sanctity would appear to be a positive condition in which by far the greater part of the total personality is God—centred and effectively dominated by the Love and will of God, as apprehended by the person concerned. It may not be too much to assume that sanctity is the sublimatory positive of infantile sexuality in the same way that neurosis is described as the negative of perversion. This way of thinking of it helps to explain both the rarity of its achievement and its status as a type of integration. It would seem that the price of sanctity is total sublimation of genital drives and total surrender of ego-direction to super-ego control. In the conduct of life, this surrender may take the form of obedience to spiritual and practical direction by superior ecclesiastical authority. The symbolic significance of surrendering personal iniative in order to become an instrument of the Divine Will need not be laboured here. The wholeness of the Saints is proportionate to the completeness of their sublimation and to the inclusiveness of their surrender to Supreme Reality, the incomprehensible and indescribable God who is, nevertheless, indubitably experienced as Love.

Even if the unification of the Saints is to be thought of as self-cure rather than disease, the impression remains that the integration of sanctity should, nevertheless, be regarded as a striking variation rather than as the end stage of the main line of human development. The true spiritual vocation is very rare and the findings of psycho-analysis suggest, very definitely, that the high road for the majority does not lead to super-ego autocracy and selective idealization, but to a more inclusive and democratic harmonization of id, ego and super-ego systems, to the development of more comprehensive reality-sense, and to the more enlightened ego-direction of personal life.

(7) Intelligence and Religious Experience

We have outgrown the earlier naïve belief in the omnipotence of Reason, that modern Lucifer, and are more fully aware that intelligence is a subjectively conditioned and fallible instrument. But recognition of the fact that the ego is the executive manager and not the master of individual life does not in any way diminish the importance of its adaptive functions. The increase in understanding and ability to control themselves so needed by human beings to-day, can come about only through the general development of a more balanced psychological reality sense, through which awareness of subjective experience would become capable of intelligent interpretation as well as of direct description in its own terms.

Spiritual experience, in the main, seems to pertain to that level of directly convincing or self-evident awareness that is characteristic of first-hand perceptual experience of the outer world. This character accounts for Jung's hypothesis of the ' objective ' psyche and its archetypes and for the mystic's conviction that religion is the only true realism. Intelligent appreciation of subjective experience, whether spiritual or perceptual, demands the application of conceptual thinking to the data of experience and not merely explanation of the experience at its own level in terms of what it feels like. It may be that spiritual experience is both informative and misleading in the same way as perceptual experience. Human intelligence in the form of conceptual thinking has corrected our perceptual impression that the sun rises and sets. It is to the same intelligence that we must look for the necessary correction and evaluation of religious experience. The experience is indubitable, and in spite of the inadequacy of verbal description, its general character of overwhelming conviction of the Presence and Love of God (the Beatific Vision) is established beyond question. But, whereas Jungian theory would explain it as objective archetypal experience, psycho-analytic findings support the hypothesis that the experience involves definitive object-relationship between ego and loving super-ego ideal (so long as the ' creaturely sense ' is retained) which may, or may not, resolve into the identificatory relationship of the ' *unio mystica* '.

Jung regards individuation (his technical term for the integrative process which results in ' finding the self ') as the goal of life, but ' Jung has said that nobody is really cured " who did not regain his religious outlook " ' (Gerard Adler, 1945, 218). This suggests that Jung's two-fold conception of psychic structure easily leads to failure to discriminate between various ways of ' finding the self ', a failure against which psycho-analytic three-fold conceptions are a more effective safeguard. It is likely that further research will support the view that the integration of sanctity with its idealization of super-ego love, its denigration of ego and id and its repudiation of aggression, is economically a different phenomenon from the redintegration which comes about through increase in ego-ability to tolerate psychological reality and to accept, with comparative serenity, all the constituents of the total personality. It is this latter type of integration, which perforce includes but, in so doing tends to modify idealization-denigration, that is the type that every psycho-analyst strives to initiate in his patients, whether he describes his aim in these or in other terms. The technique of psycho-analysis may display all the individual variations inseparable from the exercise of personal skill because practice is, after all, an art based on scientific principles. But such variations do not affect its fundamental implication that it is possible for men and women, albeit with countless reservations, to develop a more balanced reality-sense. This is equivalent to saying that it implies the possibility of integration through harmonization of the total personality.

Being and knowledge of life are not identical and the application of knowledge to living requires wisdom, accurate empathy as well as accurate information. But it is a fact that knowledge, applied with only moderate wisdom, can increase ability to live and can reinforce integrative propensities. Knowledge is not the traveller; its function is to serve as a map of the country through which the human life-journey is made. Psycho-analytic terminology and matter-of-fact common-sense are prosaic and it is easy to understand and sympathize with the preference of idealists for the more romantic and symbolically satisfying phraseology of Jung. Psycho-analysis, however, is not content to accept spiritual or ' archetypal ' experience at its face-value as a subjective fact of an order inaccessible to cognition. On the contrary, it maintains that intelligence can and should be brought to bear on all the data of experience and it is determined to further the objective knowledge of mental dynamics and economics in order to aid and safeguard the development of personal integrity. The assumption is that the more men know about themselves, the better their chances will be of coming to life-promoting terms with

themselves. Effective understanding of human nature will never be achieved without the application of intelligence to the full range of subjective experience. The fallibility of reason and its subjective conditioning should not dissuade us from its use but should persuade us to use it to the full with all the safeguards that can be devised. These safeguards include the pooling and collation of our interim findings with those of as many other workers as possible.

(IV) 'PSI' OR 'PARANORMAL' PHENOMENA

(1) Psychology and Ultimate Issues

Certain kinds of explanation may appeal to psycho-analysts: for example, (*a*) that religious experience may be of an order comparable to perceptual experience and that it may, therefore, yield impressions that are misinterpretations of objective facts; and (*b*) that conviction of the objectivity of God may pertain to certain experiences of definitive object-relationship between ego and super-ego systems. Such explanations, however tentative and incomplete they may be, are consonant with many phenomena with which psycho-analysts have become familiar in situations that are not directly connected with religion. But purely psychological explanations of religious experience are very unlikely to be acceptable to convinced Christians, and psycho-analysts cannot hope to prove beyond many shadows of doubt that any description of the intrapsychic economy of mystical experience is completely exhaustive of such experience. To the mystic, psychology cannot explain away the overwhelming realness of Divinity any more than physiology can explain away the realness of mental life, and the mystic can argue that he has no more to fear from progress in knowledge of the psychology of religion than has the psychologist to fear from advances in brain physiology. Those who hold that man consists of body, mind and spirit (or soul) usually seem to equate mind with consciousness or intelligence. Psychologists, as persons, have as much or as little right as other persons to express their opinions on ultimate issues, but as psychologists, they have the right to speak with that modicum of authority accorded to specialists only on matters pertaining to psychology.

It was noted earlier that the Jungian concept of tension between nature and spirit corresponds, more often than not, to what psycho-analysts prefer to describe as tension between id and super-ego organizations. It should, however, be remembered that although Jungian theory is more acceptable to Catholics than is psycho-analysis, Jung's own arguments are in favour of the existence of objective psychic archetypes of divinity and are not arguments for or against the existence of God. Whatever the personal convictions of individual analysts, from Freud on the one hand to Pfister on the other, one must recognize that the findings of psycho-analysis, even when far more complete than they are at present, can explain only the psychology of religion and indicate the parallels between the comparative history of religion and the phylogency and ontogeny of mental development. Psycho-analysis already has much to say about the psychological determination of conceptions of God and relationships to God. But psycho-analysis can offer no ultimate explanation of life and the universe although it may affect the balance of probability between competitive theories. This matter has been discussed by Flugel (1945, 263–5). As between science and religion, dogmatic assertion that evolution has come about by chance is no more justifiable than dogmatic assertion that it is the expression of Divine Will.

However much theologians may emphasize the limitations of the human mind and its inability to comprehend God, theological explanations seldom proceed far without attributing human motivations to God: human thinking is always human thinking. Many religious people have been driven to admit that the problem of suffering is intellectually insoluble on the premiss that 'God is Love'. Here the psycho-analyst is less completely baffled since he can begin with the intellectually credible assumption that the primary function of pleasure and pain is self- and race-preservative and he can thus view their later developments as secondary elaborations of a basically discriminatory rôle. All adults retain some unconscious beliefs in supernatural agencies; these are a heritage from infancy and possibly from our ancestors. Agnosticism seems the only fitting attitude for intelligence *vis-à-vis* ultimate issues, once it is realised that we can only think about them by analogy with human experience.

Primitive religious theories do not always lack a substratum of objective reality. There is biological justification for worshipping the sun and the earth as Father and Mother. The description of creation in Genesis (i, 2), 'the Spirit of God moved on the face of the waters', is a poetical version of modern scientific speculations that life began on this planet through the action of the sun on tidal waters. The conditions of primitive human life were probably such as strongly to favour the idealization of light and the denigration of darkness.

The would-be realist must admit that man and the universe are 'given' and not man-created and that the ability of human beings to modify themselves and to change their environment are subject to conditions which are not of their own making. For psycho-analysis, acceptance of 'given facts' includes the acceptance of the dynamics and economics of mental life and should, in my opinion, also include the demotion of the reality-ego from

mastery to management. However the balance of probability may alter, in view of the ' givenness ' of life and the universe, it will always remain possible to argue that there is a real God (or some equivalent) with as much claim to objective reality as natural scientists accord the sun. It will also remain possible to assert that complete knowledge of the intra-psychic economy of religious experience could not diminish His reality any more than better understanding of the intra-psychic mechanisms of perception eliminates the sun. Moreover, psycho-analysts have good reason to appreciate the difference between intellectual convictions of probability and subjective certainties of emotional belief, and to recognize that the grounds of belief and unbelief are to be sought in the sphere of infantile relationships and not on the intellectual plane. Intellectual atheists often show by their emotions and behaviour that they retain an unconscious belief in God. Attitudes of mind, once established, can be subsequently modified and transcended, but they can never be eliminated: human thinking may transcend animism, but the latter will always be operative within it.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the study of psychology necessarily blunts emotions of awe and wonder. On the contrary, research in psycho-analysis is just as likely to increase as to diminish the impression that man is ' fearfully and wonderfully made '. The age-old argument from design is one that will carry some weight with any thoughtful psycho-analyst not temperamentally anti-religious. So will the argument, put forward by A. E. Taylor (1945) amongst others, that the assumption on which the most materialistic scientist works, that there are natural laws to be discovered, is a tacit admission of belief that there is unity and order inherent in the universe. Apart from such general considerations, intellectual assent or dissent from the probability of para-individual unities corresponding to the communion of saints or to the God of the mystics will be influenced by the degree of probability attached to inter-psychic, as distinct from intra-psychic, experience. The reliability of evidence for telepathy, survival and such matters, is relevant here. It is, therefore, necessary to consider very briefly the scientific position regarding that field, variously labelled by different workers, but described with convenient brevity by Thouless as ' Psi ' phenomena.

(2) Telepathy

In his Presidential Address to the Society for Psychical Research (reprinted in pamphlet form, 1945) Tyrrell distinguished three principal groups of Psi phenomena which he calls ' paranormal phenomena '. He says (1945, 2): ' There are three main groups of evidence: (1) Evidence for the acquisition of knowledge without the use of the ordinary channels of sense. (2) Evidence of communications purporting to come from the dead. (3) Evidence for certain types of physical phenomena alleged to occur in the presence of a particular type of medium.'

The first group covers telepathy and clairvoyance. Many spontaneous cases have been reported but these are so difficult to verify that, in the main, they belong to the vast mass of anecdotal evidence which is viewed by scientists with justifiable misgiving. It will be remembered that the apparently telepathic dreams which came to Freud's notice (1922), left him agnostic on the matter except in so far as it seemed clear that any telepathic message received would be utilized by the dreamer for purposes of dream work in the same way and under very much the same conditions as an ordinary sensory stimulus. On the other hand, Ehrenfeld reported two dreams which he considered (1942, 322–3), ' suggest that in certain circumstances the manifest dream content may contain elements of what we have termed hetero-psychic material, that is, motives that show striking congruence and temporal coincidence—without being due to chance—with corresponding features in the mind of another person. This is what we are bound to term telepathy. . . . Our cases have shown that such an event, even in individuals with what we have called a psychic disposition, is marked by special emotional significance of the particular dream motive to either the agent or the percipient—or to both of them.' In a later paper (1944), Ehrenfeld summarizes the reports of Freud and other workers on possible instances of telepathy and suggests that the mental attitudes of patient and analyst in the analytic situation may be such as to favour telepathy in either direction. Judging by his own experience, he thinks that it may be telepathic influence that induces Freudian patients to dream Freudian dreams, Jungian patients to dream Jungian dreams and so forth. However, it must be admitted that, in general, dreams lend themselves to a variety of interpretations and the analyst's choice of interpretation is bound to be influenced by his own bias. Ehrenfeld himself concludes that (1944, 62): ' The prerequisite of any future discussion of the problem must therefore be in the obtaining of further and if possible more conclusive factual observations of telepathy in the psycho-analytic situation than our approach has been able to afford.'

Tyrrell considers that strong evidence for telepathy is provided by the ' study of trance-mediumship extending over many years, notably with the American medium, Mrs. Piper, and the English medium, Mrs. Osborne Leonard '. However, it is neither the spontaneous nor the mediumistic evidence, but the experimental study of telepathy that has given it status as a topic of scientific research. Much difference of opinion still exists among psychologists as to the validity and utility of the work, but the experimental study of telepathy has become a recognized scientific pursuit. Thus, in

America, Duke University has created a special Department for its study headed by Dr. Rhine, and Harvard University has devoted a special fund to this purpose. In this country, Trinity College, Cambridge, has instituted a Studentship in Psychical Research, first held by Whateley Carington ; whilst Cambridge University has awarded a Doctorate on a thesis entitled ' Paranormal Cognition ' (Bendit, 1943). Experimental research on telepathy is summarized by Tyrrell (1945) and described in much greater detail by Whateley Carington in his book *Telepathy* (1945). Both publications contain useful bibliographies. The aim of the experiments is, in the first instance, to establish the fact of telepathy. Rhine uses special cards, Carington uses drawings, and other test objects have occasionally been used, but the principle of most of the experiments is the same. Elaborate precautions having been taken to ensure that the subjects have no opportunity to receive information through sense channels, the experimenter chooses a series of test objects at random and the subjects or percipients guess what these are. Using appropriate statistical methods the score of right guesses has been found to be significantly higher than would occur by chance. Many thousands of such experiments have been done in the last fifteen years. The experiments and the methods of statistical analysis have been subjected to much criticism, but the experimenters are themselves convinced that they have established telepathy as a fact of nature. Dr. Soal, of London University, repeated Rhine's experiments for five years without success but, on re-examining his results, discovered that two of his subjects displayed pre-cognition since they guessed the card next ahead in the trial series more often than they should have done by chance, an occurrence which aligns with some of Dunne's views on Time.

Carington's experiments also showed, amongst other things, that telepathy does not diminish with distance, as would be the case with wireless or other forms of wave radiation. Carington noticed (1945, 66) that ' Some subjects . . . appear to pick up an impression of the linear form of the original without succeeding in interpreting it directly. For example, one of the originals in my sixth experiment was a Bow Tie, and I was for a long time puzzled by a striking and highly significant outcrop of hour-glasses in the drawings of these subjects, till it occurred to me that these were almost certainly misinterpreted Bows.' Such misinterpretation favours the view that telepathy is not a cognitive or intellectual process, but a matter of unconscious sympathy at a more primitive, even pre-verbal, sensory-affective level. A psychoanalyst would expect this, and it accords with the view of Thouless that telepathy represents a primitive means of gathering information, now largely superseded by perception. It also accords with Tyrrells conclusion (1945, 14), that ' The real telepathy is buried deep in the region of the subconscious, and we can say very little about its nature.' We know that Freud found the ability of some fortune-tellers to read the unconscious wishes of their clients to be more positive evidence of telepathy than had been provided for him by dreams (Freud, 1933, 45 *et seq.*). The experimental work so far undertaken reveals nothing about personal dispositions to telepathy nor about the subjective significance of the test objects to either experimenter or percipients.

In a discussion of objections and resistances, Carington (1945, 41 *et seq.*) attributes the rationalizations of some adverse critics to emotional resistance. He has not yet made up his mind (*ib.* 105), ' Whether some specific repulsive or dissociative force must be postulated in order to account for the mechanisms commonly known as " repression " '. However, he puts forward a purely ideational association theory of telepathy (*ib.* 59). His view of mind is avowedly most influenced by Bertrand Russell, but in some ways approximates to psycho-analytic conceptions of mental organization, although he does not appear to be aware of this resemblance.

It may be admitted at once that Carington uses his theory to advantage, but this success seems to be due to the fact that he treats mental life implicitly as dynamic and association as a synthetic force, although he presents explicitly an ideational atomic conception of mind. He says (*ib.* 96) : ' According to my present view, then, the mind consists of sensa and images, and of nothing else whatever.' He introduces the word ' psychon ' to cover any sensum or group of sensa or images capable of behaving as one. He writes (*ib.* 97) : ' I say, then, that the mind is a psychon system, or psychon structure, in very much the same sense that the body is a cell system, that a protein molecule is an atom system, or that a galaxy is a star system. The psychons are linked together into groups and sub-groups and patterns, and all these with each other, by the " forces " of association in much the same way that cells are linked by adhesive forces, atoms by electrical forces (" valency bonds "), or stars by gravitational forces.' He adds a footnote to the effect ' I use the word " force " only for the sake of vividness. It does not refer to any " real thing " any more than it does in physics '.

This brief mention will be sufficient to show the resemblance between Carington's psychon structure and the psycho-analytic conception of mental processes and their organization. It also shows the equally striking difference due to Carington's failure to recognize the instinctual dynamism of mental life or to allow for the fact that perception and ideation are mental activities always involving more than sensa or images ' by themselves '. A psycho-analyst might consider that a closer study of psycho-analytic and other dynamic psychologies,

including the American Gestalt work and the British Schemata work, would be a useful counterbalance to Carington's interest in philosophic theories of mind.

In regard to the evidence provided, one cannot doubt the honesty either of the work described or of Carington's own conviction that telepathy is a fact. The precautions taken against conscious or involuntary cheating certainly appear to be adequate: the present writer is not competent to assess the reliability of the statistical analysis. Caution is inspired, as Carington himself realizes, by the fear of re-opening the way to the tyranny of superstition by accepting insufficiently proven facts. The tentative acceptance of probable facts can only be advantageous and, therefore, the pursuit of truth in regard to Psi phenomena should be encouraged. It may be hoped that, in the future, investigators will pay more attention to personal and dynamic factors and not limit themselves only to quantitative methods applying in the main to the telepathic recognition of visual experience. Perhaps a fair estimate of the present position would be that telepathy has definitely become a problem for scientific research and that the work on it to-date has tended to increase rather than to diminish its probability.

The findings of psycho-analysis do not contradict the possibility of telepathy nor can they be said to be inconsistent with it They support the view that, if it be a fact of nature, it is a fact primarily of telepathy rather than of tele-cognition. The clinical evidence is that, if tele-cognition does occur, it takes place where relationships exist that are not dissimilar to those obtaining in hypnosis and other states of increased suggestibility. The phenomena appear to be motivated by strong emotional interests that are, to some extent, common to agent and percipient.

(3) Other 'Psi' Phenomena

Some of the evidence for 'poltergeist' phenomena and for communications purporting to come from the dead summarized by Tyrrell, is striking, but the impression remains that work in this field has not, so far, materially increased the credibility of survival, etc.: It would, however, be presumptuous to express a decided opinion without making a far more thorough study of the whole subject. As Tyrrell says (1945, 15): 'the researches of the Society for Psychical Research have been endorsed by the support of a number of eminent men. Clearly the research is not an attempt to reinstate the supernatural or to encourage superstition, as some critics try to make out. It is an attempt to explore a new region of nature, which is to be discovered by looking *within* the personality of man instead of *without*'. Among the things which psycho-analysis has discovered *within* personality are very strong subjective determinants of belief in immortality and in the omnipotence of thought. The gulf between natural and supernatural disappears if it is considered as the difference between perceptual and intra-psychic experience.

Anecdotal evidence of Psi phenomena not mentioned by Tyrrell is provided by the accounts of climbers who survive falls on the mountains, by aviators, and occasionally by subjects of dental anæsthesia. Some of these relate experiences of temporary externalization in which they observe their own bodies from without, falling through space or recumbent in the dentist's chair. There is also the problem of 'miraculous cures' which appear to involve almost instantaneous regeneration of bodily tissues; one such case has been described by Sackville-West (1943, 166–7). The authenticity of such occurrences, if they be authentic, in no way proves that the orthodox religious explanation of them is valid. At present, more is known of the pathogenic somatic effects of conflict and frustration than of the therapeutic effects of libidinal release and gratification. Instantaneous relief of fatigue is, of course, not on a par with regeneration of tissues, but many people must have experienced minor miracles of mental and bodily refreshment effected, for instance, by the opening up of an unexpectedly beautiful view towards the end of a long and tiring walk. Edmund Bergler's papers (1934, 1935) suggest a 'natural' explanation of some other Psi phenomena.

(4) The 'Collective Unconscious' and the 'Group Mind'

Any increase in the probability of telepathy tends to raise the probability not merely of inter-psychic communication or communion at primitive levels of mental development but also of various types of inter-psychic organization at higher levels. To most psycho-analysts, Jung's conception of the 'Collective Unconscious' does not yet appear a strictly necessary or indispensable assumption. But it is not an assumption that can be summarily dismissed as entirely lacking in probability, although, as Flugel says (1945, 270), 'the majority of psychologists still display a justifiable scepticism'. Flugel notes, however, (269) that Freud's conception of mass memories 'brings his position into greater harmony with that of Jung' and his racial archetypes, although Freud does not provide any vehicle for mass memories such as is afforded to the archetypes by the Collective Unconscious. In *Moses and Monotheism* (1939, 150–51) Freud wrote: 'The question arises in what form is the active tradition in the life of the peoples still extant. There is no such question with individuals, for here the matter is settled by the existence of memory traces of the past in the unconscious. . . . I hold that the concordance between the individual and the mass is in this point almost complete. The masses, too, retain an

impression of the past in unconscious memory traces.'

Jungian conceptions of 'individuation' accord with the views of those sociologists who maintain that primitive man was group conscious rather than self conscious and who interpret crowd psychology as a throw-back to earlier phases of development. Apropos of the question of the group mind, McDougall wrote (1920, 9): 'Some writers have assumed the reality of what is called the "collective consciousness" of a society, meaning thereby a unitary consciousness of a society over and above that of the individuals comprised within it. This conception . . . is provisionally rejected. But it is maintained that a society, when it enjoys a long life and becomes highly organized, acquires a structure and qualities which are largely independent of the qualities of the individuals who enter into its composition and take part for a brief time in its life. It becomes an organized system of forces which has a life of its own, tendencies of its own, a power of moulding all its component individuals, and a power of perpetuating itself as a self-identical system, subject only to slow and gradual change.'

The Gestalt field-theorists recognize the dynamism of groups and that 'The whole is different from the sum of its parts' (Lewin, 1939, 885), but all that is left of the group mind in theory is the recognition that the dynamism of the group whole is constituted by the dynamic interdependence of its members. Field theory is essentially a practical method of research in social psychology which employs diagrammatic representation and non-quantitative geometry ('topology'). Kurt Lewin (1939, 872) says: 'The field-theoretical approach is intended to be a practical vehicle of research.' The central assumption on which the method is based and on which the 'fields' are constructed is as follows: 'The psychological environment has to be regarded functionally as a part of one interdependent field, the life-space, the other part of which is the person. This fundamental fact is the key-note of the field-theoretical approach. In psychology it has become, in various forms, more and more recognized and can be expressed simply by the formula: Behaviour = Function of person and environment = Function of life-space' (Lewin, 1939, 878). The American psycho-analyst, French (1942), has made use of the field concept in his research work. There is certainly no support to be found among field theorists for conceptions of group animism. The Christian idea of the Spiritual Church constituted by the Communion of Saints is a conception of group animism involving both the living and the dead.

In popular opinion, and in the specialist opinion of the more enthusiastic exponents of particular views, it is often held to be supremely important to arrive at a final judgement on the issues raised by Psi phenomena. This seems a natural mistake in view of the strong subjective interests involved which tend to increase the anxieties of suspending judgement. No adult can voluntarily and directly change his emotional convictions or alter his personal inclination to certain beliefs, whatever their relation to his intellectual convictions and to his objective judgement on available evidence. But it is possible for many adults to distinguish between what they believe, or can infer that they unconsciously believe, and what they consider to be knowledge justified by evidence. So far as knowledge is concerned Psi phenomena demand continued suspension of judgement. The results of scientific investigation have not yet reached a stage in which they can be utilized as a factual basis for the conduct of life. However, whether we survive or not, and whether we are less psychically insulated from our fellows than we usually suppose, as human beings we are, in fact, interdependent and inter-related in our living. At the same time, however, we are also individual foci of vitality. The individual is a living being, whose psychological goal remains the attainment of optimum personal integrity. Our still rudimentary and empirical knowledge of human nature is already sufficient to indicate certain general principles of behaviour conducive to integrative living which seem unlikely to be affected by any future verdict on Psi phenomena.

(V) ETHICS AS THE PRINCIPLES OF INTEGRATIVE LIVING

(1) Introduction

If integrity be the goal of personal life, the behaviour of men and women must be directed to its attainment and the principles of ethics then become the principles of integrative living. It is clear that the personal and social aspects of ethics are inter-related and discussions of personal behaviour can never, therefore, be without relevance to problems of group and international behaviour. Although it is mainly the personal rather than the social aspect of ethics that will be considered in this section, brief reference may be made here to the similarity of their basic problems.

It would seem that optimal integration is as much the goal of world organization as it is of mental organization. The fundamental principles of governing nations and of bringing up children may indeed be identical, but their application will necessarily vary widely in different fields. In any given sphere of human activity, rules of conduct and stereotyped methods of procedure may be considered as efficiency devices comparable to the labour-saving automatism of personal habits. But, if group and personal habits are to promote and not to impede re-adaptation to new circumstances, then they must remain plastic enough to change

with changing conditions. The modern slogan 'planning for freedom' refers primarily to the safeguarding of individual liberty within the rapidly expanding framework of social organization. It also indicates the need for finding a working balance between efficiency and adaptibility, between stability and plasticity: a balance which has to be achieved alike in social and in mental organization. As Wolters writes (1945, 496): 'We demand integration and adaptation; but an integration so complete that all responses are psychologically automatic has gone beyond maturity. The person is over-ripe. Variability must be preserved for adequate living. . . . When the capacity for development is lost, death has set in.' Hence, no 'rule of thumb' codes of conduct are likely to retain permanent validity. It is only the basic principles of behaviour that can remain constant and then only in so far as they express real and enduring necessities of human living.

(2) Philosophy and Ethics

Although this section is concerned with the implications of psycho-analysis regarding the conduct of personal life and with their relation to Christian ethics, no attempt can be made to summarize the vast literature of Western ethics and moral philosophy. Some idea of its extent may be obtained from Bertrand Russell's *History of Western Philosophy* (1946) and Albert Schweitzer's *Civilization and Ethics* (1946).

No two authors could differ more widely in personality and mental approach. It is, therefore, all the more striking that they agree in their general appraisement of the failure of Western philosophy to solve the problem of ethics, that is, to provide a logical or intellectually adequate basis for moral conduct. Thus, Bertrand Russell writes (1946, 98, 99): 'The pursuit of truth, when it is whole-hearted, must ignore moral considerations; we cannot know in advance that the truth will turn out to be what is thought edifying in a given society. . . . One of the defects of all philosophers since Plato is that their inquiries into ethics proceed on the assumption that they already know the conclusions to be reached.' Schweitzer writes (1946b, xii–xiii): 'The process by which Western thought has hitherto sought for a world-view is doomed to be fruitless. It has consisted simply in interpreting the world in the sense of world- and life-affirmation . . . in adopting an optimistic-ethical interpretation of the world. . . . It is only when one has clearly grasped the fact that Western thought has nothing else in mind than to establish for itself a world-view based on world- and life-affirmation and ethical in character, that one can realize how in its theory of knowledge, in its metaphysics, and in all its movements generally in the game of life, it is guided, consciously or unconsciously, by the effort to interpret the world in some way or other, and in some measure, in the sense of world- and life-affirmation and ethics.' In Schweitzer's view Western thought has so far failed to achieve its end, not only because in its concentration on life-affirmation it ignores the tendency to life-negation so prominent in Oriental philosophy, but above all because the basis of ethics is not to be found in the world but only in the individual will-to-live.

(3) Evolution and Ethics: Psycho-Analytic Conceptions

The growth of evolutionary and comparative theories of religion was accompanied by similar developments in the sphere of ethics. The first contributions to a natural history of morality long ante-dated the development of psycho-analysis and were hampered by inadequate conceptions of mental life. Some of the views of later writers, in particular, Westermarck and Hobhouse, though apparently uninfluenced by psycho-analysis, approximate to certain of its findings.

Westermarck concluded that moral judgements and conceptions are based on moral emotions and his conception of the nature of these emotions shows remarkable insight. He writes (1906, 738): 'We found that the moral emotions belong to a wider class of emotions, which may be described as retributive; that moral disapproval is a kind of resentment, akin to anger and revenge, and that moral approval is a kind of retributive kindly emotion, akin to gratitude.'

Writing of the fundamental and unchanging interests of man, Hobhouse says (1915, 10): 'all these permanent qualities, which run through humanity and vary only in degree, belong to his inherited structure. Broadly speaking, they are of the nature of instincts, but instincts which have become highly plastic in their mode of operation, and which need the stimulus of experience to call them forth and give them definite shape'. According to Hobhouse, we move between the two poles of individual impulse and social tradition and there is always 'the modelling of each new generation by the heavy hand of the past' (*ib.* 14). Of morality itself he writes (*ib.* 14–15): 'That the moral standard of man is based on the character of man, though it sounds like a truism, is a principle which has been but little understood in modern ethics. . . . The instinctive element in human morality is by no means an unfailing power implanted by nature in all men to distinguish right from wrong. . . . Human morality is as blind and imperfect as man himself. . . . Let us, then, understand that human morality from the first rests on the antagonisms as well as the sympathies, the corruptions and foibles as well as the excellencies of human nature.' Hobhouse realized (*ib.* 35) that: 'The relation between intellectual and moral advance is certainly not simple or direct', but he lacked any conception of the intricacy of mental organization which enforces multi-polar rather than bi-polar adaptation.

Since the mid-nineteenth century the views of biologists on the relation between natural and moral law have undergone an almost complete reversal. T. H. Huxley saw morality as a reaction against the barbarity of nature, whereas his grandson, Julian Huxley, regards the course of evolution as supplying valid clues to the present and future direction of human development. He stresses the need for adaptive and dynamic as distinct from static personal ethics (Huxley, T. H. and J., 1947). A few modern biologists, notably Julian Huxley and Waddington, have sought to use the findings of psycho-analysis to elucidate the psychological problems of ethics. Thus, Julian Huxley traces the natural history of moral judgement to a ' proto-ethical mechanism ' for coping with infantile ambivalence. According to him (*ib.* 110) ' Primitive love conquers primitive hate by saddling it with the burden of primal guilt ; and with this the polarity of right and wrong becomes attached to our thoughts and actions '.

Waddington turned his attention to the bearing of mental organization on morality and concluded that the development of moral realism and scientific ethics was dependent upon more realistic super-ego development. Waddington's views appeared first as an essay in *Nature* (1942) accompanied by discussions to which the Editor did not invite any psycho-analyst to contribute. The book published later (*Science and Ethics*, Waddington, *et al* 1942), contained a correspondence with Karen Stephen, which turned largely on the nature of the super-ego and of goodness, and a short contribution by Melanie Klein. The latter regards the infant's anxiety and love-promoted reaction against its own aggression as the root of morality and considers that (*ib.* 87) ' in the depths of our minds our first longings to preserve and save our loved parents, and to reconcile ourselves with them, persist . . . whenever we have the feeling of moral goodness, in our unconscious minds this primary longing for reconciliation with the original objects of our love and hatred is fulfilled '. Money-Kyrle subsequently published two papers, the second (1944) a revised edition of the first, in which he in turn sought to establish the primitive morality of concern for the ' good object ' as a universal basis of ethics.

Although the whole of Freud's work is ultimately relevant to the conduct of life and he established the fundamental relations between ego-differentiation, morality and guilt, he himself did not display any particular interest in ethics, as such. Flugel's *Man, Morals and Society* (1945) is a comprehensive reference book to-date on the variations in personal morality which can result from diversities in super-ego organization and inter-systemic relationships. There is a special chapter (240) devoted to the ' Psychology of Moral Progress ', in which eight tendencies or transitions are listed as characteristic of moral development. These are as follows :—

(1) from egocentricity to sociality,
(2) from unconscious to conscious ;
(3) from autism to realism,
(4) from moral inhibition to spontaneous ' goodness ',
(5) from aggression to tolerance and love,
(6) from fear to security,
(7) from heteronomy to autonomy,
(8) from orectic (moral) judgement to cognitive (psychological) judgement.

These transitions (*ib.* 255) ' from one state or condition of a more primitive kind to another indicative of a higher state of evolution ' have been criticized as affording criteria rather than as being actual stages of moral development and the reality of moral progress has been questioned. From the economic aspect, however, Flugel's eight tendencies indicate transitions from less adequate to more adequate degrees of personal integrity.

(4) Super-Ego Organization and Ethical Realism

Social codes and personal standards necessarily interact and influence one another. Most psycho-analysts would agree that man has become a moral being because he is a psycho-social being, though they might argue that his sociality is, in the first instance, familial, and that he is first and foremost a family being. Few people are entirely free from familial or social anxiety in one form or another, or totally indifferent to public opinion. But psycho-analysis shows that personal morality is the result of super-ego development through which cultural standards are individualized and operate as mental controls of instinct. Super-ego control is effected by the diversion of instinctual drives from expressive to organizational uses.

Whatever the differences of opinion about earlier phases of development, there is general agreement among psycho-analysts that the basic organization of the super-ego is complete at the close of the Œdipus phase and the ground-plan of personality established by about the age of five years. The ethics of the individual are, therefore, based on values acquired in infancy and his moral attitudes, however much they may be elaborated and modified in later life, will be rooted in attitudes developed in infancy. It is well-known to psycho-analysts that the automatism of super-ego control too often results in measuring adult experience by an infantile foot-rule and in enforcing infantile adaptations wholly inappropriate to adult situations. It is evident, for instance, that Flugel's transition ' from orectic to cognitive judgement ' can take place only if the super-ego is well enough attuned to reality to co-operate with adult intelligence. Action taken by an adult may be right in the sense that it is appropriate to the current situation, but it may be psychologically disastrous if it has to be taken in defiance of conscience, however absurd and irrational the latter's demands may seem.

The perseveration of infantile attitudes in conscience would be less disabling in later life if the super-ego itself developed on a basis of infantile realism, but this is seldom the case. The more usual warping and distortion of infantile reality-sense has many determinants in the infant's own anxieties, but too often gains ample support from outside. The most important environmental factor which militates against infantile realism is the tendency of ordinary civilized parents to ignore or actively to deny both infantile erotism and infantile death-wishes. This tendency is due to the need of adults to remain ignorant of these matters owing to their own inability to tolerate their long-forgotten infantile urges. Western tradition appears to favour what may best be described outright as a psychopathic type of super-ego development, an assumption that is in line with the conclusion reached by Ernest Jones (1933) regarding the defensive-perverse character of the phallic phase.

It was said in an earlier paper (Brierley, 1945, 24) that, under the pressure of Christian culture, 'The Œdipus conflict tends to issue in a personality-pattern in which the frustrated and forbidden primary impulses are identified with the denigrated infantile and parental erotic and sadistic selves. The idealized asexual parents and idealized selves form a prohibitive control system in the super-ego organization.' In effect, the child often purchases a precarious ego security at a heavy cost of available instinctual energy. High charges of aggression, directed through the super-ego organization, keep in subjection the discredited impulses and the dissociated infantile ego systems. What can happen in the social sphere when a cultural super-ego tyranny is overthrown is amply illustrated in Fascism and Nazism. The rebel instincts attain dominance in their most inhumane and perverted forms and provide an exhibition of greed, lust and cruelty never equalled in scale or in the deliberation of its planning. For such revolutionary evils, a reinstatement of super-ego authority is no cure nor any insurance against worse to come.

It would seem, therefore, that there can be little real hope of any civilized fullness of living until the mental phenomena of infancy are as well understood and taken for granted as are the bodily events. If parents and nurses accepted the Œdipal and other mental crises with the sympathetic matter-of-factness they often display in regard to teething or learning to walk, sexuality and hostility could find a legitimate place in the developing reality-ego organization from the beginning and the super-ego would become correspondingly humanized and better attuned to reality. Civilization has certainly nothing to fear from the spread of more exact knowledge regarding infantile life; on the contrary, it has a great deal for which to hope. The frustrations of infancy which are unavoidable are many, e.g. incest wishes are doomed to disappointment by physiological immaturity. But how much more easily these frustrations might be surmounted if their nature was better appreciated by parents who could then help their children to dispense with the distortions of reality-sense which, at present, they so often reinforce. Similar arguments apply to the conflicts of later life, since every age has its own inevitable frustrations and its own possibilities of compensation. Fewer people would deplore old age, for instance, if they knew better how to insure themselves mentally against its obvious disadvantages.

If parents could be realistic about infantile problems and about their own relations to each other and to their children, this realism would act as a brake on Œdipal idealization. It would favour super-ego identification with more fully human parents rather than with phantastic asexual imagos endowed with omniscience and omnipotence. Humanization of the super-ego would facilitate personal integration, better relations between the generations and between the sexes and so, in time, better relations between nations. This world would be a happier and saner place if a tithe of the love now directed to various ideals were directed to men and women. People of every type and colour are more alike than they are different, and clearer appreciation of basic similarities would help to foster the sense of human solidarity so needed to-day. The giving of factual information to children about adult sexual life is a step towards a saner way of life, but complete sanity about sex and aggression, a fuller measure of personal control and ability to enjoy the rational use of all our instincts, must wait upon the growth of psychological reality-sense. This growth may be slow because of the urgency of the anxieties which have always made people resist new ideas and crucify their prophets; on the other hand, the extreme urgency of the present human situation may help to expedite it.

Clearly, where super-ego realism is concerned, parental knowledge of the facts of early development is not enough; it is the parent's emotional revulsion from infantile erotism and ferocity that are malformative in their effects. The infant does not introject what his parents happen to know about infantile life: he introjects their personal attitude towards it as revealed in their everyday relations with him. Neither a docile infant nor a lusty rebel is likely to tolerate, without conflict, impulses that are intolerable to his parents.

It is certain, however, that the most tolerant and understanding parents cannot do away with the many frustrations and crises in development that are inevitable in infancy. Anxiety, like other forms of pain and fear, is basically self-preservative and an incentive to growth and adaptation, although it tends to become self-defeating when exaggerated. But parent-child relationships are decisive in their selective influence on the child's potentialities and

in the degree to which they favour progressive or regressive solutions of infant life-problems. The child who is loved has clearly the best chance to develop his own libidinal capacities, not only in personal relationships but in many other forms of active interest in living. The advantage to the child of being wanted is a psychological factor too little emphasized by population experts and eugenists. In the same way, the infant whose impulses and feelings are recognized and respected for what they are, has the best chance of coming to realistic terms with them himself. The advance to greater moral realism depends upon the extent and speed of increase in psychological knowledge and its application to the development and modification of personality. The degree to which one can hope to attain a ' scientific attitude ' to ethical problems depends upon the degree to which one is, or can become, a moral realist. Any extensive development of moral realism is, therefore, likely to spread over a number of generations even in favourable circumstances. It would be definitely unwise to expect miracles of the first few generations, even of the most successfully analysed parents and their children.

(5) Integrity and Control by Use

The recommendations that psycho-analysis can already make in regard to the upbringing of children cannot be considered in detail here. There are no invariable or infallible rules, though there are general principles and a certain amount of more specific guidance as to the handling of critical life-situations common to all infants. In every case the principles have to be applied to a particular infant in a particular setting, and no ready-made programme will suffice. The general principles of integrative development are, in the main, the same as those which govern therapeutic redintegration which were briefly discussed in an earlier paper (Brierley, 1945, 110–11).

(i) *Libidinal control in relation to the development of libidinal capacity : libidinization*

Personal integrity is a libidinal end which is attained in the main only by libidinal means. Libidinal control, however, does not imply absence of all preventive controls and prohibitions ; it implies rather a common-sense *régime* in which spontaneity is restricted only when this is demonstrably necessary. Although innate libidinal potentials almost certainly vary from individual to individual, it remains true that love and friendliness tend to evoke love and friendliness. Libidinal control means satisfying the need for love without pandering to it and, on occasion, using preventive restraint without retaliation. The essential capacity which has to be encouraged to develop in the interest of personal integrity is the capacity for active loving. This was rightly stressed some years ago by Balint (1936). Where this capacity is well established, libidinal disappointments can be better tolerated because substitute relationships are more readily formed and aggression is more susceptible to libidinization.

The relation of libidinization to those other fusions of libido and aggression, sadism and masochism, has not yet been adequately explored, either in its personal or its metapsychological aspects. Sadism and masochism seem to be primary fusions of impulse, whereas libidinization is more usually applied to the establishment of libidinal dominance in a system of ambivalent relationships. Speaking purely descriptively, it would seem that libidinization implies the tempering of aggression by libido, whereas sadism and masochism involve the modification of libido by aggression. Primitive sadism seems to be concentrated on the achievement of the instinctual aim (erotic or food-seeking) to which the aggression is adjuvant.

Libidinization seems to be the most effective and the most directly integrative method of dealing with aggression, but it depends for success upon well-developed active libidinal trends and the absence of relatively stronger hostile and sadistic trends. The working balance of trends may change with the course of experience, depending on the responses elicited by the varying conditions of life.

A well-integrated adult may be comparatively slow to wrath and averse from vindictive reprisals, but he will take steps to protect himself against proven enemies and will not pretend to like people whom he dislikes. Infants, young children and immature adults are more volcanic in their responses. Their capacity for libidinization is correspondingly more dependent upon the behaviour of the personal objects of their ambivalent relationships. These persons must prove to them by experience that they are, in fact, more love-worthy than hate-worthy. Granted a favourable libidinizing trend, it is not likely nor even desirable, that the whole of any individual's aggression can be completely libidinized. What is obvious is that people usually need no encouragement to develop anxiety and aggression or to distort their reality-sense. They need every encouragement to develop their libidinal potential to the point at which they can deal responsibly with their disintegrative trends and can tolerate a greater degree of realism in regard to themselves and other people.

Personal attitudes towards life are not generated by intellectual convictions : intellectual convictions are rather pointers to emotional attitudes and beliefs. Optimism does not depend, for example, upon an intellectual conviction that God, man or nature are benevolent ; it depends upon conscious or unconscious affective belief, or faith, derived from experience of loving-kindness. Such faith makes possible intellectual convictions of the goodness of God or life. No conceptual system, as

such, can make life worth living or the reverse; the sense of worth-whileness and the sense of futility are equally dependent upon the adaptation of the personality.

People who see no hope for the brotherhood of man except in recognition of the common Fatherhood of God, or, for that matter, the common Motherhood of Nature, usually ignore the fact that family relations are the fountain-head of personal and social hate as well as of personal and social love. These idealists have a degree of justification inasmuch as faith in life and friendly attitudes towards one's fellows are ultimately determined by adequate experience of libidinal relationships in infancy and childhood. The child who never succeeds in developing a mutually affectionate relationship with either parent is not very likely to overflow with charity towards his fellows when he grows up. On the other hand, a child innately well-endowed and born to loving parents is blessed in his infancy and may in later life become a blessing to others.

Love and fear usually work together in promoting the control and modification of instinct, but if control aims at willing and intelligent co-operation rather than at blind obedience under threat, love is to be fostered rather than fear. The test of personality-pattern is much the same as the test which is now being applied to civilization: how far does it afford secondary outlets for interests frustrated in their primary intent, i.e. how far does it minimise discontent by providing new content? Zilboorg writes (1939b, 354): 'The measure of civilization is not in what is repressed in the individual, but rather in what is recaptured and gratified after repression.' Dollard writes (1939, 62): 'But socialization is by no means a completely frustrating experience. The seeming obvious intent of social organization is to maximize gratification, to permit of all possible impulse expression which is consistent with group survival.' The integrative rôle of prohibition would seem to lie in stemming expressions of instinct that are personally and socially mal-adaptive. In the same way, it is legitimate to employ force where this is the only means of preventing mal-adaptive behaviour. It should be emphasized, however, that prohibition and force are transitional means of prevention and that the only method which is permanently integrative and curative is the alternative disposal of the frustrated impulses.

The growth of libidinal capacity and the domestication of aggression are only two aspects of personal development, but it is more convenient to discuss them separately. Libido is essentially creative, expansive and relational unless actively discouraged, the overcoming of infantile erotic frustrations without impairment of adult sexual potential should not prove to be an insoluble problem for most children. The chief aids to the successful overcoming of frustration are to be found in compensatory relationships of affection and new interests symbolizing those that have to be relinquished. Apart from lack of affection and other directly 'blighting' influences, the chief sources of active discouragement usually arise from lack of realism in adults and from failure to suit adult requirements to infantile capacity. Once the primary libidinal impulses can be accepted and respected as the root from which springs the whole garden of human creativity and affection, a major source of discouragement will be removed.

One or other feature of the recapitulation theory has been criticized by biologists, but the hypothesis that the Œdipal phase represents an ancestral age of puberty accounts for the infantile climax of sexual development better than any other so far advanced.

The two-fold classification of instincts tends to minimise the actual importance of self-preservation in individual development rather unduly and diverts attention from consideration of the possible influence of ancestral occupations and habits of life, as distinct from family relationships, etc., on modern interests and pursuits. For example, acquisitive tendencies may still be facilitated by ancestral food-gathering; hunting certainly continues to be a lively passion, which also finds expression in purely intellectual fields, in conjunction with other trends such as curiosity, desire for mastery and so on. There are probably not a few Nimrods among the more ardent research workers in all branches of knowledge. The bodily effects of man's adoption of an upright gait are appreciated by anatomists and physiologists, but the psychological effects are still imperfectly understood, in spite of the fact that every physically normal child still has to learn to walk erect. It is tempting to surmise that our ancestors had something of a struggle to keep themselves upright in the earlier stages of this postural change and that human 'Excelsior' idealism may still be fostered by this originally utilitarian effort.

(ii) *Domestication of aggression: its preventive and auxiliary uses*

Libidinal impulses are generally considered to be more labile than destructive impulses, but this is not the only reason why the domestication of aggression is inherently more difficult than the fostering of libidinal capacity. The situations in which destructive impulses arise so often involve a two-fold frustration. Thus it is not only a matter of dealing with aggression mobilized by libidinal frustration and anxiety, but also of coping with the ensuing frustration of primary destructive urges. We readily accept the fact that libidinal frustration is painful and is resented, but we still tend to overlook the corresponding fact that frustration of destructive trends is equally unpleasant; proto-revenge

is doubtless sweet, even to an infant, and infantile helplessness plays as decisive a rôle in enforcing the frustration of aggressive wishes as it does of libidinal ones. The infant is just as incapable of gratifying what may appear to the onlooker to be whole-hearted wishes to murder as he is of fulfilling his positive Œdipal desires. If the painfulness of this inability to destroy and the intensity of primitive affects are taken into account, it becomes easier to understand that infants readily become anxious about aggressive tendencies before they develop any degree of emotional sophistication. It becomes credible that even very early frustrations should evoke intense reactions, and that these should revive in later situations in forms corresponding to the phase of development then current. The 'typical depressive phantasies' would then represent the final crystallization of a process which begins in infancy, proceeds through the ensuing phases of early development, and is completed by regression following Œdipal conflicts (see Controversial issues and proto-morality, above).

The disposal of frustrated aggression is, indeed, among the hardest and chanciest of personal and social tasks. Where the individual is concerned, frustrated aggression that achieves no secondary outlet is, in the main, disintegrative in its effects on personality-pattern. It is absorbed unmodified in the psychic economy, usually reinforcing super-ego sadism and hostility. In the main only, because such statements have to be qualified by recognition of the probability that a certain quantity of aggression is necessary to the institution and maintainance of some indispensable types of mental defence, e.g. repression. Hence, that modicum of inturned aggression which prevents the continued expression of drives in ways that have become futile or dangerous, serves a useful purpose and is basic to the development of mental organization.

Most civilized persons, however, labour under a surplus rather than a deficit of inturned aggression. Personal stability is usually favoured by ample provision for the expression of aggression, albeit in displaced and modified forms. But it is evidently an over-simplification to contrast the interests of the individual and the group by saying, without qualification, that the free expression of aggression is integrative for the individual but disintegrative for his group. Certainly, no society could maintain itself which permitted its members free and untrammelled expression of their aggressive impulses. The most primitive groups always institute social controls of murder and personal violence, just as they do of sexual relationships; the instability of 'capitalism' can be related to its failure to control the jungle savagery of 'exploitation' which is the rule when 'business is business'. But societies, like individuals, are continually threatened by the surplus of frustrated aggression which accumulates in all members who do not achieve adequate secondary methods of expression, particularly where their aggression is continually exacerbated by other forms of privation. In primitive tribes, communal participation in the infliction of cruel punishments probably acts as a safeguard to social stability (see Dollard *et al.*, 1939, 123 *et seq.*). One obstacle to the humane reform of penal codes, e.g. to the abolition of flogging in this country, is to be sought in the unconscious reluctance of law-abiding citizens to be deprived of vicarious satisfaction of repressed impulses to violence. The interests which used to draw crowds to public executions have not ceased to operate because people are now hanged in relative privacy; they have simply been deprived of an age-long customary outlet. This surplus aggressive tension on occasion explodes in revolution or in war. The increase in stability in a nation at war is a temporary effect, usually followed by a period of instability. This aftermath is due not only to the practical hardships which, in one form or another, accrue even to victors in war, but above all to the fact that aggression has again become accustomed to more or less direct outlet, whether in actual combat or in more purely emotional and verbal hatred of the enemy. It is much easier to rouse the dogs of war than to persuade them to sleep again.

It is often convenient, but always disastrous, to forget that instinctual energy, once mobilized, has to be expended or 'bound'. What is not discharged more or less directly or in mitigated symbolic form through muscular or mental motility, in work or play, will inevitably expend itself in modifying the psychic economy and in producing somatic effects other than voluntary action. While, on the one hand, mental organization may be said to result from the toleration of frustration, it is clear, on the other hand, that adequate integration may be rendered impossible by excessive frustration. It is well known that there are persons whose energies are so absorbed in (mental) economic vicious circles that their capacity for effective action is reduced to a minimum, and also that there are persons so intolerant of inaction that they go to pieces unless they are habitually busier than bees. For every individual there is, presumably, an optimum balance between the amount of energy that is needed and can usefully be employed in mental organization and the amount which is better expressed in action or thought.

The optimum ratio between energy used in organization and energy expressed in motility, whilst specific for each individual, will tend to vary about an average characteristic for each personality-type. Thus, it is usual for compulsive anxiety types to discharge large amounts of energy in a fairly constant stream of activity, although the activity may vary according to the individual from unproductive symptomatic behaviour to the productive and successful discharge of professional duties. Manic-depressives, on the other hand,

whether they are sick or well, usually tend to show an oscillating rhythm and to alternate periods of inactivity with periods of intense activity. Though 'do as you would be done by' may be a sound general principle of conduct, it is a principle that can be applied satisfactorily only if due regard be paid both to type and to individual differences. If one is schizoid-hysteric in type and one's neighbour is a manic-depressive or paranoid obsessional character, it will seldom be useful to treat him precisely as one would prefer to be treated oneself, or to expect him to share one's tastes and find satisfaction in the way of living that has the greatest appeal for oneself.

It seems probable that surplus libido is more readily dealt with in the mental organization than is surplus aggression. The charges of hostility that can be used to advantage in the mental economy are relatively low compared with the total amount of hostility often generated. In a great many people, integration would be favoured by a freer discharge of aggression than they habitually allow themselves. It is desirable, particularly with immature persons of all ages, to provide legitimate channels for the expression of hostility, while at the same time, avoiding unnecessary frustration and wanton exacerbation of anxiety and aggression.

The question of types obviously has to be considered in this connection also. Some types favour libidinization more than others do; the process is, in a sense, one of emotional compromise and comes more naturally to some schizoids and hysterics than it does to persistent dichotomists like manic-depressives and obsessionals. Any form of compromise is difficult for an obsessional: he has to see things in black and white, to hate and then to love, to quarrel and make it up afterwards. Generally, the most an obsessional can achieve is a certain moderation in the expression of his feelings in personal relationships and an improvement in discrimination as to the persons and situations that are really inimical or friendly to him. The 'militant constructiveness' cited by Money-Kyrle (1944, 168) as a normal attitude certainly represents a healthy and effective fusion of libido, aggression and self-preservation, though the militancy sometimes tends to outrun the constructiveness. This 'militant constructiveness' is, however, attainable only by persons capable of distinguishing the intermediate degrees of moral brightness between black and white and not by persons who are constrained to regard other people only in terms of the depth of their blackness or the brilliance of their whiteness. Intellectual and emotional detachment, whether displayed in relation to objective or subjective problems, to other people or to oneself, is another end-product of infantile ambivalence which can be very useful, but may become dangerous and life-thwarting if libidinization is inadequate. Mechanistic materialism is an example of the nihilism to which a too-destructive detachment may lead. The part-product of modified aggression that is of incomparable personal and social value is a sense of humour.

A greater capacity for libidinization usually implies a lesser need for direct expression of aggression, because this finds correspondingly more outlet in mitigated and displaced forms. We, in this country, are undoubtedly wise in holding fast to our freedom of speech and our cherished privilege of grousing at Governments. One reason why our party members do not shoot, knife or beat each other up, is probably the opportunity they have of blackguarding each other to their mutual satisfaction in the House of Commons. Safety-valves will be needed in all walks of life so long as the majority of men and women tend to be over-frustrated and under-provided with outlets either for creativity or for modified and unmodified aggression. The unifying effect of a common enemy upon a nation at war is a well-recognized fact, but the logical conclusion that a nation at peace tends to labour under a certain surcharge of unexpressed hostility is, as yet, less of a commonplace. It is also understood that idealism is strongly activated in war and can effectively sustain war-effort in soldiers and civilians alike, but it is not yet equally well understood that, after victory, the same idealism tends to militate against peace. We hear much less of the inevitable substitution of peace-time objects of denigration for enemy devils than we do of the need for ideals of peace to substitute for ideals of war, though the evidence of the devil-substitution is abundant. It is publicly and privately deplored that victory is followed by a renewal amongst allies of squabbles, suspicions and disruptive tensions that remain in abeyance whilst the fight is on, but it is far less openly acknowledged that victory in war and inter-allied and social discontents in peace are dynamized by the same forces. Idealization, by its very nature, is inimical to peace because it is inseparable from denigration and always involves a dual distortion of reality. Realism alone is favourable to peace. The rôle of sadism and masochism in this connection is discussed by Edward Glover in the new edition of his *War, Sadism and Pacifism* (1947).

Libidinization may be the most effective way of modifying aggression, but relatively unmodified aggression can serve integrative ends. The use of aggression, in the mental economy and in social organization, in the necessary prevention of such types of behaviour as really threaten well-being and stability, is clearly an integrative use. Prevention by persuasion is always to be preferred to prevention by force, but there are occasions, in both personal and public life, in which force has to be used as a legitimate means of prevention. Democratic societies are right in setting high value on tolerance, freedom of speech and association, etc. But the fate of the Social Democrats in inter-

war Germany is a warning against excessive toleration of forms of intolerance which aim at the deliberate abolition of all free institutions.

The preventive use of aggression is negative, except in so far as it is protective and its results conduce to further positive developments. The most usual directly positive function of aggression seems to be the reinforcement and intensification of instinctual aims other than those that are destructive in intent. A close alliance between hate and aggression certainly exists to-day, and, under primitive conditions, it may have been necessary to survival. It seems clear, however, that in the animal world aggression is by no means invariably associated with hostility. The hunting carnivore is a ferocious beast but it is questionable whether he could be said to hate his prey (unless it escapes him). It would seem more legitimate to describe his ferocity as appetitive, or greedy ; as primordial sadism rather than hostility. The animal's aggression is clearly mobilized in the service of his food-finding and hunger-appeasing self-preservative impulses. Animal matings often appear rough and violent to human observers, but there is no good reason to suppose that anything is involved in such behaviour other than sexual urgency, leading to the ruthless overcoming of obstacles.

The inference from animal behaviour is rather to the effect that aggression has natural and positive, auxiliary functions and is ' normally ' used in reinforcing other drives, in supplying impetus to surmount obstacles and in fortifying the perseverance required for any long-term programme of achievement. In libidinization, a more or less permanent libidinal preponderance is assumed. A libidinized relationship, for instance, is one in which ambivalent conflict is adequately solved in favour of dominance of libidinal attitudes towards the person concerned. But the stronger the libidinal personal relationship, or the major life-interest, the greater the amount of free or mobile aggression these can absorb in auxiliary employment. This is another reason why it is so important for individual and social welfare that people should make suitable friends and find work that can both engage and develop their personal interests.

Popular conceptions of ' escapism ' usually combine sense with nonsense. Inevitable frustrations are best accepted as such ; it is a waste of life either to kick perpetually against the pricks or to submit inertly to every blow of fate and flee for refuge and consolation to some realm of pure phantasy. But such frustrations can be ' escaped ' after acceptance if compensations can be found and the initial protest safely utilized. Where conditions permit, the aggression mobilized by unavoidable frustration can energize the search for ways of overcoming deprivation through the forming of new relationships and fresh channels of expression. Acceptance of life entails acceptance of defeat in many directions and on many occasions, but a truly sthenic acceptance will build upon ruins and pursue fulfilment in one direction after another. Re-adaptation of this kind will be piloted by libidinal interests, and self-preservation may supply strong incentives, but a large part of the necessary staying-power will be derived from aggression. This kind of dynamic and progressive re-adaptation is most favoured where aggression can become conscious and be allowed to play its auxiliary part in and through the ego-organization.

Conscious anger, which can be canalized to productive use, is an enormously energizing factor. Psycho-analysts take it for granted that capacity for hatred is as normal as capacity for love. Both are usually capable of displacement from personal objects to general aims. Any civilization founded on respect for persons and concern for their welfare probably demands a considerable shift or expansion of love and hate from persons to tendencies. The Christian, for instance, is enjoined to hate the sin, but not the sinner. All too often, however, conflicts of ideals lead to the bitterest interpersonal hostilities because the personal reality of the opponents is swamped by mutual denigration ; they cease to be fellow persons, holding different opinions, and become devils to one another.

Aggression, like any other instinct, is a premoral source of vitality, which can be used for any number of different purposes but can only be controlled effectively by being used. Anyone who has been analysed will tend to feel that fear of instinct has become second nature to men and women, along with guilt about infantile sadism and erotism. Modification of this attitude in the direction of greater realism is not easy, because mastery of these anxieties involves facing all the apprehended risks and dangers ; it means owning and doing one's best to assimilate aspects of the self that are usually ego-dystonic, tolerating aggression and shouldering the burden of infantile guilt, instead of trying to ' root it out ' or ' lose ' it. The burden of guilt and the remorse associated with it are often lightened, without conscious insight, by unconsciously determined programmes of reparation and creation, but the most stable solutions are those which dispose of aggression through the ego-organization and render it available for adaptive purposes. Ego-strength can be estimated, not only in terms of libidinal capacity and self-preservative adaptive plasticity, but also in terms of power of aggressive origin harnessed to life-fulfilling ends.

Human beings have most justification for fearing instincts which are frustrated and achieve no personally or socially acceptable outlet, because these are the personal and social pathogenic factors. It is perhaps even more true of aggression than of other impulses, that prevention of primary methods of expression, however necessary this may be, is an interim measure, liable to prove disastrous if no

proper provision is made for suitable alternative outlets. It remains true that personal and social integrity can be assured only by libidinal dominance, but such libidinal primacy can be achieved only in so far as problems of aggression find adequate solution. The 'Four Freedoms', if they could be established, would render the social task easier by reducing the continual exacerbation of anxiety and aggression which is now almost the rule. But freedom from personal anxiety about aggression, and from the threat to social stability and realistic world-organization represented by surplus frustrated aggression, can only emerge as more individuals acquire confidence in their ability to control their own impulses by using them effectively. Prophylactic prevention is better than cure, but prohibitive prevention can lead either to health or to disease according to the presence or absence of permissible and acceptable alternatives. Civilized living can offer plenty of scope for domesticated uses of aggression, but, so long as human beings feel constrained to apologize for having any aggressive impulses at all, aggression will not be taken for granted and properly catered for as an essential component of human nature. If aggression be regarded as the turning outwards of a Death instinct, the argument for effective external expression becomes all the stronger.

(iii) *Identification and object-love* (see also Brierley, 1945, 95 *et seq.*)

It is customary to decry 'narcissism' by comparison with object-love although it is clear that integration cannot be achieved without the use of considerable quantities of libidinal energy in mental organization. Inter-systemic libidinal relationships, e.g. between ego and ego-ideal, are the heritage of former external object-relationships, but mental harmony in the adult often seems to be correlated with adequate self-love. It is people who live on fairly good terms with themselves who are most likely to live on good terms with their neighbours. A person of ample libidinal capacity can afford the mental expense of libido to maintain adequate self-love without impoverishing his current external relationships. Even the less well-endowed 'narcissist', whose object-interests are weaker, is not doomed to a prison of ego-centricity. If he is at all capable of putting himself in other people's shoes, i.e. of projective identification, he can still expand his interests considerably. There are many people for whom identification proves a basis for more satisfactory relationships than object-love. Introjection of 'bad' relationships is not a completely adaptive process, because the ensuing identification of one or other aspect of the personality with the hated person promotes inter-systemic tension and not harmony, as is most clearly illustrated in melancholia. But identification has integrative effects other than those which result from the introjection of libidinal object-relationships which plays such an important rôle in the natural cure of grief and loss. Ego-identification, often accompanied by admiring conscious imitation, is usually a helpful solution of heterosexual rivalry and a good substitute for homosexual object-love. These varied personal functions of identification give it high social value and it seems likely that it favours the development of a sense of human fellowship quite as much as object-love.

Object-relations are essentially discriminatory; the number of individuals for whom any one man or woman can develop sentiments of personal affection varies greatly but is not unlimited. Object-love expands by repeated displacement, but its natural tendency is to concentrate on one person after another and to single out the beloved; it carries with it a tendency to isolationism and to the evocation of competitive jealousy and all the other forms of envy, hatred and malice in relation to intruders and outsiders. Even where displacement occurs from a personal object to a class of objects, or to a 'cause', the selectivity of object-interest often remains evident. Personal likes and dislikes will always remain selective and will certainly never cease to develop and to influence behaviour. War-experience attests, however, that fellow-feeling can be strong enough to override personal and national attractions and antipathies. The need for the development of a greater sense of human fellowship and solidarity is apparent; the possibility of such development is given in the basic similarities of human beings and the community of their most urgent needs; its actualization will depend upon many factors, including advance in realism, but it will never materialize without the aid of sympathetic imagination. Sympathetic imagination combines intelligent appreciation with empathy. Hence, fellow-feeling probably has its securest basis in projective identification, although it has other essential roots in various modifications of definitive object-relationship.

(iv) *Sublimation: the pilot function of ideals*

Instinctual energy that is not directly discharged, absorbed in the mental economy or diverted to symptom formation, finds expression in reaction-formations or in some of the heterogeneous activities commonly included under the omnibus term 'sublimation'. Generally speaking, in reaction-formation, super-ego and ego alliance against the id permits the expression of the dystonic impulse only through its opposite. The strength of the id interest and the difficulty of suppressing it may be gauged from the anxiety, often the fury, evinced by the subject if the appropriate

reactive behaviour is thwarted. The classical example is the fanatical housewife whose abode is not a comfortable home but a temple of human sacrifice to cleanliness and order. In sublimation, again generally speaking, the primary impulses are not finally thwarted but only diverted from their primary channels to secondary, tertiary and quaternary avenues of expression, varying in degree of displacement and mental 'distance' from the original aims and objects. The success and the stabilizing effect of sublimation depend upon the amount of instinctual energy that flows through the alternative channels with the concurrence of the total personality. There are innumerable degrees of failure and success, from inability to achieve any lasting or truly adaptive mode of expression, through activities of varying efficiency which meet with different kinds of interference, to the more stable grades of habitual and satisfying activity.

It is clear that sublimation is not merely desirable in the interests of society, but indispensable to the development of personal integrity. In spite of all the variations in capacity for sublimation linked with differences in tolerance of primary frustrations and anxieties, no one can hope to achieve any appreciable degree of personal integrity without some symbolic outlet for desires which are, by their very nature, unrealisable in their original forms and without some method of liquidating infantile (and possibly racial and communal) guilt. Every primitive culture known to us offers such outlets, and the beginnings of sublimation reach back into the mists of prehistory. It is common knowledge in the consulting-room that hobbies and cultural interests are usually items favourable to prognosis. The patients least able to benefit by treatment are often those so full of bitterness about primary frustrations, both infantile and adult, that they continue to rebel with fury against the acceptance of substitutes and 'second-best' gratifications. They persist in seeking to dictate their own terms to life, any other course seeming to them unconditional surrender to outrageous injustice.

The means of livelihood available to-day differ as widely in their psychological values as they do in their economic and other rewards. Agriculture is an arduous way of life, with many natural hazards as well as risks and difficulties due to the times, but, in spite of all its modern complications, it continues to offer a way of life profoundly satisfying in its human values. Many professions, for instance medicine, offer similar possibilities of integrative living. In industry the transition from handicraft to machine production took place without any regard for the preservation of human values, although to-day it is recognized that industrial civilization implies both psychological and material welfare. The 'humanization of industry' has become an urgent current problem.

It seems to be a valid generalization that sublimation always involves the diversion of instinctual energy from primary to secondary channels of expression, the displacement often being effected through the symbolism of the new activity. But 'sublimation' clearly covers a number of different processes of many grades and types, that are by no means identical either dynamically or economically. In 'A critique of the theory of sublimation' Harry B. Lee drew attention to a certain lag in psycho-analytic thinking about sublimation. He considers, (1939, 269) 'that the evolutionary character of psycho-analysis as a science has failed to impress itself upon this aspect of the theory, and that Freud's generalizations about sublimation have remained untested and unverified; through not regarding the concept with a perpetual tentativeness, we have neglected to revise it in accordance with metapsychological standards'. Lee is favourably impressed by the work done by Melanie Klein and Ella Sharpe in this field. Utilizing their work in a later paper, 'A theory concerning free creation in the inventive arts', he concludes that the artist's sublimation (Lee, 1940, 293) 'is the artist's *vis medicatrix naturæ*, compounded of synergistic and serial unconscious mental processes through which he transcends the miseries of recurrent mobile depressions'. This hypothesis is strikingly consonant with the views expressed by Ella Sharpe (1946) on the psychology of Shakespeare.

At the same time, the early conceptions of sublimation as symbolic gratification of infantile erotic wishes should not be too lightly dismissed. Although they are no longer adequate they are not, therefore, due for discard but for revision, amplification and co-ordination with more recent conceptions. For instance, it is probably quite true that, for the artist, the production of a work of art often has the significance of having a baby, but this does not preclude the creative activity from serving many other purposes simultaneously; it is quite evident that the newer hypotheses throw more light on the particular psychological conditions in which symbolic parturition occurs. Economic considerations alone make it likely that every well-defined personality-type has its preferred sublimatory trends. We are certainly not yet in a position to assume that all creative artists are manic-depressives but evidence is accumulating that creative art may be a most-favoured form of manic-depressive sublimation and 're-instatement of the ideal'.

It is in relation to sublimation and cultural development that ideals seem to play their most positive rôle. The negative aspects and the dangers of idealization have been, if anything, over-emphasized in this and the preceding paper (Brierley, 1945). The reason is that, hitherto, the positive aspects have been consistently over-accented whereas the reverse picture, the con-

comitant denigration, impairment of reality-sense and failure to libidinize aggression, has been almost totally ignored. Over-valuation of ideals is just as disastrous to any prospect of personal or social integrity as cynical under-valuation. The realist must accept ideals and their opposites as psychological facts and try to assess their advantages and their disadvantages. Insight into the process of idealization-denigration must deepen if any gradual transcendence of irrational idealism or materialism by a more integrative realism is to come about. Men and women are not going to lose their idealist and counter-trends any more than they are going to lose their consciences. To give up the pursuit of an ideal in favour of a worthwhile but more realizable aim is a difficult task because it involves heavy frustrations as well as anxiety risks. It often means giving up the hope of re-living infantile gratifications in all their absolutist bliss, giving up the illusion of omnipotence for the acceptance of personal limitation, and foregoing the certainty of revelation for the relativity of human knowledge.

Nevertheless, it is in the field of sublimation that idealization has most greatly enriched human life, although this enrichment has not as yet compensated for all the misery it has brought in its train. It is probable, however, that ideals have been the main pilots of creativity in sublimation. Obsessional undoing and manic reparative and reinstating drives function as incentives to sublimation through their connexion with libidinal ideals. Creativity which liquidates guilt is enhanced, in spite of the desolating gulf between vision and performance experienced by all inspired artists. At the same time, it would appear that creativity is impeded and stunted if it be limited to compulsive reparation, i.e. if its aim be restoration rather than creation. This is, however, only another way of saying that creative power varies directly with libidinal strength and its preponderance over destructivity. Sheer necessity for survival is itself a prolific mother of invention. Communal sublimations, e.g. the emergence of primitive agriculture and metal working, or modern industrialism itself, are always over-determined and are not susceptible of expression in any very simple form of instinct or relationship equation.

(6) Values

So far, it is chiefly the dynamic and economic aspects of instinct-control and morality that have been considered. The personological aspect of ' values ' and their development must now briefly be discussed.

(i) *Definitions and standards*

Human values reflect the complexity of the human psyche. Value is an abstract concept, used in various senses and capable of a variety of definitions. Most of these definitions have in common a scale of assessment of worth, whether the values in question are ethical, monetary, artistic, intellectual or belong to any other category. Every individual will be influenced by the standards of value that prevail around him, but every individual's scale of worth will also be intimately personal, the outcome of his own specific life-experience. Judgements of objective worth (in relation to objective standards) can be made in any field, but judgements of subjective worth are always related to personal feeling and need. The ultimate source of personal values is to be sought in the sphere of instinct and emotion ; the subjective valuation of other people, for example, is determined by the significance to us of our relations with them and may have little to do with any objective estimate of their characters.

Moral values in the narrow sense are characterized by two special features, their absolutism for the person who entertains them and their tendency to exhibit a sharp polarity between good and evil, in spite of the evident fact that everyone is good and bad by any definition of these terms. The definition of goodness and badness, e.g. the definition of ' the good life ', has been fruitful in controversy and weak in logic because the dependence of human values upon human nature has not been understood and knowledge of human nature has not been adequate. Definitions of good, for instance, alternate between hypotheses based on conceptions of Absolute Goodness as an attribute of God and relativist theories which see good and bad as fundamentally artificial human conventions, devoid of any trustworthy criteria.

Moral standards differ in various parts of the world and in various epochs, but they differ in essentials less than might be expected. This suggests that the most fundamental problems of personal development and social organization are the same for all human beings at every time and in every place. Many virtues are virtues all over the world and many vices are universally recognized as vices, though some virtues and vices are differently estimated under different conditions. Thus, the poverty which St. Francis preached as a virtue could conveniently be regarded by nineteenth-century industrialists as a crime justifying all the human degradation of ' cheap labour '. The estimation of physical courage and martial prowess has been consistently higher in Europe than in China.

(ii) *Natural history of values :*

(*a*) *Primary need* (*pleasure-pain*) *values : id and infantile ego standards.* Cultural variations, however, do not obscure the essential natural history of values. There is little dispute that the most primitive standard of goodness is satisfaction of need, instinctual gratification in a satisfying relationship which evokes pleasurable experience ; pleasurable experience, moreover, which we presume exhibits at first little or no gradation but

constitutes an ' all-or-none ' affective absolute. Similarly, the primitive standard of badness is related to the painful absolute of frustration. Gradations in pleasure and pain become appreciable as mental organization proceeds. The gratification standard, which is an immediate pleasure-pain standard of direct correspondence to need, is not lost during later development though it may be superseded or even inverted. It re-emerges in many adult forms of happiness and discontent, such as æsthetic pleasure and pain. With the development of conscious memory and foresight, anticipation of pleasure and pain supplement and may eventually override immediate pleasure and pain as guides to behaviour. Conduct is now governed by variations on the themes of hope of reward and fear of punishment. These anticipatory standards continue to operate throughout life, and have been even more ruthlessly exploited in the moral and religious ' persuasion ' of adults than in the upbringing of the young.

In thinking about the infant's ' good ' and ' bad ' experiences we still assume, following with Freud, that erotic and self-preservative needs are simultaneously gratified in one total experience, e.g. that oral libidinal impulses and hunger are satisfied together in happy suckling. The absolutism of initial pleasure-pain values may be linked with the absolutism of survival needs ; their urgency in the infant may be connected with the lesser certainty of fulfilment arising from dependence upon environmental co-operation.

(*b*) *Moral values and their development : super-ego standards : cultural pressures : controversial issues and proto-morality.* Our willingness to use the term ' moral ' or the term ' guilt ' in reference to infantile experience will naturally depend upon our conception of the origin and course of super-ego development. In the present state of knowledge, it may be preferable to reserve these terms for the ' values ' which result from the inter-relation of id, definitive ego and super-ego organizations. There is probably no doubt in the mind of any psychoanalyst that the terms may be correctly used from the close of the Œdipus phase onwards. There can also be little objection to the use of terms such as ' proto-moral ' or ' proto-ethical ' for feelings of the infant which influence him to differentiate his values and to develop standards other than those of immediate gratification-pleasure and immediate frustration-pain.

Morality, like any other human characteristic, is an affair of reciprocity between the individual and his environment and there is little doubt that most infants are subjected to moralistic cultural pressure from a very early age. Mothers and nurses use freely such words as ' naughty ' and ' good ' even to a babe in arms and, though the babe may register nothing but the feeling conveyed in the tone of voice and the gentleness or otherwise of its handling, it probably registers these very early.

The early gratifications which make life possible for the infant usually occur under conditions that the observer would describe as ' being loved ', and early frustrations under conditions that the same observer would call being ' alone and helpless, not loved '. Whatever the precise nature of the infant's own feelings, they are quite certainly very different in these two different conditions, and it is also certain that infants can develop acute anxieties when they are left alone. It is not at all difficult, therefore, to imagine a natural transition from anxiety when the mother is not there to anxiety when she is there, but not in a ' loving ' mood. The mother's own character and reactions must inevitably give impetus to the baby to adapt his behaviour to her conscious and unconscious requirements. These earliest adaptations need involve no premature emotional or cognitive development ; they would be rather of the nature of conditioning by results, similar to the ' learning ' of animals in many laboratory experiments, which show that behaviour which results in pleasurable experience tends to be facilitated and behaviour that results in pain, inhibited. This early ' conditioning ' would pave the way for later differentiation of values other than immediate pleasure and pain. When these almost automatic adaptations are supplemented by conscious cognition, the child will be driven by force of experience to recognize that gratifications themselves fall into two groups. These are, firstly, the permissible, which win approval and are ' good ' (pleasant and safe) and, secondly, the reprehensible and forbidden, which win disapproval, are ' naughty ' or ' bad ' (unsafe though immediately pleasant) and may lead to various distressful consequences. The child who has learned to distinguish between what is approved and what is disapproved is already a proto-moral being.

Adaptation to the specific family environment is promoted by growing discrimination between the permissible and the forbidden. Realistic discrimination between the possible and the impossible, actually dangerous or actually safe, is often less encouraged by family standards. Early values are solidly based on real experience of pleasure and pain, but, as development proceeds, values subsequently differentiated tend to diverge from reality to the extent that the family ethics fail to coincide with actual needs and facts. The more arbitrary and irrational the family standards are, the less incentive the child has to become intelligently realistic about his own behaviour. Where the demands made on him are also fluctuating and inconsistent, he may even find it very difficult to be sure of what is ' naughty ' and what is ' good ' and will thus become predisposed to doubt his own judgement for the rest of his life.

Irrational ethical injunctions produce similar effects on the development of moral judgement as does the giving of false information on intellectual development. In any case, the subjective incen-

tives to reality-distortion are many and strong, and it is, therefore, very undesirable to confuse a young child in his efforts to orient himself in this bewildering world by telling him either ethical or factual lies. Children can be quite ruthlessly logical, and if they find that items of information or advice they receive from their elders are incompatible, they may cease to believe anything they are told. In very favourable cases, such early scepticism may act as an incentive to finding things out for themselves and result later in an aptitude for research work but such an outcome is by no means invariable. In any case an early and well-founded loss of confidence in the veracity and sincerity of adults is a handicap to the child in the development of human relationships. To many children, it is a constantly recurring puzzle that adults not only frequently contradict themselves, but so often say one thing and do another.

The cultural pressure to develop moral standards has been mentioned first because so much attention has recently been paid to the subjective, particularly the animistic, determinants of proto-ethics. There is, consequently, some risk of overlooking the fact that, although personal morality is an individual resultant, the human infant is not born into a moral vacuum. He is born to parents already possessing their-own version of prevalent cultural standards. These standards exert from the first a directly selective influence on the child's gradual differentiation of values and not only on mental organization through introjection and projection. The baby is an active agent, not an inert doll, and he may succeed in imposing quite a number of his own wishes on his attendants. The fact remains, however, that his life *régime* is dictated to him, rather than dictated by him. The values entertained by his parents are a set of values offered to him, with which he must come to terms. He may accept, reject, or compromise with these ready-made values, but he cannot avoid becoming aware of them and reacting to them.

Melanie Klein's views on the origin of personal ethics are given their simplest and most concise expression in her contribution to *Science and Ethics* (Waddington *et al.*, 1942). The impetus to moral development, ' to self-condemnation, which is the root of conscience ' is given by ' the child's own feelings of revulsion against his own aggressive tendencies—a revulsion which he experiences unconsciously as early as in the first few months of life ' (*ib.* 84). ' The child's overwhelming fear of losing the people he loves and most needs initiates in his mind not only the impulse to restrain his aggression but also a drive to preserve the very objects whom he attacks in phantasy, to put them right and to make amends for the injuries he may have inflicted on them. . . . When the imperatives : " Thou shalt not kill " (primarily the loved object), and " Thou shalt save from destruction " (again the loved objects, and in the first place from the infant's own aggression)—when these laws have taken root in the mind, an ethical pattern is set up which is universal and the rudiment of all ethical systems, notwithstanding the fact that it is capable of manifold variations and distortions, and even of complete reversal ' (*ib.* 85).

Melanie Klein's descriptions of infantile experience are often said to attribute to very young babies an undue precocity, inconsistent with their larval stage of mental development and organization (see also Brierley, 1944, 104–5). Language, however, is a function of the organized ego, an ego which has attained the ability to distinguish between subject and object and to appreciate the relation between them. Hence, if infantile experience be at first undifferentiated, i.e. if it be a succession of total situations experienced as sensori-affective wholes, then any verbal description must falsify it to some extent. But the feeling-quality of a very early experience may nevertheless be such that, when it is revived at a later date, the revival may be in a form which can be described in words without the same degree of falsification. If one wishes to arrive at a realistic evaluation of Melanie Klein's work, it is necessary to enquire whether any current assumptions about early life that are more generally acceptable than some of hers, favour the occurrence of affective experience which could later crystallize in more explicit phantasies, e.g. of protecting ' good objects ' from destruction by one's own sadism, and the typical ' depressive phantasies '.

If life is, at first, a succession of comparatively unrelated experiences, of alternating contrasts of absolute satisfaction and absolute distress, then proto-love and proto-hate are not originally associated, except in so far as one may oust the other. This happens if pleasant experience is suddenly interrupted and *vice versâ*. Further, if early pleasurable experiences are accepted *in toto* and carry identificatory ' proto-me ' feelings, whereas unpleasant experiences tend to be repudiated and to arouse larval ' not-me ' feelings, the stage is set for a transition from anxieties about undifferentiated painful situations to anxieties about sadism and aggression in later, better differentiated, situations. Some early painful experiences may never become associated with the definitive reality-ego ; they may be non-associated rather than dissociated. In any case, early repudiation of, or revulsion from, unpleasant total situations would necessarily involve repudiation of the aggressive reactions which formed part of the painful undifferentiated whole.

Considerations such as these do not solve the chronological problem of when experience ceases to be indiscriminate and becomes discriminate, but they make it seem more probable that ego-organization and ego-differentiation (which ultimately culminates in definitive super-ego formation) begin and proceed more or less together.

Behaviourist observations suggest that ego and super-ego systems attain an appreciable degree of coherence by the time that what Ferenczi called 'sphincter morality' is established. It is the effort to acquire sphincter control which provides the life-situation that seems peculiarly well-adapted to induce pre-occupation with 'internalized objects' and to bring the infant up against problems of ambivalence as such. It seems likely that many earlier anxiety crises now revive and can be given more definite content, though they may be further crystallized during the ensuing Œdipus phase. Learning to speak and learning to walk involve their own particular anxieties and problems of control, but it seems to be 'lavatory life' which is especially prone to become over-charged with mixed feelings. Few psycho-analysts would doubt that in this life-situation the fæcal stool becomes a very definite object, though it may be questioned how far the primitive nipple-object and its penis-heir antedate it as clearly discriminated objects and how far they acquire retrospective definition. There is one source of grief and dismay in becoming clean which was noted by Freud, Ferenczi and others, which we rather tend to lose sight of when stressing the aggressive significance of evacuation. Making water and passing stool can express quite other than angry feelings, and often, in the beginning, seem to be of the nature of libidinal activities, spontaneous out-pourings of responsive appreciation or proto-gratitude, rather than despite. The enforced recognition of the fact that these infantile libations are not acceptable may be acutely depressing. Some people never recover from this painful discovery, and they retain throughout life the hopeless conviction that anything they have to give is without value, or is even 'bad'.

Mystical literature abounds in illustrations of the kind of thinking and feeling which Melanie Klein regards as typical of 'depressive phantasies'. It thus affords ample corroboration of the existence of such phantasies in persons living centuries before the advent of psycho-analysis and contradicts any suggestion that such phantasies are artificial products of technique or fabrications of modern minds. On the other hand, the 'manic-depressive' conceptions and experiences of the mystics usually exhibit clear signs of Œdipal pre-occupations and post-Œdipal regression. The evidence of mysticism, therefore, supports the view that Melanie Klein has not so far paid enough attention to the rôle of regression in the retrospective crystallization of depressive phantasies or in the ætiology of manic-depressive states. The intra-psychic reality asserted by the mystics and by adult manic-depressives often seems to function as a defence against the recognition of an unbearable historical reality, a painful actual relation between parent and parent, or parent and child. A related type of 'denial' defence is illustrated by the theological doctrine of the Trinity. This is a doctrine of the indivisible unity of a spiritualized and masculinized Holy Family, Three Persons but One God; it is an affirmation of libidinal and personal solidarity between parents and child which constitutes an absolute denial of all tensions between them. Mystical literature, then, tends to confirm the point of view arrived at by Ella Sharpe in her paper 'From "King Lear" to "The Tempest"', in which she said (1946, 28): 'If this had been a theoretical paper instead of an essay in interpretation, its title would have been "The Rôle of Regression in Manic-Depression".'

In her paper 'The Œdipus Complex in the Light of Early Anxieties' Melanie Klein herself devotes more attention than hitherto both to regression and to idealization, and also modifies her views on the 'depressive position'. She writes (1945, 28): 'In some former papers (1935 and 1940) I have referred to the infantile depressive position as the central position in early development. I would now rather suggest the following formulation: the core of infantile depressive feelings, i.e. the child's fear of the loss of his loved objects, as a consequence of his hatred and aggression, enters into his object relations and Œdipus complex from the beginning.' The term 'core' is still open to the charge of constituting an enclave, but, clearly, depressive feelings may be experienced long before they can be formulated in definitive object-relational phantasies such as come to light in the analysis of older children and adults. This revision, therefore, goes some way towards diminishing the apparent precocity suggested by some earlier statements, though it may not seem to every psycho-analyst to go far enough.

The fact remains that Melanie Klein has drawn our attention to many formerly neglected aspects of mental life, particularly to the personal significance of animism, and to the continued persistence in the adult of animistic trends and unconscious (or conscious) beliefs that are never wholly lost and are easily revived, sometimes in very subtle disguise. Personal animism, as she herself maintains, depends upon the capacity to recognize personal or 'whole' objects. Hence, it remains desirable to insist that the earliest animistic experiences almost certainly lack the personal definition and the emotional sophistication which is imparted to them when they are re-animated by regression from a phase of development in which clearer self-object discrimination has become established. No precocity is involved in the recognition of the fact that anxiety crises may occur at any age and that these may be 'proto-moral' in the sense that they stimulate ego-differentiation and initiate feelings which revive as components of later guilt experiences.

There is no escape from the patent fact that all hypotheses about very early infancy, like hypotheses about the primordial life of mankind, are

speculative. For one thing, we simply do not know how much mental organization may be inherited. From what we do know of the social control of murder and sex-relations in extant primitive communities, we may surmise that the child's phylogenetic heritage, if any, would pre-dispose him to fear murderous impulses and to experience acute anxieties about Œdipal wishes. Both these predispositions would be amply reinforced by the culture pressures of the average Western family. The preservation of good relations with parents is a very practical necessity of early life. The feeling of moral goodness in adults, which Melanie Klein equates with unconscious reconciliation with parents (Waddington, *et al.* 1942, 87), is an ego awareness of super-ego approval which could not occur unless similar relations between parent and child had really existed in infancy. It is questionable, however, whether Money-Kyrle's 'primary morality' (1944, 169) is quite so primary as he supposes. As it operates in adults, it often seems to represent a post-Œdipal regressive solution of ambivalence by idealization, often obsessional in quality and, sometimes, highly charged with persecutory sadism and reckless masochism.

The evidence from mysticism leaves open the further question of whether typical depressive phantasies are not, strictly speaking, typical manic-depressive phantasies? There is a very evident difference between recognizing the liability of all infants to depressive feelings and to phases of pre-occupation with internalized object-relationships and asserting that such feelings and pre-occupations are of equal developmental significance in all infants. This question of relative importance needs more elucidation if the impression is to be successfully corrected that Melanie Klein and her colleagues tend to think of all human beings as conforming to a single manic-depressive type. The emphasis on 'depressive positions', like the emphasis on oral interests, needs counter-balancing if it is to free itself from seeming to approximate to a mono-phasic or mono-instinctual theory of development (compare Glover, 1945, 90).

Their pre-occupation with 'internalized objects' has also raised doubts as to whether Melanie Klein and her colleagues are not themselves mystics and have not developed a magical technique which deals with these objects on their own terms. But recognition of the fact that human beings entertain mystical and magical beliefs is itself realistic and psycho-analysts should find it possible to investigate such beliefs without becoming mystics themselves. If the analysis of hysteria does not usually convert a non-hysterical analyst into an hysteric, there is no reason why the analysis of manic-depression should turn him into a mystic. There is, naturally, always the danger that unsuspected defences in the analyst may lead him to concur in similar defence systems in his analysands. This is one of the main reasons for requiring candidates to undergo a comprehensive training-analysis and for subsequently diversifying their training controls. The problem of training-transference is very real, but surely it is not insoluble provided that the aim of training remains the development of a responsible analyst, and that it does not degenerate into the mere transmission of the trainer's own views and personal technique. Clearly, a responsible analyst must be able to use his own judgement and learn from his own clinical experience.

It is possible to make a creed of any theory, but the scientific position is that the work of Melanie Klein is a series of hypotheses which call for long-term critical evaluation in relation to theory as a whole and to personal experience in practice over a period of years. Such hypotheses call neither for belief nor dis-belief, for immediate acceptance or immediate rejection *in toto*, but for detailed examination and testing on both the intellectual and the practical planes. Any psycho-analyst who can adopt this 'scientific attitude' is adequately realistic and can investigate and make practical trial of Melanie Klein's work without fear of succumbing to mystical beliefs.

It is the earlier phases of ethical development, or proto-morality, that are most controversial. There is general agreement that individual personal morality is established (successfully or unsuccessfully) with the post-Œdipal completion of the ground-plan of mental organization and personality-pattern. This morality is by no means uniform from person to person, but, henceforward, for any given person, that which his conscience approves is moral good, and that which his conscience disapproves is moral evil. Conscience evaluation now supersedes, or considerably modifies, immediate pleasure-pain evaluation; it makes considerable use of anticipatory pleasure-pain expectations (conscious guilt nearly always includes fear of punishment), but it inherits in full the absolutism of early all-or-none experiences. The moral transvaluation of primary values may proceed to a stage at which almost all direct instinctual gratification becomes suspect and 'good' becomes chiefly disagreeable duty and self-righteous thwarting of oneself and others. Short of such extremes, most people suffer in some measure from incompatibility between their primary need and their moral standards. One or other, or both, may at any time conflict with rational adaptation to current environment.

(c) *Integrative values: total personality and mature ego standards.* It will now be evident that a 'good life' can result only in so far as the demands of instinct and of conscience can be harmonized sufficiently well to give the ego some measure of united backing in its conduct of daily life. The demand for a rational ethic of necessity is really nothing less than a demand for a third, post-moral, or integrative, standard of values. A purely external standard of environmental necessity or

rational cultural requirement can never suffice because human adaptation is multipolar and not bi-polar and mental conditions must also be taken into account. It is always a question of how far and by what means, the subjective economy of the individual will allow him to accommodate himself to current conditions. Integrative valuation can be based only upon a more realistic assessment of instinctual needs, of conscience demands and of environmental requirements. A standard of integrity is implied in Karin Stephen's discussion of ' goodness ' in her correspondence with Waddington (Waddington *et al.*, 1942, 78–9).

It seems quite evident, theoretically, that the relation between individual and group should be one of mutual give and take. An ego-centric life of self-expression devoted to purely individual aims is as far from the optimum balance of interests as the opposite extreme in which personal life is submerged in the pursuance of group-welfare. Neither isolationary individualism nor person-ignoring collectivism are genuinely life-promoting. The standard of psycho-social good is rather a standard of co-ordination between person and group which ensures optimal benefit to both. Integration results from the harmonization of variety which enriches life and not from the attempted imposition of uniformity which can only impoverish it. Since psychological peace and freedom depend upon sufficiently harmonious co-operation of the different aspects of the personality, world peace can presumably only be stabilised and human freedom assured, by voluntary co-operation directed towards that harmonization of nations which would yield eventually a measure of world-integrity.

(7) Negative Ethics and Power Control

The part played by frustration and anxiety in the development of moral values helps to explain the predominantly negative character of so many ethical systems and their reliance on prohibition and fear of punishment. There can be no question of undoing the effects of evolution, of stopping human beings from developing consciences or of doing away with anxiety and guilt. A great deal could probably be done, however, to prevent intensification of anxiety and guilt and to enable the ego to come to better terms with them. A basic problem for mankind to-day is the acquisition of more life-fulfilling habits of self-control. It is hard to see, for example, how any democracy can mature and function with maximum efficiency unless a majority of its members become capable of more effective self-control by appropriate use, rather than by inhibition or repression, of their vital capacities. Ethical conceptions of self-control have always tended to become one-sided and prohibitory. The essential test of self-control is less the ability to prevent personally or socially unacceptable behaviour than the ability to express the maximum possible energy in acceptable and life-fulfilling ways. Prohibition is only an intermediate step on the road to permissible, alternative expression, a means and not an end. The end is control by use, giving the life-enhancement which comes from integrative living and leading to continued growth and development.

Negative morality, whether individual or group, is an authoritarian *régime* demanding obedience without insight and operating through fear and threat of force. It is no exaggeration to say that it is dynamised almost wholly by aggression. It is highly effective in promoting the in-turning of infantile hostility against the id and ego and its out-turning against people identified with these objects of super-ego hatred. There are few emotions more cruel and ruthless than righteous indignation. The hostile character of a negative moral *régime* may be self-evident or may be more or less adequately disguised as a passion for control. The latter may show itself in various forms of strict self-discipline, in over-conscientious behaviour, over-scrupulous exactitude and so forth. It may, however, find outlet in urgent attempts to manage other people, ostensibly for their own good and in similar projective ' power ' manœuvres. In short, negative morality is personal power-politics, and it is as little likely to achieve personal integrity as its international counterpart is adapted to promote world-integration.

Plato long ago realized that the people who desire power are not always those who can be trusted with it. Acton's now proverbial dictum that all power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely has proved only too true. Party politics, with all their inanities, are a better safeguard of certain important types of personal liberty than single party governments. The exercise of power by men over men can diminish only if the human capacity for life-promoting self-control increases.

It is, perhaps, as well to emphasize that the technique of psycho-analysis is not a power technique. The influence the analyst acquires over his analysands through transference-relationships is often exaggerated by lay persons, but it is always fairly strictly limited. Such as it is, this influence is habitually used in ways that aim at increasing the patient's own reality-tolerance and self-control. Transference analysis is directed, in particular, to the gradual emancipation of the analysand, not to his permanent subjugation. Analysts are fallible, no one's technique is uniformly perfect and results are always conditioned by a number of different factors, but the goal of analysis is certainly not domination by the analyst but freedom for the patient through the development of greater personal integrity and more efficient self-management. Being human, analysts are quite as liable as other people to feel the lure of power, but they are also in a much better

position to appreciate how greatly the lust of power is enhanced by psychological as well as by environmental insecurity. It is common knowledge that the patients who are most tyrannical and interfering are those whose internal economy is least stable; their mental budget is so precariously balanced that they live under an unconscious threat of mental bankruptcy.

(8) The Christian Ethic of Love: the Realist Ethic of Life

The need for a more positive morality and a more vitalizing ethical code is now widely recognized. The conception of an ethic of love existed long before Christ, but there has always been agreement amongst Christians of truest insight that the essential ethic of Christianity is an ethic of love. Modern Christians are becoming increasingly alive to this fact; it is, for example, the corner-stone of Albert Schweitzer's thinking. Unfortunately, in practice, this ethic too often ceases to be a realistic charity and active fellowship and becomes either a sadistic ethic of ruthless persecution in defence of ideals, or a masochistic ethic of pacifism and self-immolation. Not a few sincere Christians regard pacifism as the only logical conclusion to be drawn from the teaching of the Gospels. It is to Christianity that the civilized West, though not the East, owes its conviction that aggression is evil in itself. Non-recognition of aggression as a natural, pre-moral, force having its appropriate uses as well as its too frequent abuses, is, in part, responsible for the Christian failure to solve the problems of aggression (see Flugel, 1945, 274). By reason of its very nature, an idealistic ethic should not be expected to provide a stable solution of any profoundly real human problem.

It will be apparent, however, that there is a measure of agreement between the Christian ethic of love, as presented, for instance, by Schweitzer in the unequivocal form of reverence for life and active love, and the type of ethic of life-promotion which tends to emerge from the findings of psycho-analysis. The differences are, in the main, the inevitable differences between an idealism that must incline, in view of its origins, to be over-selective and to perpetuate the absolutism of primitive experience and the moral dichotomy, and a realism that strives to be adequately comprehensive and to correlate personal experience with objective knowledge about mental life. An integrative ethic of life-promotion which is realist will seek, like Christianity, to further libidinal dominance in personal and social life; it will do this by providing for the appropriate use of all instinctual impulses and personal intentions in ways conducive to this end. Unlike Christianity, a realist ethic will try to solve problems of aggression on the assumption that this natural force cannot be eliminated or 'rooted out' of human nature, but can only be more or less suitably employed. The same applies to the variety of human motives with which aggression is closely associated. For example, ambition and rivalry are strong incentives unlikely ever to cease to function in men and women; the desire to out-do infantile rivals has contributed to much valuable individual prowess in many fields. To a realist it will seem an impossibility that mankind should ever wholly cease to be competitive and become instead wholly co-operative; but it will seem a possibility, though not necessarily an immediate probability, that competition could be subordinated to co-operation, most effectively by using it to further integrative ends.

The differences between Christian and realist ethics could be illustrated by comparing the technique of Christian prayer with the technique of psycho-analysis, but this cannot be undertaken here. A concise account of 'The Degrees of Prayer' is given in the posthumous *Collected Papers* of Evelyn Underhill (1946, 35–53). There is a striking contrast between the concentrated direction of Christian prayer to God and the 'free association' essayed by the analysand to permit the unconscious determinants of his mental life to emerge. The Jungian technique of 'amplification' (Jacobi, 1942, 81) is akin to some methods of meditation. A few other relevant likenesses and differences between Christian and psycho-analytic conceptions are discussed in the following paragraphs.

(i) *Respect for persons: as children of God: as human beings*

Respect for individual persons is possibly the most enduring value contributed by Christianity to human life. The Christian reason for this respect, the sanctity of persons as children of an idealized Heavenly Father, made in His Image, tends to concentrate respect on the '*Imago Dei*' rather than on the human being as such. This tendency has often sadly impaired respect for persons in the common practice of daily life. This was not the case, however, with the historical Jesus or with the greater Saints. In regard to Christians now living, anyone reading the work of Albert Schweitzer will probably conclude that, in him, his id urge-to-live and his super-ego ideal of love, are truly harmonized in his reverence for life and issue in very practical care for persons; a great part of his life has been spent as a medical missionary in Africa. The findings of psycho-analysts fully endorse respect for life and for persons, but they endorse respect for all the life impulses and all the variety of persons.

(ii) *Religious idealism: humane realism*

The realist must acknowledge the positive functions of idealization and the part ideals have played in diversifying human culture and in inspiring altruistic behaviour. He must also recognize the havoc and misery wrought by the

companion process of denigration and by the excesses of persecutory sadism and masochistic self-immolation that issue so readily from devotion to ideals. The psycho-analyst can afford to be a plain realist and to remain agnostic about ultimate issues, because he knows that inspiration for living is given to every human being in his very instincts. He does not need to idealize love, because he has constant evidence of the integrative power of libidinal impulses and their derivative interests and affections, and also evidence of the way in which destructive impulses can be employed to constructive ends. His experience of mal-adaptation and disease and of the conditions which govern therapeutic success and failure, serve to illumine for him the principles of adaptation and the conditions of mental health. The conception of optimal integration as the goal of personality development is derived, not from ideals, but from matter-of-fact inferences from the intensive study of living people.

The sovereignty of ideals in mental life may be as much an anachronism as the sovereignty of nations in the present world. Things worth living for may be worth dying for, and it is certainly true that there can be no greater test of love for another person than laying down one's life for him. But it is all too evident that the readiness of men and women to sacrifice their lives for their ideals has been shamelessly exploited throughout the ages for quite unworthy ends. All the indications suggest that the time is ripe for the transference of allegiance from ideals to more rational aims of life-fulfilment. These aims may at least be ultimately attainable, although at present they share with many ideals the character of short-term unattainability. Idealism may free one from narrow egocentricity, but so also can personal affection and fellowship. Men and women bear responsibility for the life in themselves as well as for other people : indeed, the Christian is taught this in the parable of the talents, but does not always remember it. It is true that the most a confirmed idealist may be able to do by way of transcending his idealism is to identify his ideals with more intelligently realistic standards, but this process would itself tend to modify the idealist in a realist direction and so make for re-adaptive behaviour.

(iii) *Personal relevance and orientation*

The deepest appeal of Christianity is to the heart of man ; its respect for persons involves concern with their desires and emotions. It is this profound subjective appeal that is responsible for its continued vitality and for its several renewals. The Christian may frequently be puzzled by God and by life, but he is encouraged to believe that, whatever the trials of his daily life and the state of his human feelings, he is the beloved child of his Heavenly Father and may, therefore, rest upon the decision ' Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him '. The Christian doctrines of creation and redemption offer him, in addition, the conception of purpose in his own life and an orientation to the Divine Purpose. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that people disillusioned with the earlier over-optimistic humanism should tend to return to the Christian fold. But those who desire to reinstate Christian values and consider that these alone offer guidance for personal life, forget that many other people now hold that Christianity has itself failed as completely as a too facile humanism.

It is also natural that a similar attraction to Christianity should be felt by people convinced by experience of the inadequacy of materialism and the purely objective natural sciences in respect of urgent problems of emotional and impulsive life. To such people, there may seem to be no alternative to Christianity (or some other avowedly mystical religion which contrasts the ' natural ' with the ' spiritual '), but the narrowly sensualist doctrine of eating, drinking and making merry which is to them a doctrine of despair. This Hobson's choice, however, is not compulsory since better understanding of human nature offers another way out of the dilemma. This way is already attracting a number of men and women for whom the choice between idealism and simple animality is impracticable and who feel, dimly or clearly, that another and more genuinely human choice must be possible. Popular interest in psychology is steadily increasing ; Jung even regards interest in psychology as a leading characteristic of modern man. The vitality of this interest is confirmed, for example, by the high sales of psychological literature and the statistics of attendance at popular lectures (the average attendance at a recent W.E.A. psychology course was more than three times as high as the average for any other course in the same term). No psychology has so far made more basic contributions to the understanding of human nature and personal life-problems than has psycho-analysis. Infant science though psycho-analysis may be, the orientation it affords is not the blind submission of the ' good child ' to the inscrutable Will of God, but adult acceptance of responsible living in accord with the insight so far attained into the natural laws of personal life.

(iv) *Spiritual and integrative values*

The Christian's treasure is in Heaven, and his human life in time and space is also in Eternity. Christian values are, therefore, of the spirit and not of the flesh. The sacramental view of life, however, does not deny the flesh, but requires its dedication and its use to the glory of God. This more integrative, sacramental attitude cannot very easily be maintained in partnership with Christian idealism because it connotes the simple acceptance and enjoyment of sensual pleasures as bodily ' graces '. There is an inevitable tendency towards the attitude that such pleasures befoul the

fleshly tabernacle of the spirit and have no place in the 'temple of the Holy Ghost'. The body-spirit correlation of the sacramentalist readily gives place to the body-spirit conflict of the ascetic.

How do the integrative values implicit in psycho-analysis compare with Christian 'other-worldly' and spiritual values? Psycho-analysis is definitely not 'other-worldly' but neither is it crudely materialistic nor naïvely ego-centric. It does not concern itself with ultimate issues but accepts man as it finds him, a psycho-social being, the course of whose development has endowed him with a highly organized mental life and corresponding psychological needs in addition to his primary animal requirements. Hence, the satisfaction of primary needs alone is no longer sufficient to make human life worth-while. Man lost his animal simplicity when he developed moral values. Over and above the moral values, Christians place what they call 'spiritual' values associated with ideals of Divine Love, Truth, the Beauty of Holiness, Absolute Reality and Goodness.

The nature of these spiritual, or purely psychological, values, is liable to be obscured by their association with theological dogmas and metaphysical theories; if these associations are ignored, the cardinal spiritual values appear as idealist and absolutist versions of realist integrative values. Thus, 'Love' represents the whole range of libidinal values, i.e. the human realities of love, affection and fellow-feeling, upon which the possibility of personal and social integration ultimately depends. 'Truth', as real truth, stands for the relative but constantly expanding body of human knowledge, for personal sincerity, and for the common-sense desiderata of veracity and honesty in human relationships. The 'humility' and 'obedience' required of the Christian are paralleled for the realist by the pride-deflating recognition of the givenness of life and its conditions, and the necessity for finding and complying with the natural laws upon which life-fulfilment depends. Integrative values are natural, not super-natural; they develop out of the primary values at the human level of mental organization, and they make for the optimal co-ordination of primary and derivative needs.

There is no tendency in psycho-analysis to decry the senses or to undervalue sensual enjoyment. There is only a recognition that a life of purely sensual indulgence is no longer adequate or possible for man. A worth-while life ordinarily includes a personal optimum of primary gratifications, but it usually demands other channels of expression and other forms of enjoyment as well, including a greater or lesser variety of emotional and intellectual interests. Psychological freedom is neither licence nor inhibition; it is the ability to make integrative use of instinct through the ego-organization in ways that best meet id and super-ego requirements in current circumstances. The formula for life-fulfilment is necessarily specific for each person, but individual formulas may be expected to show type resemblances.

(v) *Other-worldliness and spirituality: ultra-egoism and integrity: some ego misconceptions*

Christianity is other-worldly and spiritually minded. Psycho-analysis is neither other-worldly nor super-natural in outlook, but it is intrinsically ultra-egoistic. It extends the conception of mental life and personality far beyond the narrow confines of the operative conscious and pre-conscious ego. The ego seems to have developed primarily as the agent of intelligent adaptation to the outer world. Human intelligence has now called in question the validity of moral and religious traditions. It has also discovered that there are features about man's automatic unconscious systems of instinct-control which militate, not only against mental health and happiness, but also against a fully objective appreciation of external conditions themselves. The ego, therefore, has to take a further step, to which it is not yet so well adapted, and to use its intelligence to explore subjective life and the constitution of human nature with the same thoroughness which it has hitherto devoted to the natural sciences. The result, according to Freud's three-fold conception of the mental constitution, is that the ego finds it is not an end in itself, but an agent of a more comprehensive life, the total personality. It has often been said that Freud struck the third, most shattering, blow to man's ego-centric over-estimation of himself, the first two having been dealt by Copernicus and Darwin respectively. Freud thus offered to mankind its third great chance to re-survey 'the place of man in nature.'

The self-importance of the ego is diminished by the extended conception of personality, but its responsibilities are, if anything, increased. It remains the controller of voluntary motility and the active manager of personal behaviour and relationships, but it has to enlarge its conceptions of management and to apprentice itself afresh to life with a view to acquiring a more adequate technique of multi-polar adaptation. The apprenticeship includes the critical revision of both traditional and revolutionary standards of value in relation to a central aim, the harmonization of the various demands made upon the ego by id, super-ego and external conditions.

Arguments about free-will versus determinism usually derive from abstract conceptions which express antithetic human wishes and are not based on evidence from psychological facts. The real situation appears somewhat paradoxical. The validity of psychological determinism is seldom questioned by psycho-analysts because clinical evidence re-proves from hour to hour that we are what we have become as a result of our

past history, and that what we are now becoming is shaping our future. But, equally, there can be no question that living is creative and that, within limits variously circumscribed for different people, the ego appears to have some possibilities of choice. Every decision is a fresh decision, which may represent a new beginning, a re-adaptation, not necessarily always predictable in advance, although explicable after the event. It would seem that the ego is fulfilling its proper functions when it tries to take the most reasonable decision on the evidence before it, as if it were a responsible free agent. But the sounder the internal and external reality-sense of the ego, the better will it recognize the limiting conditions of its own choices and the more likely will it be to arrive at integrative, practicable decisions. In relation to the total personality, the adequately realistic ego might well say with St. Paul ' I live, yet not I '.

The situation of the ego and its prerogative of consciousness induce it to arrive at a number of mis-conceptions, most of which are not merely natural mistakes of self-ignorance, but defences against anxiety. It seems inevitable that the ego should regard itself as the personality, until evidence to the contrary is forced upon it. The major errors arising from this over-determined egocentricity are short-sighted confusions of the means and the consequences of adaptation, its pleasure-pain and other affective indices, with the aims of instinct and the goals of personal life. Hedonism is an ego mistake of this kind. Pleasure and happiness are not aims of instinct, but conscious indices of the fact that instinct is attaining its ends, usually through the establishment of suitable relationships with appropriate objects (see Brierley, 1945, 107–9).

Fairbairn's criticism of hedonism is justified, but his criticism of the theory of erotogenic zones (1946, 31) overlooks the discriminatory functions of pleasure and pain and the fact that mucous membranes are sensitised areas, i.e. regions of hypersensitivity to object-contacts and, as such, natural foci of interest. Fairbairn's proposition (1946, 30) that ' libido is not primarily pleasure-seeking, but object-seeking ', is wholesomely corrective of hedonistic over-emphasis, but tends to encourage another error of ellipsis. It is preferable to describe the aim of instinct in full as ' object-relation-seeking ' rather than to describe it in ego short-hand as ' object-seeking '. The ego is the practical conductor of instinct-object relationships and is constantly engaged in object discrimination and assessment ; ' objects ' therefore tend to figure largely in personology. The patient of Fairbairn's who protested (Fairbairn, 1946, 30) : ' You're always talking about my wanting this and that desire satisfied ; but what I really want is a father ' was fully justified, but wanting a father is ego short-hand for wanting a father to love and to be loved by, etc. ; the patient wanted to re-establish a system of relationships she still needed.

Concentration on objects has its drawbacks even in personology, but it is disastrous to metapsychology, whose systems are all systems of dynamic object-relationships. Curiously enough, it is Fairbairn who makes the mistake of thinking that Freud's conception of mental structure is static rather than dynamic (Fairbairn, 1946, 36). Admittedly, Freud's later conception of mental organization is greatly to be preferred to his earlier, more mechanist ' fiction ' of the psychic apparatus, but his theory of mental structure was never other than dynamic. The conception of mental organization is intrinsically a dynamic conception of energy-pattern, and this dynamism of structure is basic to the psycho-analytic conception of mental life.

The tendency of the ego to mistake means for ends is illustrated in the social sphere by the elevation of the acquisition of wealth and power to be goals of human endeavour, though they have welfare value only in so far as they can be used to provide the conditions for creative and integrative living.

Some of the commonest errors made by the ego arise, then, from a too short-sighted reality-sense, i.e. from the mistaking of means and consequences for ends. The reality-ego tends to regard itself as the person, instead of merely the conscious agent of the total personality ; it tends to concern itself with objects as such and to forget that their personal significance is dependent upon the relations established with them ; it also readily confuses pleasure and happiness with goals of living, whereas they are the result of adequate adaptation and the indices of life-fulfilment. In addition to developing better perspective in regard to its own rôle in mental life, the conscious ego has further to recognize that, although the total personality is an individual focus of life, this focus or nexus (Whitehead's term) constantly interacts with other foci. Human life is psycho-social life. It is an affair of reciprocal relationships, not an affair of living for oneself alone, nor of living only for one's fellows, but of harmonizing individual and social interests. The conscious self is the responsible executive agent of the total personality, existing in active mutual relationship with other persons.

(vi) *Attitudes to instinct and their consequences*

It can be argued that the simple endeavour of the ego to find and to accept the fullest attainable measure of personal and objective reality, and to deal with it as integratively as may be, is an exacting discipline not so far removed in practice from the Christian discipline of ' Thy Will be done '. For the would-be realist, however, the urge to life-fulfilment finds its first authoritative expression in the promptings of instinct and in the inferred laws of mental life, rather than in super-ego inspired codes of traditional morality and idealistic creeds.

The pressure of instinct is, after all, the pulse of life itself, whereas the voice of conscience is all too often the voice of human prejudice and stupidity. Anyone whose respect for natural law is greater than his regard for human decree, cannot regard instinct as evil in itself, nor the advice of conscience as necessarily good. The realist, however, will not fall into the error of idealizing instinct and contemning wholesale both morality and religion. He will respect instinct but he will also respect any integrative values which find expression in ethical codes and religious teaching. At the same time, he will not hesitate to seek the reasons for the failure of these codes and creeds, notwithstanding their positive value-content, to advance humanity further on the road it is apparently attempting to pursue, a way of greater integrity in personal life and social organization.

The positive psycho-social values of religion may be attributed, in great part, to its salvage and re-distribution of infantile energies and relationships and the possibility it offers to the individual, on the one hand, of some degree of personal, if partial, integration and, on the other hand, of some degree of effective orientation to his fellowmen and the universe in general. Christianity, in particular, offers a positive way of living in as much as it stresses love, the truly integrative factor in life. In practice, however, and in its historical development, Christianity has exercised too preferential a selectivity in love. It has favoured the more highly sublimated forms of love while denigrating the more primitive libidinal impulses, although these are the root and source of all the varieties of love and of all the diverse trends of human creativity. Many of the negative and life-impeding effects of religion are connected, in one way or another, with the defects of idealization-denigration as a method of solving problems of ambivalence and of severing emotional love from sensuality.

The direction of evolution may be towards an expansion of consciousness, but the implications of psycho-analysis suggest that this needs to be a balanced, or spherical, expansion which would extend ego-awareness in both super-ego and id directions. It would be a result of better ego-assimilation of instinctual impulses and infantile relationships and their more complete utilization under positive and humane ego and super-ego control. If the race does not cease to exist in the meantime, such a process of all-round widening of the sphere of consciousness might, eventually, yield a higher proportion of adequately realistic men and women with a greater degree of mental integrity and, consequently, more intelligent and life-promoting habits of personal conduct and social organization. Utopias will always remain roseate dreams, but a saner and more gracious world than exists to-day is not merely a wish-fulfilling illusion ; it is a real possibility although it may not be an immediate probability.

(VI) CONCLUSION

It is evident that the revolt of modern man against the dead hand of traditional and supernatural authority has proved a somewhat Pyrrhic victory, in that it has resulted in a triumph of unreason and aggression. Crude materialism is, indeed, a more frustrating attitude to life than Christianity, but, humanly speaking, there must be something wrong with both the personal and social aspects of a religion which can provoke, or at least fail to prevent, such cataclysmic reactions as this century has already witnessed. It seems not unlikely that, if the religious revival desired by Christians did come about on a large scale, it would be followed at a subsequent date by a still more vigorous revolt. At present the intellect has won relative freedom ; but not so the heart, whose capacities for personal love and social co-operation are still fettered by traditional modes of dealing with infantile conflicts. The fact that substitutes for orthodox religion have been found in plenty, most recently in political ideologies, is a sign that these traditional modes are still in operation. These alternatives to religion demand the focus of an ideal, whose ostensibly abstract appeal is nearly always reinforced by identification with its personal promoters and ' leaders '. Acceptance of the new ideal brings in its train all the old consequences of idealization-denigration. What is needed is not more ideals but more enlightened, realistic and integrative standards of private and public behaviour, standards which are relevant to the psycho-social necessities and the actual conditions of world affairs.

The development of such re-adaptive standards would require modification of current attitudes towards instinct and a re-assessment of ' values ' ancient and modern, with a view to establishing the living conditions which would favour rather than hamper, psychological maturation and the development of fellowship. Religions are attempts at integral living, but the development of more stable civilization depends upon the discovery and practice of more efficient methods of psycho-social integration than Christianity has yet achieved. In terms of life, the only practical religion of humanity would be a way of living which would promote both personal and social integration. Such a way of living could be firmly based only on realistic knowledge of man's nature and a humane, or personalist, approach to the many-sided and extremely difficult problems of social organization for human welfare.

Existentialists maintain that life is an experience

to be lived and not a problem for solution. The findings of psycho-analysis support the conception that life is simply for living, but they also show that experience raises a host of problems whose solution is only likely to be found through the fuller use of intelligence and the development of a more trustworthy subjective and objective reality-sense. But, although more knowledge is urgently required to make plain the way of integrity and to establish the principles of integrative living, it is equally true that the goal can be achieved only in so far as knowledge is applied in living and so translated into being. Hence, every personal attempt to live integratively is a direct, if minute, contribution to the raising of the psychological standard of life for all.

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NARCISSISTIC EQUILIBRIUM

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When in psycho-analytic literature such varied phenomena, as a state of sleep, a baby sucking its thumb, a girl primping before a mirror, and a scientist exulting over the Nobel Prize are all referred to as 'narcissistic', a more precise definition of the term seems indicated. They may be traced to the same root but they are manifestly different things. Were our vocabulary richer we could have a separate term for each shade of meaning, as did the Greeks with eight or nine different words for love. Narcissism is reported as inherent in the most sublime of sublimations and in the most psychotic of regressions. In some instances it is held responsible for the heightening of male potency, but in other cases blamed for its diminution. It can be found at work both in feminine frigidity and feminine attractiveness. It is supposed to neutralize any destructive tendencies, yet becomes a source of anxiety to the ego. It is a defence against homosexuality, yet homosexuals are particularly 'narcissistic'. Sleep is a narcissistic withdrawal of libido (28), yet sleeplessness is the flight of enhanced narcissism from further augmentation (55). It is used to explain the drag of inertia and the drive of ambition (41). Such ambiguity indicates sufficiently a need for exploration and clearer definition of a term used so much in psycho-analysis yet with such diverse meanings.

The term 'narcissism' was originally coined by Havelock Ellis (9) and used by Näcke before Freud employed it in his libido theory. Freud wrote of only two forms—the primary and secondary forms. The earliest nucleus of the ego was to him the primary narcissism derived from the pleasures the child gets from its own body, and as a synthesis of isolated auto-erotisms. This primary narcissism develops as the child's ego develops. He declared (27) that there is no ego libido at the very start, but only auto-erotic impulses from which narcissism can develop. Its pronounced development in man he traces to the prolonged helplessness of the human infant (33). Alexander (3) expresses a similar idea when he says that the primary narcissistic nucleus is close to the id, when there is no distinction between the ego and the outer world. In the fœtus, narcissism, he believes, is reduced to its simplest terms, distributed throughout its structure (4). When the ego ideal develops, primary narcissism gives place to secondary narcissism, indicating that the super-ego develops simultaneously with the recognition of an outer world (5). The inability to distinguish between inner and outer reality, between self and outer world, which is characteristic of primary narcissism may help to explain the regressive trends of the solipistic philosophers so akin to paranoia.

Jones (51) sees the original primal narcissism distributed in four directions, varying with the individual. One portion remains unaltered and is attached to the real ego. This is the primal narcissism. A second portion is attached to the idea of the parent with over estimation. The third portion forms the ego-ideal and is joined by a fourth which is transformed into object love. Along with the development of secondary narcissism and the distinction between ego and outer world comes the dependence on a love object from whom things are expected, both pleasures and privations. At this time the first identification forms the foundation of the super-ego because frustration at the hands of this love object or by the external world is mastered by such identification with the frustrating object. The super-ego or repository of these identifications then become invested with secondary narcissism. Freud found that the changing of object libido into narcissistic libido on giving up the sexual aim is a kind of sublimation perhaps true of all sublimations (20).

Similarly sorrow changes outer deprivations into inner gain (8) for the lost love object is irrevocably erected in the child's ego by identification. Grief is thus a process of desexualization and sublimation. When an erotic attachment ends with the death of one of the partners, phantasies of the lost one are usually free of erotic excitement. We can appreciate that the impossibility of satisfying such desire is an important part of sublimation as in the infant's weaning from the breast and substituting a part of its own body, a sort of oral sublimation. As Freud noted, the ego gets control of the id by turning erotic object choice into ego modification (19). Hence secondary narcissism in this respect is an important adaptation to reality and sharply differentiates it from primary narcissism which excludes and ignores reality.

What part does identification play in all this? 'Identification', says Alice Balint (6), 'always operates in the interest of and clings to the defence of narcissism. The bridge between self love and the love of reality is made up of identification.' For we identify with people whom we like. Identification with the environment that humiliates him enables the sensitive person to contrive to love himself. Reciprocity and mutual dependence between object love and secondary narcissistic love make the latter quite distinct from primary narcissism. For this reason we can account it a therapeutic advance when the schizophrenic begins to identify with the doctor. Similarly many women derive their self-esteem from identification with their successive lovers. By identification with the frustration, the ego masters it. One may learn from one's opponents. Likewise a child plays dentist on its playmate to master the painful

experience in the dentist's chair. In analysis the patient is able to sacrifice some of the narcissistic defence by means of identification with the analyst.

It is surely not without significance that there is scarcely anybody who can accurately appraise his own actual and potential accomplishments. The dependence on others for our own self-evaluation may protect us from the danger, if left to ourselves, of over self-evaluation. More accurate self-appraisal is one of the most precious gains from a satisfactory analysis thereby proving the dissolution of the child-parent relationship. Federn (10) in this connection draws our attention to the fact that it is impossible to ' know thyself ' without subject love.

Some light on this process has been thrown by a study of the origin of the super-ego which as Stärcke (72) says stands to narcissism as the test of reality does to object-erotism. We have seen that the first forces of reality which frustrate the child's desire are the subsequent objects of its identification and object love. Just as the child must forego his id desires for the sake of retaining parental love and protection during the formative stage of ego development, so the mature person must make sacrifices of instinctive pleasure for love and protection of that super-ego with which a state of tension is intolerable. Narcissistic harmony or equilibrium is therefore a state of security between ego and super-ego derived from the original harmony between the obedient child and its loving parents. In certain ' narcissistic ' characters there is no tension between ego and super-ego and traits gratifying narcissistic libido cause less unconscious guilt. Hence sublimations are free of guilt. But, not all secondary narcissism is sublimation, because the super-ego originally called forth by reality becomes reinvaded by primary narcissism, so that the relation to reality becomes disturbed with the suppression of instinctual desire. A prim, priggish feeling of superiority is seldom accompanied by creative originality because ego functions of mastery have been sacrificed to the inflation of the super-ego. What force could destroy the sublimated relationship to reality if not a re-invasion by primary narcissism ? Such re-invasions are found to express disturbances of narcissistic equilibrium in proportion to the extent to which reality is ignored.

The main thesis of this paper is to expound the theory of narcissistic equilibrium which could eliminate many of the afore-mentioned inconsistencies and ambiguities. This equilibrium is maintained by the relationship of the ego and the super-ego in the same way that the friendly relationship between son and father, child and parent contributed to family equilibrium. Both ego and super-ego are made up of identifications. Where the latter are harmoniously integrated in the personality we have the state of narcissistic equilibrium. The super-ego does not demand of the ego more than it can produce. The ego is not terrified by the threat of the super-ego severity. Narcissistic equilibrium is like a business in which father and son are in partnership and each has complete confidence in the other and each knows what is going on in the other's mind, and there is mutual respect.

It is clear then why irrational, neurotic, psychotic or infantile parents produce a very shaky narcissistic equilibrium. The ego finds itself responding to and obeying dictates of an irrational and contradictory super-ego. It responds with shame and fear as it did as a child before the threat of a brutal or alcoholic parent. The pattern of its own confusion follows the pattern of the original family confusion. Hence shame develops, as well as fear.

What we are dealing with as Wittels has noted is a sort of drama of phantoms of identification (77). The super-ego not fused into a logically consistent and realistic structure becomes a source of tyrannical interference with normal adaptation. Nevertheless the ego's love of the super-ego may be more precious than the love of very desirable real objects. Even the choice of real objects is dictated by the internalized love object. A girl repudiates her alcoholic unsuccessful father, runs away from home and marries the very man who can repeat the pattern of father. Who can deny that the super-ego is more real than her actual love object ?

This loss of narcissistic equilibrium is well illustrated in suicide. It is not enough to say that the suicide kills himself because he kills an internalized love object upon whom he revenged himself. He is at war with this internalized object because its demands are over-severe, inconsistent and inappropriate to reality. Nevertheless the ego needs the love of this super-ego with the same desperate need that the little child has for the parent, however brutal. Thus in suicide not only does the ego kill the cruel super-ego but the cruel super-ego demands the death of the ego. In all suicide whether total or partial, acute or chronic, this sado-masochistic melodrama between ego and super-ego, proceeds to the ruination of all equanimity and balance.

At this point I would like to introduce the term compensatory narcissism for an ego deficiency in which the narcissism is reparative. This places it in the group of ego defences such as projection, reaction formation, displacement, etc., so well illustrated in character neuroses. Extreme ' narcissism ' implies weakness and vulnerability. Insecure persons inflate themselves with self love to compensate for a lack of devotion from without and because of an unconscious feeling of not deserving it. Again the individual is condemned by an archaic and unrealistic super-ego which makes him uncomfortable. This involves so much suffering and denial of reality that intense masochism is required to sustain it, as well as sacrifice of ego mastery. Here the exaggerated self appreciation which lurks beneath the masochist's self-

humiliation is as infantile and unrealistic as is the bombastic self-inflation of the socially insecure. The insecurity and vulnerability that lies at the core of such compensatory defence is based on the lack of narcissistic equilibrium itself a result of trying to please an impossible super-ego.

The decline in ego strength that occurs with senility is likewise compensated for this kind of narcissism. Both body and psychic egos are cathected. The painful reality of one's decline in capacity is ignored in response to an unrealistic super-ego. Senile or organic self-inflation showing this narcissistic imbalance indicates that even in old age and in brain injury the super-ego will not relinquish its tyranny. In similar fashion, intoxicants like alcohol, morphine, cocaine, hashhish, stimulate the compensatory narcissism while they impair the ego's real efficiency. It is as if something within the ego itself perceived its own deficiency and sought instantly as in the Korsakow's syndrome to step into the breach gloriously. It seems that no specific ego lack accounts for compensatory narcissism but anything which a tyrannical super-ego can unconsciously condemn in the ego, whether it be oral sadism, cannibalism, incest wishes, homosexuality, or any id desire unacceptable either to reality or the original parent. Thus only with relaxation in the severity of his super-ego is the self-punishing masochist free to release the aggression which was so offensive to his super-ego. The more uncomfortable the neurotic is with his super-ego the more compensatory love from others will he demand. The proof of this is that it is not external appreciation that he really wants, since he despises it when he gets it. In similar fashion the psychopathic criminal seeks to compensate for his lack of narcissistic equilibrium by narcissistic over-compensation. This phenomenon is so common that no clinical illustration seems necessary.

To Piaget we are indebted for many objective observations on childish narcissism (57). If the infant is in love with himself it is not because he knows his self, but because he ignores all that is outside his dreams and desires. Piaget finds that it is the ' egoism ' of the child which prevents him from understanding adults and other children. The child regards his own point of view as absolute. He will not trouble to test his own ideas against those of others. He thinks he himself has discovered what has been taught by others (56). This narcissism is obviously compensating because it is due to actual ego weakness. One primary blow to the child's narcissism not discussed by Piaget is the regulation of his excretions. This is compensated for by the parental love and the development of the super-ego which would otherwise be a disturbing force if the child did not receive this love. Compensation we can thus see works in two directions. If the ego feels itself unloved by the super-ego it inflates itself, and conversely, if it is compensated by parental love, it relinquishes its primary narcissism. Reality breaks through the primal narcissism by showing to the child that his need for love and protection is greater than his need for auto-erotic pleasure. The repression of these pleasures may be effected narcissistically by pride in other achievements (52). Children who have been strictly and prematurely trained in sphincteric control to the pride of their parents show a consequent pride in neatness, order and primness corresponding to the original pride in excretion. So great then is the child's need for love, that his narcissism can be shifted to envelope actually self-destructive masochistic tendencies. Not all children need to submit, with such passivity however, but can by their negativism do the opposite of what is wanted, thereby preserving a sense of self and independence. Hence both independence and passivity can be narcissistically charged. The child frequently retreats into phantasy when frustrated in attempts at mastery of reality. This narcissistic retreat has a reparative value, particularly when the child is obviously not mature enough to cope with the reality situation.

Compensatory narcissism follows the pleasure principle of the id even at the cost of maladjustment to reality. If distortion of reality by delusion, hallucination and phantasy offered more pleasure than reality then we would all become psychotic. When reality absolutely affords no pleasure at all, as in conditions of extreme privation, retreat into phantasy, delusion, and illusion is so common as to be regarded as normal. Mirages and pleasing hallucination then provide the pleasure which reality cannot. We must have pleasure in order to live at all. Drug addicts can attain this by means of a drugged euphoria, but their ego weakness is furthered by abandoning attempts at ego mastery. Hence the importance of ego mastery in the shift from primary to secondary narcissism. Lack of this satisfaction in mastery is a contributing factor in regression to psychotic omnipotence. As Federn (10) points out, normal and healthy narcissism is associated with feelings of triumph over difficulties.

It is not enough to say that the psycho-analytic study of the psychoses reveals that they are narcissistic. ' Narcissism ' is found in epilepsy, fits, stammering, depersonalization, paranoia, hypochondria, homosexuality, and character neurosis, and is non-specific. The catatonic posture frequently suggests a return to fœtal narcissism indicated by the refusal to eat, speak, or control excretion. There is in the psychotic a weak synthetic force and a domination by the archaic id with its inconsistency. Logic derived from the ego's grappling with reality is thrown aside when reality is abandoned, and for this reason in therapy we attempt to restore the synthetic power of the ego by a stimulation of logical analysis. In spite of his narcissistic retreat every schizophrenic has

some dim notion of the unreality and loneliness of his substitute delusional world (39). He is not contented with his primitive narcissistic stage of adaptation but tries to get closer to the world again (70). Wälder (75) draws attention to Schreber's reversal of the morbid process by the attachment of his narcissistic libido to intellectual work and goals so that sublimation made possible his return to the human world. We cannot be sure that narcissistic regression is complete even in catatonic stupor since patients often return from this state abruptly to re-establish object relations. Hence, there is always some tie to reality.

Schizophrenic narcissism can be explained by two distinct hypotheses, constitutional and traumatic. In the first hypothesis, the splitting of the psyche is based on a constitutionally determined weakness of synthetic power, consequently the pleasure derived from reality mastery is not sufficient to counterbalance regressive and infantile pleasures—in other words, the inability to integrate is constitutional. In the second hypothesis severe traumatic shock and crippling anxiety, or premature privation with inadequate primary identifications weaken the ego synthesis and also the capacity to derive pleasure from reality. An examination of the traumatic hypothesis adduces no specific qualitative or quantitative ætiological factor. Everything which the psychotic personality has suffered has been experienced without psychosis by normal persons. Glandular weaknesses also indicate constitutional inadequacy. Schilder (69) points out that the narcissism of the schizophrenic differs from that of the epileptic whose withdrawal is just as profound but who yet wishes to square himself with the world. We might characterize the narcissistic regression of the epileptic as more elastic. Organic brain cases on the other hand show considerable rigidity of cathexis. Fromm-Reichmann (38) describes how a schizophrenic patient responded twice with a catatonic stupor when the analyst had to change his appointment hour. Such deep and sensitive dependence on transference is not expressed in words. Actually the tentative, silent attempts at object relations of the schizophrenic suggest a different meaning than is ascribed to those of most people. A sexual meaning is ascribed to a handshake, a physician's ring can be interpreted as armour that frightens him, suicidal attempts may follow a tactless remark or a feeling that the doctor is indifferent, all of which indicate a deep need of love and an equally deep fear of showing it. The narcissism of the psychotic is not entirely primary, but is compensatory as well, because of an awareness of inner helplessness, fear of betrayal and abandonment with evidences of narcissistic imbalance. Whatever sublimation of his narcissism the schizophrenic can attain prevents regression to primal narcissism. Sublimation implies mastery and power of synthesis which seems to be lacking in the schizophrenic. Instead, a vicious cycle seems to occur with an excessive need for love and dependence, not gratified by reality nor by increasing mastery, producing regression to primal narcissism, with increasing ego weakness and so on.

It is easy to see from what we have considered above that sublimation has an important bearing on narcissistic equilibrium. Sublimation by combining reality with pleasure is an indispensable instrument holding the ego to reality. Writing a novel, painting a picture, building a house, objectify the ego's conflicts, give it power, money, social esteem. Freud (20) said that probably all sublimation occurs through the ego changing the sexual object libido into narcissistic libido and Walder (74) thinks that a sublimation of narcissism pre-supposes the sublimation of object instincts in order that narcissistic libido may be freed from any existing attachment. The objects within the self have to be changed. As in identification there is a development in the ego of the qualities of the loved object. Sublimation of component instincts occurs so often in analysis as the transference dependence is given up that Walder's emphasis of the object relationship as a factor seems quite important. Possibly because of the slight amount of object libido available, the sublimations of the psychotic are insecure. The transference of the schizophrenic and the hypochondriac are as unstable as are their sublimations. Hence narcissism of itself cannot result in sublimation. Otherwise our Mental Hospitals would be centres of culture.

It would appear that where there is no need for renunciation, there is no need for sublimation, and this applies as well to narcissism as to object love. Primitive cultures demanding little renunciation produce little creative genius. Abandoning the polymorph perverse cravings for the sake of social reality implies a super-ego before which the ego acts as did the child before his parents. When this control of the super-ego is repudiated in schizophrenia or in alcoholism could this be only the re-enactment of earlier rejection between parent and child? On the other hand, the greater the affectionate bond between parent and child the more consistent the love between super-ego and ego. The development of the super-ego based on renunciation is thus a determining factor in sublimation. The more parents render their offspring helpless, the less capacity do the latter have for renunciation and extensive sublimation.

This brings up the relationship of love to narcissism? According to Freud (22) narcissism is the original condition from which object-love later developed. Narcissism is the origin of sympathy (21). It seems very doubtful if there is any love free of narcissism or that does not have even a large admixture of self love. Parental love which is more self-sacrificing than filial love has been called 'narcissism born again' (30). Their love

impels parents to give their children a better life than their own. Lampl de Groot (42) says that an adequate reserve of narcissism enables the individual to accomplish object love. If the narcissism is depleted, the individual attempts to restore it by permitting himself to be loved. Putting it in another way we might say that object love is brought in to restore narcissistic equilibrium. The phrase 'depletion of narcissism' requires some scrutiny. The demand to be loved by others is as we have seen a compensation for lack of self-esteem, due to condemnation by the super-ego. If the super-ego is inexorable, the ego is made to feel inadequate. This can be traced to depreciating attitudes of the parents in almost every case. Depletion of narcissism could then be re-phrased as depletion or disturbance of narcissistic equilibrium.

Freud (32) spoke of a type of narcissistic love given to people who have an excellence lacked by the ego. This is a love of qualities that one wishes were one's own. He found the over-estimation of the love object in 'True love' a sure narcissistic feature in object choice, perhaps because of the previous over-estimation of the self. Old married people over-estimate the value of one another as they become more like one another, and as they merge and identify they are the less capable of enduring the loss of the partner. Falling in love as a habit seems to reflect an actual narcissistic imbalance or inadequacy of self-regard. Some persons whose egos need this constant bolstering appear to be in 'love' not with the actual person they unite with, but with the projection of an earlier introjected object. The overtones may be those of object love, but the undertones are narcissistic.

Jealously is another involvement of self-esteem with love. La Rochefoucauld said there was much more self-love than love in jealousy. Actually the person who is deeply secure in basic self-esteem is not often jealous. It is only when we unconsciously feel inferior to others that we suffer from jealousy. Being rejected in love in favour of another is as deflating to self-esteem as is the receiving of love from another, inflating. True and pure object-love might be something akin to Spinoza's love of God. 'He who loves God cannot endeavour to bring it about that God should love him in return' (71). In other words, a love which demands no return on its investment has plenty of capital already. The capacity for true object-love is therefore an index of secure basic self-esteem, the opposite of jealousy and which the Christian doctrine 'love your enemies, do good to them which hate you' (St. Luke 6 : 27) stimulates because it does not apparently demand a return on the investment. Such security expresses, I believe, the complete harmony with the super-ego.

Relevant to the problem of jealousy is the proverbially accepted narcissism of woman which is implicitly greater than that of man as endorsed by our conventions. Analytically, this is ascribed to her lack of a penis and its traumatic significance. 'The purely feminine woman is purely narcissistic' says Lampl de Groot (45). 'She does not love but permits herself to be loved.' This biological passivity is, however, only introductory, for there is nothing passive about successfully rearing a large family to psychological maturity. Bearing a child does not *ipso facto* destroy the woman's narcissism for she can lavish upon it the pride formerly spent on herself. 'Women escape their narcissism', said Freud (30) 'through object-love of the child'. Hence we may say that the child always represents a part of the ego, and is resented, if abnormal, as too close a mirror of the parents' frailties, or as a projection of self-condemnation. Love of her child is therefore a blend of both object-love and self-love to the normal woman, whereas to the narcissistic woman the child is a threat to her body beauty and self-importance. It is her primary narcissism which makes menstruation, coitus, pregnancy and labour, traumatic and castrative. It is a narcissism based on inadequate renunciation of infantile dependence and omnipotence for mastery and adaptation to reality. The 'intensification of narcissism' in the adolescent girl can thus be partly explained as a disturbance in narcissistic equilibrium through new social and physical problems. Though Freud (34) considered female narcissism as due to penis-envy and as a belated compensation for original sexual inferiority, Klein (53) ascribes it as due partly to omnipotence phantasies about body function and excretion. It is with her whole body that she attains full biological potency, hence her narcissism would extend to the body as the man's to the penis, which that body excites. The narcissism of the woman who makes her body attractive so that she can attract the biologically fittest male to make her a mother is a more valued and masterful narcissism than that of the girl who cannot tolerate breast-feeding or pregnancy because it might mar her body beauty. In the latter case she places the attraction of the man above her own productivity, and in thus rejecting her biological rôle resembles the male homosexual. Both fear being hurt by biological responsibility which indicates that the narcissism is compensatory for lack of mastery. The more castrated a woman feels the more she will need the compensatory narcissism, and the less castrated, the more her self-esteem will be based upon motherhood or its equivalent.

This brings us logically to homosexual narcissism and it is generally accepted that homosexuals are markedly 'narcissistic'. Just what shape, direction and degree this narcissism takes is obviously necessary for us to ascertain if the formulation is to have meaning. The identification with the woman or the mother is perceptible in the outer trappings, but the deeper identification based upon

the desire to have a baby by father is less apparent. Identification with the woman often takes on a burlesque character, indicating hostility and revenge against her for narcissistic insult or deprivation. One homosexual described by Reik (59) abandoned his lady friend for a handsome youth, thus re-enacting the little boy's painful disillusionment when the first woman in his life abandoned him for a man. Since this occurs to every small boy it is not in itself sufficient to account for male homosexuality. It is often the intense incestuous bond to the mother, prevailing over the castration fear which causes the identification with her and the inability to renounce her. She became an external possession within the ego at the cost of castration which then inevitably destroys the narcissistic equilibrium. Why is the narcissism in this instance not more masculine and less bi-sexual ? Normally the incest bond to the mother is abandoned because of both castration fear and identification with the father. The additional factor of oral regression and dependence characteristic of both male and female homosexuality implies a fear of biological responsibility. All oral passive persons are strongly ' narcissistic ' because their fixation is to that period in childhood when primary narcissism was not renounced for mastery. Absence of identification with the strong father shows itself in super-ego weakness with consequent narcissistic imbalance. Freud (36), Abraham (1a), Rado (58), Bergler (7), Stern (73), Alexander (2), and others, have drawn attention to the oral fixation in homosexuals, the importance of contact of oral mucosa in female homosexuality, and the coincidence of both alcoholic and drug addiction with homosexuality and passive dependence emphasize the importance of the oral fixation in determining narcissistic imbalance.

This brings us to the relationship between passivity and narcissism. Lampl de Groot (43) declared that severe narcissitic insults over genital inferiority cause in the little girl the assumption of the passive rôle. It is true that the body, if wounded, assumes an attitude of rest and passivity, but this is not a universal reaction to narcissistic insult. Loyala's mutilation caused him to become the founder of the Jesuit Order, and the story of our two Roosevelts indicates the spur of ill-health to ego mastery. When the little girl first sees the little boy's penis she is unmistakeably determined to have one too. Hence we cannot agree that passivity is the universal reaction to body deformity. Passivity is probably conditioned long before the traumatic loss and makes use of the latter for libidinal satisfaction. The biologically passive receptive function of the vagina, combined with previous oral receptivity, appears to be more important in determining female passivity. Prolongation of the stage of oral dependence and the occurrence of the trauma during this stage may have more importance than the trauma *per se*. Trauma is more easily borne and survived when some degree of ego mastery has been attained.

Little mention thus far has been made of the anal zone and yet this, too, is strongly invested with narcissistic libido and is an important factor in homosexuality. We have seen that for the love of someone else the child forsakes a part of its body contents and body pleasures. This renunciation is important for both sublimation and super-ego development. When object-love is abandoned as in catatonia, a return to the renounced pleasures occurs with pronounced coprophilia. Hendrick (46) regards the love of fæces as an intermediate phase between narcissism and object-love inasmuch as the fæces become something of an object after leaving the body. The anal phase coincides with so many developments in ego mastery, walking, speech, etc., that we cannot neglect the factor of ego growth in the establishment of secondary narcissism, while recognising the important factor of winning love through renunciation.

Ferenczi (15) connected hypochondria with anal-eroticism, commenting that stool pedants become stool hypochondriacs. If the gastro-intestinal tract is the organ system of the body, specially cathected in the hypochondriac, we would expect oral introjection phantasies to be prominent. It is astonishing how often the abdominal pain of hypochondriacal nature proves on analysis to accompany oral sadistic and cannibalistic phantasies.

Freud (26) connected the refusal of food in melancholics with the oral incorporation of the loved object. The unrestricted narcissism of the process was commented upon by Abraham (1b). In the hypochondriac the intestinal organ which consumes the love-object is the organ punished. Thus Levey (54) describes a duodenal ulcer case with guilt over cannibalistic impulses toward the father and Fenichel (13) reports a depressed woman who would not eat fish because it had a soul and who had phantasies of eating her dead father. The same author finds the phantasy of being devoured by the introjected object operative in the fear of cancer (14). It is a tenable hypothesis that the selection of the body-ego as the target of ambivalence is in itself a defence against selecting the psychic ego. According to Schilder (61) hypochondria is both an increase in the narcissistic libido and a fight aganist it. This implies that narcissistic libido is a threat to the ego instead of a defence. The hypochondriac feels like one threatened from within and therefore concerns himself with his body which gives him pain rather than pleasure. On the other hand regression to primal narcissism may involve the psychic ego as in schizophrenia. Why narcissistic pleasure from the body needs to produce pain we cannot see unless associated with guilt due to aggressive, incestuous, or cannibalistic wishes. In hypochrondria therefore, we see a serious disturbance in the narcissistic equilibrium expressed not in terms of compensatory

psychic narcissism but in terms of compensatory body narcissism. It is hard to see how an oral sadistic attitude to the parent could represent the prototype of narcissistic equilibrium. It is hence not accidental that athletes, health faddists and body narcissists are particularly prone to hypochondria, and are specially concerned about the foods they eat. We know too that the frequent relationship between hypochondria and melancholia suggest an ambivalence to an early love object that has become introjected and later the object of punishment. The cannibal with a stomache-ache after eating father might be taken as the symbol of the hypochondriac. The concern over intestinal excretion so characteristic of this regression repeats the previous parental concern over intestinal function. Here even in hypochondriacal narcissism something of an object relationship is maintained on a pregenital level. The ego seems to give its body parts the love and concern once given by the parents, but with the ambivalence indicative of narcissistic imbalance, because the parental attitude was originally ambivalent and sadistic even in its concern.

Can ' narcissism ' be a source of anxiety in itself ? Freud (23) said that an accumulation of narcissistic libido over a certain level becomes intolerable. Anna Freud (16) referred to passionate object relations of adolescence as an attempt at recovery from narcissistic regression. Sleeplessness has been regarded as a flight from enhanced narcissism and Hanns Sachs (60) saw the machines created by schizophrenia as defence against overwhelming narcissism. Are we to regard narcissism as a source of anxiety or a defence against it ? If regression to primary narcissism did not bring some comfort and peace, what would be the advantage of it ? When we assume that the defence against anxiety can itself be a source of it we are forced to answer the question, is it because the defence is faulty ? Where does the concept of narcissistic equilibrium fit into this ? Other defences such as repression, projection, displacement, introjection can injure the ego by reducing its adaptation to reality. In both alcoholism and paranoia, projection develops into a source of anxiety. On closer scrutiny, however, it seems probable that the instinctual impulses are the real cause of the anxiety and not the narcissism which fails to protect against them. Narcissism can be compensatory in that it represents a desperate effort on the part of the ego to put on a good face before the super-ego. If the Nazis had not bolstered their wavering self-esteem by a super-race ideology, how could they have tolerated their own sadism ? The Spanish Inquisition could cheerfully condemn hundreds of thousands of heretics to death only because it could exalt itself into a divinely inspired mission. It is probable that much compensatory narcissism is needed to neutralize the guilt from destructive tendencies. It is these destructive drives which impair the narcissistic equilibrium between ego and super-ego requiring projection and consequent removal from reality. Hence it is not narcissism that creates anxiety, but the instinctual and chiefly the sadistic destructive tendencies against which narcissism is but the shield.

I believe that we can throw more light on narcissism if we consider it as a libidinal force which, like object-love, can turn to many different objects within the self. The more narcissism is mingled with object-love, the more contact it maintains with reality and consequently the greater its force for reality mastery. Narcissism becomes pathological to the degree that it invests objects within the ego, which are associated with earlier stages in growth when reality mastery was slight and tentative. The success of analytic therapy depends upon the degree to which narcissistic love can be blended with object-love, and turned upon objects within the self which reinforce the drive to reality mastery. We might call this ' progressive narcissism ' as opposed to regressive narcissism. Federn (10) calls it healthy narcissism. Primary narcissism invests the body, but secondary narcissism invests the mind, which becomes an ever wider avenue of pleasure in reality. A sign of schizophrenic improvement is the return of interest in the body's appearance and clothing. Schilder (61) notes that the body-image expands when we feel friendly and loving, but contracts when we hate. He declared that our own body is not nearer to us than is the outside world (63). Body images are never isolated but always encircled by the body image of others (64), and the body image is the result of social life (65). Hence, there is no sharp clear distinction between narcissistic love and object-love ; but between the various objects of narcissistic love there may be those which bring it closer to and others further away from reality.

The term fixation is useful in this connexion implying different objects, impulses, and levels of development which can be invested with narcissistic libido. It implies an incomplete desexualization or subjugation of infantile libido. In schizophrenia the levels of fixation range from fœtal to post-natal and preverbal stages. In the hypochondriac the fixation to the narcissistic love object is at the late stage of autoerotism. In paranoia the level of narcissistic investment appears to reside in the phase of infantile omnipotence. The oral magic of words and flatus seem strongly invested in the stutterers. The homosexual loves himself as the projected love object belonging to a father or a mother of earlier days. These objects of narcissistic love within the self can vary from pride in one's athletic prowess, to Proust's reveling in detailed memories of his past. Narcissistic persons shift the libido from one internal object to another. The process is probably indistinguishable from the process of identification and ' phantom ' formation described by Wittels (77). Former love objects

are taken into the self and invested with narcissistic love.

From the above we may conclude that narcissism may be differentiated not only as to whether it is primary or secondary, but as to whether it is regressive or progressive, i.e. whether it leads away from reality mastery or towards it. Psychotic narcissism belongs to the former, healthy narcissism, ambition, creativity belong to the latter. Compensatory self-esteem or self-inflation can thus be distinguished from true self-esteem according to foundations in real achievement. Not all compensatory self-esteem is regressive for as in the case of feminine narcissism it can lead to achievement in reality and to actual true self-esteem from biological maturity. Narcissism, however compensatory, is not in itself a source of danger but a signal of inadequate control of the ego over its instinctive drive. Narcissistic equilibrium is a state of ego security based on realistic mastery and self-appraisal, in other words, harmony between ego and super-ego. Narcissistic disequilibrium or imbalance involves the need for compensatory self-inflation and other phenomena commonly but unspecifically referred to as ' narcissistic '. Before primary and compensatory narcissism can be outgrown, object-love via identification is needed. A reciprocal relationship between object-love and self-love is determined by that between child and parent, ego and super-ego, forming the basis of this narcissistic equilibrium. Regression to primary narcissism could be an identification with the world itself and its indifference, similar to what is done intellectually in philosophic solipsism. Thus, many shades of meaning are to be found in the term narcissism, and it would be profitable both in practical therapy and in theoretical understanding if we could reach towards a sharper definition of the term, a goal towards which this paper is offered as a step.

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THE SUPER-EGO AND OTHER INTERNAL OBJECTS [1]

By ADRIAN STEPHEN

The concept of the super-ego was devised by Freud to co-ordinate certain observed facts. It has served its purpose very well, but that does not imply that we must remain for ever satisfied without as clear a description of these facts as we can get. There has been much argument lately on such questions as that of the date when the super-ego first appears, the nature of so-called 'internal objects' and so on, and though it does not much matter what technical terms we use so long as we are certain what facts they refer to, I still feel that we have some need to clear our minds.

As everyone knows, Freud did not arrive at his concept without some, so to speak, experimentation. He thought of the concepts among others of the 'Censorship' of 'Narcissism' of the 'Ego Ideal' of 'Whole Objects' and of 'Part Objects' of 'Libido' and of 'Aggressivity'. His latest conclusion was that the 'Super-Ego' was partly inherited and partly the result of the introjection of a lost Object that was both loved and hated. What I want to attempt to-day is to correlate some facts that we all of us must constantly observe with Freud's concept of the 'Super-Ego'.

Leaving the super-ego on one side for the moment I will ask what it is that all of us continually observe in analysis, and the answer is, I think, that we observe our patients in the act of fulfilling their wishes as best they can in the circumstances in which we have placed them. I do not know whether that statement will appear paradoxical or self-evident, nevertheless fulfilling our wishes as best we can is surely what we all do wherever we are and all the time. Certainly we have many wishes that we cannot fulfil, but I take it that we all actually do what in the existing circumstances we on the balance want to do. A patient may, of course, have strong positive or negative feelings towards his analyst, and may long to rise up from the couch and put them into effect, but what the analyst has asked him to do is simply to say whatever thoughts come into his head and one part of the circumstances in which he finds himself is his affective tie with his doctor.

One of the things that Freud observed, then, was that his patients behaved as if they felt closely watched by something which was not quite themselves and which set up a standard of behaviour for them. The nature of the thing which watched them varied and their relation to it varied, but if I am right in thinking that what we observe in analysis is the fulfilment of wishes, then the concept of a super-ego must be based on such observations.

Now we must all of us frequently have had

[1] Read at a Conference of European Psycho-Analysts held in Amsterdam (24–27 May, 1947).

experience of patients who behave just as if they had taken some loved object or some critic into their insides. There is no doubt that the concept is based on accurate observation, but there are many ways in which the phenomenon can appear. The patient may feel that someone is hostile and he may, as we say, ' project ' this hostility on to his analyst, perhaps he feels on the contrary that someone approves of him and is applauding him. Often it is as though there were more than two persons involved. The super-ego may seem to be located spatially inside his own body and sometimes he hears voices. The love object or hate object, too, may be a complete person or it may be only a so-called part object—a penis or a nipple or fæces.

A question then arises as to the simplest and most convenient way of referring to these phenomena and to me the answer seems to be that it is by saying that they are all the expression of fulfilled wishes.

At the moment I do not mean to give a clinical history but I think I may make my meaning clearer if I refer to a case which I have at present under treatment. The patient is a woman now in her fifties who came to me on account of repeated attacks of depression which have alternated with bouts of elation for some twenty-five years. I have not been able to uncover her earliest history yet, but it is clear that as a child she used to have violent temper tantrums which occurred when she was separated from her mother. She used to lie on the floor and scream and fling herself about. Later she had appalling night terrors about a man who was going to creep upstairs to her room and plunge a knife into her in bed. Later she used to picture herself as a man—a Scotch hero named William Wallace. Her first attack of depression occurred at about the age of twenty-three, when a man to whom she was devoted was killed in the first world war. A few years later her father died and she had another bout of depression, and when her mother died a few years later still her cyclothymic breakdown started. She has also married a Scotchman twenty years older than herself who is certainly a modern edition of William Wallace and of her father, with both of whom she identified herself. These are a few of her symptoms which I want to express as the fulfilment of wishes. There are obviously several identifications, she identifies herself with her father and her mother and with several other people including her husband. All these identifications can be described, and I believe it would be convenient to describe them, as the fulfilment of wishes. She has wanted to be various other people, and she has in fact moulded herself on them—she has regarded herself as being them. She tells herself and her analyst that *she* ' needs discipline '. She has wished to have them inside herself and she feels as though she had them there—but having them inside herself and being them makes her feel at times shut up—and she feels shut up in her house—just as her mother is shut up in her grave. So also, in the same sense, her father is shut up inside her and so is her husband.

I think that at this point it might be convenient to pause a moment and consider the nature of a wish. In his *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, Freud gave a description which still holds good. He put it in terms of instinct and of the libido theory. Instincts, he said, have aims and objects—and I take it that a wish as a manifestation of instinct also has an aim and an object. If anyone cares to dissect a wish into three elements —the force behind the wish, the aim of doing something to an object and the object to which it is done then, certainly, it is possible to do so, but I want to point out that this dissection, however useful it may be for some purposes, is yet highly artificial. It is highly artificial too to describe the ' Mental Apparatus ' in the terms used by Freud, either in the theoretical chapter at the end of the book on dream interpretation, or in the *Ego and the Id*, or in the *Further Introductory Lectures*. The fact seems to be that in all his successive formulations, Freud was attempting something that he felt to be as yet impossible. In *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, indeed, he remarks that these formulations are not to be taken too rigidly, and when he says this, he has in mind particularly that part of the psychic apparatus which he calls the super-ego.

With regard to wishes, however, I think that in another place he has given us a most useful hint as to their nature. He speaks of wishes as having the character of ' hallucinatory wish fulfilments '. As he states the position himself he would seem to regard them as based on the memory of some past satisfaction—some satisfaction which had once been experienced either by the subject himself or by his ancestors. To put the matter with diagrammatic simplicity, a child would remember satisfaction at the breast and, when later it felt the need of such satisfaction, again it would try to achieve it by hallucinating a breast. Later still it would find mere hallucination unsatisfactory, and it would find itself driven to take some appropriate real action.

Now, of course, I do not know just how literally Freud meant his theory to be accepted, but what seems to me a more plausible, if only slightly different theory, is that what children remember and want is a warm, soft, comfortable smelling, thirst-quenching something. I mean that the thing wished for and hallucinated is an undivided unity. Probably, in trying to put it into words, I have chosen the wrong words. Probably, too, since babies can't speak and no two are quite alike, no words exist that would give an accurate description. Nevertheless, the principle remains the same—it is the total experience that is desired—the total

experience of what for lack of better words we describe as ' the satisfaction of an instinct '.

If I am right about the nature of our wishes, however, it is still clear that there are some that we attribute to the ego, some to the super-ego—at this moment I will say nothing of the id. On what principle are these attributions made ? To return to my patient, there is no doubt that she has made strong identifications with her father and her mother—on the basis (to speak that language) of an almost completely unresolved Œdipus situation. She has never escaped from a very primitive relation to the parents and she has, as it were, transferred the relationship to her subsequent love objects. The question is, then, to what observed facts do we refer when we speak of some of these identifications as manifestations of the super-ego, some as manifestations of the ego ? It seems to me that where Freud really did get confused was in attempting to introduce ethical considerations into what was originally a dynamic scheme. This, of course, is not to say that ethical judgements are not fit subjects for psychological discussion—they certainly are—but they do not form part of a scheme based on dynamics. To introduce them in this way is to introduce a cross-classification which is misleading. The reason why they have been introduced is clear enough—the super-ego wishes that were first observed were essentially ' moral '. They did—or most of them did—seem to fit in pretty well with the idea of ' conscience ', but when we trace them back we find that many of them can only be considered as the representatives of a vengeful, castrating, destructive, jealous individual whose perfect morality we may very well take leave to doubt. Possibly there may have been a time when the accepted morality of the human race was like that of the super-ego, that is a question for argument, but we should hardly call it moral nowadays. I will illustrate this point from the patient of whom I have already spoken. Sometimes she hears a voice speaking to her and saying, ' It is no use, you cannot escape me—I shall catch you whatever you do.' This voice, she says herself, is like the voice of a demon. She locates it physically inside the lower part of her abdomen, and she says it ' drags at her insides '. She compares herself to the man in the Bible out of whom Jesus is said to have cast a legion of devils, and she hopes that I will repeat the miracle. The voice might be described as in some sense the representative of the id and I should raise no objection if it were, but I find it very difficult to draw any distinction that is at all clear between some representatives of the id and some representatives of the super-ego. Some people would, perhaps, escape the difficulty by saying that the id had corrupted the super-ego, for there is no doubt that she regarded the words as the utterance of a threat. The aim of the ' demon ' apparently is to punish her, or, if one cares to put it so, she has an unconscious need for punishment. She would, in yet other words, get a sadistic pleasure out of punishing herself and fulfil all sorts of wishes in whatever way we care to describe them.

It seems to me, then, that, however useful the concept of the super-ego may have been in the past, the time has come to revise it. It seems to me that its real content, the real data which cause us to assume the existence of such a psychic entity, is a mass or collection of wishes and if anyone wants to define the super-ego as a collection of wishes that can be summarized as desires to be in some particular spatial or psychological relationship with any particular person, one's father or mother or both of them, then, of course, he is free to do so. But we are still left with a whole series of wishes which we need to distinguish from the wishes of the ego and for which we have no other name. If one wants to, one can call these other wishes ' internal objects '—but what is it that distinguishes them from those which we ascribe to the ego ? The main distinction is that in some sense they seem to stand apart from the ego. The subject feels as if he were being blamed or threatened or, perhaps, praised by them—and in this way they are exactly like those other wishes that we ascribe to the super-ego. But here again something sounds odd. How can one be blamed or praised by wishes ? I will remind you of Freud's own concept of hallucinatory wish fulfilments. The subject, in other words, feels as if he was or as if he contained a blaming or a praising object, because unconsciously he wishes that he did and his wish has become what Freud calls a ' psychic reality '. Actually there is, of course, no permanent hard and fast distinction between the different kinds of wish—whatever name you give them. Sometimes they are adopted into what one may call the main body of the self, sometimes they are projected on to gods or demons or on to other people—or on to the so-called conscience—so that to talk of the super-ego as a single entity seems misleading.

After our infancy, when we have learnt to speak, our wishes, at anyrate our conscious wishes, probably mostly ' clothe themselves in words ', but while we are still infants, they must clothe themselves in the memories of aural, visual olfactory and other sensations. What we call the ego is probably based mainly on verbal memories, that is to say the wishes express themselves in verbal terms, and it is, perhaps, these verbal images that enable us to be logical at all (and ' logical ' is, after all, only the Greek for ' verbal '). Some of the other wishes also express themselves verbally. It is only possible to guess what, before then, internal colics, bladder sensations and so on, mean or what for a baby the sensation of warm milk is like, and the comfort or discomfort that he experiences in his stomach. Presumably these sensations help to form the basis of what later on we may call God,

or a super-ego, or an internal object, or conscience, or a persecuting demon, but I do not think it possible to draw distinctions between them except by defining them so arbitrarily as to be misleading or to call some of them super-ego and some by other names.

BOOK REVIEWS

War, Sadism and Pacifism. Further Essays on Group Psychology and War. By Edward Glover, M.D. (George Allen & Unwin, 1947. Pp. 292. Price 9*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a fascinating book in the true meaning of the term, which implies a considerable measure of ambivalence. It attracts because the author has something tremendously (again in the true sense) important to say, and because we cannot help feeling that in many ways he is profoundly right. It repels because his message is in many respects intensely unwelcome and because the manner in which he delivers it provides many superficial justifications for an outbreak of the irritation which is at bottom due to the nature of the message itself.

As the main title indicates, the basic portion of the book (now called Part I) consists of the four essays first published under the same name in 1933 and reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. XIV, p. 420. To this are added ten 'further essays', divided into three further 'Parts', dated 1938–40, 1941–44 and 1945 respectively. Some of them are modifications of papers published or read during the periods in question, all of them dealing with various aspects of the same fundamental subject—the relation of war to the unconscious.

Owing to this arrangement there is a good deal of overlapping and repetition, of a kind that does not always help the reader to overcome his resistances and obtain a clear grasp of the author's meaning. But there are two further difficulties connected with the presentation of the message which work in the same direction. One of these is primarily cognitive; although the individual sentences and paragraphs are crystal clear and indeed in their pungent wit, often a delight to read, there is yet a certain elusive quality in the argument as a whole, so that at the end of each chapter or part the reader is apt to ask himself 'Have I really understood what the writer wishes to convey, or what he would have us do?' The second difficulty is orectic. One feels that the author is all too obviously taking a grim sadistic delight in debunking any pacifist complacency that may be left in us. One is even tempted to consider that an appropriate subtitle for the book might have been 'Thirteen Variations on a Sado-Masochistic Theme', in which the adjective would have expressed the author's attitude as well as the main subject of his discourse. Even in 1933 the 'Outline of Research' (contained in Chapter IV), with its recommendations for Interim Reports every fifty years and experiments planned on a 100 years' or 1,000 years' basis seemed something of a mockery in a world that clearly possessed the means (and perhaps the will) to destroy civilization before the first of these periods had elapsed. And the irony is even greater now, especially in view of the author's parting words in which he reminds us that the invention of the atom bomb is capable of playing straight into the hands of the unconscious, in so far as it makes possible the realization of our phantasies of world destruction in which in certain aggressive moments we have been wont to indulge. The atom bomb in short represents a triumph for the Death Instinct and 'it remains to be seen whether the Life Instinct can stage an effective come-back'. There is little in Dr. Glover's book to suggest that it can.

The 'variations' thus end on a note of stark tragedy. Psycho-analysis has, it would seem, more than justified the fears of those who have suggested that physical science would prove man's undoing by presenting him with dangerous tools with which he will destroy himself. With the advent of the atomic bomb mind has really reached the end of its tether and the great experiment of human life can be written off in the celestial laboratory as one more failure—though doubtless an instructive one.

Faced with this bleak prospect, is there any hope of a reprieve? The reader, if he does not throw aside the book in anger or allow it to fall from his hands as he closes it in blank despair, will turn back and search eagerly for any remedy. Does not psycho-analysis itself, as reviewed in its relevant aspects by Dr. Glover, suggest some means by which we may escape from our self-imposed doom? Or, alternatively, is there perhaps some flaw in Dr. Glover's thesis?

As regards the first point, Dr. Glover's own remedy is, of course, Research—above all research into the phenomena of sadism and masochism which, according to him, are the instinctive forces fundamentally responsible for war. No doubt most psychologists will agree with him in his insistence on the desirability of a scientific, rather than a moralistic, political or propagandist attitude. Apart perhaps from the grim suggestion that little of practical value will emerge for centuries, perhaps even for millenia, his Outline of Research is an excellent one, though as one continues to read the book, one begins to think that there is little likelihood of psychologists being left to carry out any

but the first preliminary stages. Still, on the face of it, it seems ridiculous that, as Dr. Glover reminds us, we should be willing to spend large sums on investigation into the causes of scarlet fever or foot and mouth disease and nothing on the study of the far more menacing phenomena of war. One reason for this discrepancy is doubtless to be found in the fact that men have not been sufficiently clear as to *how* war could be studied scientifically; what were the scientific problems to be faced and what the techniques available for their investigation? Here Dr. Glover's Outline should be really helpful and indeed has pretty certainly influenced certain programmes of research that are beginning to be considered by UNESCO and other bodies. It may, indeed, well be that a not inappreciable step will have been taken towards the prevention of war by merely establishing the respectability of the scientific approach to the subject, quite apart from any scientific findings.

Apart from the general prescription of research by which we may hope in time (if the time be given us) to lighten our darkness, what other more concrete and immediate remedies has Dr. Glover to propose? Here he is on the whole disappointingly vague, and would seem indeed to have little faith in such suggestions as he does tentatively put forward—nor is his treatment of them as clear as we could wish. We should, he says, reduce frustration by abolishing authoritarianism in education—and 'we could make a good start by instantly dismissing all authoritarian psychologists from the Child Guidance Clinics of all countries', though unfortunately he gives us little clue as to how he would distinguish between authoritarian and non-authoritarian psychologists. Furthermore 'we could try to reduce the tangled mass of superstitions and conventions that obstruct all rational adaptation to sexual life'. Above all, we should increase the rôle of the family and decrease that of the State; 'the family must somehow or other win back from the State the rights it has lost'. Similarly we should endeavour to increase the scope of other social units or 'cells' intermediate in size between the family and the State. As a more immediate measure we must reduce the sense of insecurity which, he rightly stresses, is moral and psychological as well as economic in its origin (it would hardly be fair to blame him for not telling us how this is to be brought about in a war-torn and chaotic world). He also hints (and here would seem to be a more novel contribution), that certain forms of ritual to canalize aggression might be useful, or again—if such a thing were possible—the cultivation of war neuroses on a mass scale might automatically put a stop to war, though he admits that the human race as a whole is still too obstinately healthy to make the prospects of this last solution very hopeful.

What then of the possibility of some fundamental flaw in Dr. Glover's thesis? This thesis is that war is a manifestation, perhaps an inevitable manifestation of sadism and masochism and he shows (convincingly, it seems at least to the present reviewer), that war provides a very ready channel for frustrated hate and love. But in his treatment of this theme he draws little distinction between a 'shooting war' and a war-like state of mind. War, in his view, begins long before the start of actual war-like violence (just as peace starts long before an armistice), and this position enables him to blur the distinction between act and wish and sometimes makes it seem as though the problem of war-prevention were co-extensive with the problem of dealing with aggression in general. Admittedly we all have murder in our hearts, but few of us are murderers. In a race in which such deep-lying wishes as those connected with cannibalism, incest, parricide and infanticide have been successfully dealt with, is there not hope that war, a far more impersonal form of aggression, can also be abolished? Even if (as seems probable and as Dr. Glover himself obviously believes) war or inter-group aggression has been to some extent the price we have had to pay for intra-group morality, is it not possible that by a further step we may direct much of this aggression outside the human sphere altogether, so as to find the 'enemy' in those forces that are opposed to human welfare as a whole—enlisting human aggressiveness in one great campaign to increase human welfare in what has now become one human world?

And this leads to a further point. In so far as war depends (as the author maintains) ultimately upon individual aggressiveness, the essential step in its causation lies in the identification of the individual with the State or other group that goes to war. Considering its importance, extraordinarily little consideration to this process of identification is given in this book. In particular, why is it that through identification with the State individuals tend to lose their hardly-won personal morality, so that nations are apt to carry on their dealings with one another in the most crudely egoistic fashion? Dr. Glover's answer would seem to be that the State, unlike the family, which it has so largely supplanted, is essentially loveless (pp. 217ff), so that aggressive impulses are not kept in check as they are in the family circle. But, in the first place, it is surely a gross distortion of the truth to say that the relations between the individual and his State are necessarily loveless. Admittedly, there seems to be little of love in income-tax demand notes (they might perhaps be considerably improved by the adoption of a more maternally persuasive tone), but it would be absurd to suggest that the millions of 'patriots' who throughout the ages have sacrificed themselves for their 'motherlands' have not been impelled by love as well as by personal aggressiveness or a sense of duty. And how is this doctrine of the lovelessness of the State to be harmonized

with what Dr. Glover himself tells us of the love elements that at a certain stage of hostilities begin to play an important part in war aims (the hopes for ' a better world ', establishment of ' the rights of man ' and so on) ? In the second place, even admitting that the State is (at least relatively) loveless, is it sufficient to say that for this reason ' it cannot establish checks on its own violence of purpose ' ? Many a severe parent, many a harsh super-ego can do this. True, as psycho-analysis has shown, they do it largely by directing aggression inwards rather than outwards. What would seem to differentiate the State from the parent or individual super-ego is its tragic and remarkable capacity for directing aggression outwards. In this respect the nation-state resembles the paranoiac or the delinquent. It all too easily acquires a criminal super-ego ; and the methods of treating delinquents might surely be expected to have a bearing on the problem of civilizing the morality of States. There are points of great importance to which more consideration might profitably have been devoted in the book, and the omission is all the more regrettable and surprising in the case of an author who has shown much interest in the problems of individual delinquency. There can surely be no doubt that membership of a group can elevate conduct as well as degrade it—and not merely in relation to other members of the group, but to the wider human world (witness the attitude of some religious or professional orders with their standards of charity, kindliness or ' service '). Is it not possible that the ' honour ' of nations should come to be associated with the helpfulness of certain knightly bodies (or for that matter of our ' scouts ' and ' guides ') rather than with the viciousness of criminal gangs or the brutality of Fascist youths ? Is the problem of substituting a civilized for a criminal group super-ego really as insuperable as Dr. Glover in many parts of his book would seem to suggest ?

In this book Dr. Glover takes his stand as a rather extreme representative of the psycho-analytic school of writers who find the ultimate cause of war in individual unconscious aggressiveness and in view of the difficulty of reducing this latter take a pessimistic view of the chances of abolishing war. As a group their attitude contrasts strikingly with that of certain other students of man, e.g. the one thousand and odd American psychologists who recently signed a declaration stating that in their opinion war was not an inevitable manifestation of human nature, or, again, the members of the culture-pattern school of anthropology, who hold that culture can select very freely from among the numerous human potentialities, so that environmental influences can to a large extent make man war-like or unwarlike as desired. This school has produced some remarkable evidence, which certainly deserves to be studied from the psycho-analytic point of view. This is a large task (doubtless one that deserves a whole volume or series of volumes), and Dr. Glover cannot be blamed for only touching on it lightly here. All the same, at one point the reader's appetite is whetted by a (tantalisingly brief) preliminary confrontation of the two points of view. It is here admitted that a number of facts uncovered by Benedict, Mead and others ' simply cry out for interpretation '. It is agreed that while the culture-pattern school labours under the disadvantage of its neglect of the unconscious and of the consequent necessity of taking social phenomena more or less at their face value, both schools are yet at one in emphasizing the relative malleability of the human mind in early years. It is here too that Dr. Glover himself finds the chief elements of hope in the present situation, and indeed in this book, and still more in *The Dangers of Being Human*, he stresses the potentialities of culture transmission from one generation to another. On the whole, however, he is sceptical, as we should expect him to be, and after very briefly putting forward a number of valuable suggestions (chief among which perhaps are : (1) the fact that striking but misleading appearances can be produced when ' antithetical instincts are equally strongly charged ', and (2) the possibility that ' it may require only a marginal stimulus to tip the balance on one side or the other '—a point which is taken up in relatively hopeful vein elsewhere in the book), he makes the rather cryptic statement that, if the culture-pattern theory of war is true (it is, he thinks, only a ' quarter-truth '), ' the human race has good reason to congratulate itself '—on the possibilities of the future, we may ask, or the actualities of the past ?

This last query may be raised bearing in mind the quotation from Freud's correspondence with Einstein in *Why War* with which Dr. Glover prefaces his book. Freud there enunciates the view that the ultimate biological justification of war, as of social aggression generally, lies in the fact that by directing violence outwards it counteracts the Death Instinct. As a result of the advances of physical science it now looks as though the relative usefulness and protectiveness of this device would shortly end and that war in turn is becoming only a not very devious route to the satisfaction of the Death Instinct, which it was originally its function to ward off or delay. If this is true, man is now called upon to perform a drastic act of biological re-adaptation. Shall we be equal to the task ? After reading this book we may feel very doubtful ; but at any rate we have been warned. And it would be well if those in charge of world destinies would take Dr. Glover's warning thoroughly to heart—in spite of the unflattering things he sometimes says about them (for that matter it is only fair to add that he is not particularly flattering to psychologists or psychoanalysts either). Probably every psychologist (and

many others) would agree that at least two of the many vital phrases in this book should be constantly before the eyes of those to whom are entrusted the issues of peace and war: '*Solvitur comprehendendo*' and 'The true measure of a peace plan is the degree to which it is based, however indirectly, on the love instincts'.

J. C. Flugel.

The Anatomy of Lango Religion and Groups. By T. T. S. Hayley. (Cambridge University Press, 1947. Pp. xi + 207. Price 21*s*.)

The title of this book implies that Mr. Hayley's purpose is to give the anatomy of Lango Culture and to avoid the more speculative field of its morphology. Nevertheless, a simple morphological idea underlies the system of classification he adopts—namely, the idea that all Lango ceremonies, apart from their specific function, have the wider function of maintaining the unity of a complex social structure of interlocking groups.

To the psycho-analyst, who is more accustomed to regard a primitive ceremony as an institutionalized obsessional symptom, this tendency, so characteristic of modern anthropology, to explain it in terms of social purpose must be necessarily suspect. He will remember that patients often react to interpretations with a renewed attempt to rationalize their symptoms, and may conclude that anthropology is reacting in much the same way to the interpretations first given it by Freud. But while a rationalization implicitly denies, or at least minimizes, the importance of a truth, it may well be true in what it explicitly affirms. That primitive (and civilized) customs and rituals do often fulfil the social purposes ascribed to them by modern anthropology is incontestible. What is needed therefore would seem to be not so much a decision between rival theories as a more comprehensive theory which can combine them.

Mr. Hayley's theory of what might be called 'Social Self-Preservation' could perhaps itself be extended to meet this need. It implies that the ultimate motive for those integrative rites which cement the unity of groups is fear of the internal forces of disruption. Analysis knows something of these forces in the individual, how they are aroused, or increased, in infancy by frustration, how they may develop to enormous proportions under the influence of an unfavourable interplay between experience and phantasy, and how they are continually revived by the inevitable tensions of later social life. They threaten the integrity both of what the individual feels to be good within himself and of the group which, to his eyes, mirrors his internal composition. They are therefore a constant source of anxiety for the safety of himself and all he loves, which moreover increases, and is inextricably interwoven with, his anxiety about the material dangers threatening from without. The magical or religious ceremony may thus be conceived as a collective obsessional symptom which reduces the anxiety of each individual and, by controlling or canalizing his unconscious aggression, also increases the defensive integrity of the group. In this, the sharing of a pleasurable release of tension must also often play its part.

Roger E. Money-Kyrle.

ERRATUM

In the paper by A. Fodor, 'Mosaic Prohibition against Cooking the Suckling in its Mother's Milk', Vol. XXVII, parts 3 and 4, p. 143, lines 32 and 40, and p. 144, line 2, to read: Shaddai *instead of* Schadaz.